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INTRODUCTION 
LIFE AND -^QRKS OF AL-GHAZALI 
Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn 
• • • • 
Ahmad, al-Ghazal i i s regarded as the Proof of Islam 
(Hujjat a l - I s l a m ) , the Jewel of Religion (Zayn al-DIn) 
and the Renewer of Religion (Mujaddid), Often he i s 
accorded the same s t a t u s as the four Imams of Sunni f iqh. 
He was a great reformer whose reforms refined and enriched 
the r e l i g i o n . I t i s he to whom goes the c r e d i t of combin-
ing the Islamic orthodoxy with mysticism without degrading 
e i t h e r . He i s the pioneer of the l a t e r Ash'ariyyah system 
of Kalam, 
Al-Ghazali was born at Tabran in d i s t r i c t Tus in 
Khurasan in H. 450/A.D. 1058. ' G h a z a l i ' l s h is a l i a s about 
whose or ig in there i s some controversy. According to some 
scholars i t i s derived from^Ghazzali* which l i t e r a l l y means 
'one who weaves r o p e ' , which was perhaps the profession of 
a l -Ghaza l i ' s f a t h e r . That i s why ' a l -Ghaza l i ' i s some times 
wr i t t en as ' a l - G h a z z a l i ' a l s o . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to know 
tha t re l ig ious teaching was so common those days tha t people 
belonging to even the working and poor c l a s ses could receive 
highest knowledge and a t t a i n high pos i t ions in the cour ts 
and the adminis t ra t ion . This assumption gains credence 
from the fact t h a t many of the great theologians and scholars 
of t ha t time belonged to such c l a s ses ; for example Im"am 
Abu Hanifah was a c lo th merchant. Imam Abu J a ' f a r was a 
Shroud s e l l e r , Allamah Quffal Maruzi was an ironmonger. 
These professions were not looked down upon and people 
were not ashamed of being named af te r t h e i r p rofess ions . 
So a l -Ghaza l i ' s fa ther might have been a ghazzal or a 
rope-weaver. But some other scholars , among whom i s 
Shaykh Muhi al-Din, the seventh descendant of a l -Ghaza l i ' s 
own family, hold that 'Ghazidi ' i s derived from 'Ghazala' 
which was the name of the v i l l age in Tus to which a l -
Ghazali belonged. But t h i s l a t t e r view i s not widely 
accepted, 
Al-Ghazali 's fa ther himself was not mugh educated 
but c e r t a i h l y he knew i t s va lue , as at the time of his 
death he put h is two sons^ Hamid al-Ghazali and Aljmad a l -
Ghazali^under the ward of one of his fr iends for a proper 
education. Thus the primary education of a''.-Ghazali in 
theology and jurisprudence was completed in Tus by Shaykh 
Ahmad bin Muhammed al-Radhkhanl. After tha t he went to 
Jurjan to study under Imam Abu Nasr I s m a ' i l i . After return-
ing from Jurjan he memorised a l l h is tex t books within 
three years and acquired maturity over them. 
For further study al-Ghazali had to choose between 
Baghdad and Nishapur which were considered the main cent res 
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of higher education of the t ime. •Allamah Abu Ishaq 
ShirazI and *Abd-al-Malik, Diya-al-Din Imam al-Harraayn 
were connected to these two centres r e spec t ive ly at that 
t ime. Since Nishapur was nearer , a l-Ghazal i decided to 
go there for higher education, espec ia l ly in theology 
and jurisprudence, under Imam al-Harmayn. He remained 
there t i l l H. 478/A.D. 1085 when his teacher d ied . He 
displayed an extraordinary i n t e l l i gence and pene t r a t ive 
vis ion from the beginning of his childhood. His teacher 
used to c a l l him Bahr-e-Zakkhar or 'deep ocean ' . He 
gained considerable reputa t ion in the very l i f e time of 
h is teacher and wrote various outstanding books. Here 
he was also a t t r ac ted to Sufism and became a d i s c i p l e of 
' Ali-al-Farmadhi a l -Tus i , a great mystic who himself was 
a d i sc ip le of a l -Ghaza l l ' s uncle . From al-Faramadhi he 
learn t much about the theory and p rac t i ce of Sufism. He 
even practiced rigorous asce t ic and mystical exe rc i s e s . 
But he could not a t t a i n to the proper exalted stage of h is 
predecessors . But t h i s a t t r a c t i o n to Sufism was not a l l 
in vain. His c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e was coupled with dogmatic 
orthodoxy which l a t e r on prompted him to j u s t i f y mysticism 
which so far had been considered as heresy. 
Al-Ghazali was twenty eight years old when he l e f t 
Nishapur. But he was so equipped with knowledge tha t he 
had no p a r a l l e l in the whole Muslim world. At the age of 
t h i r t y four in H, 4 8 4 / A . D . 1091 he was appointed Professor 
at the Nizamiyyah Academy of Baghdad by Nizam al-Mulk, the 
v i z i r of the Seldjuk princedom. This was a highly p r e s t i -
gious sea t . Henceforth he enjoyed great r epu ta t i on . Within 
a short span of time he achieved unprecedented fame in j u r i s -
prudence, administrat ion, learning and t each ing . His l ec tu re s 
were attended by three hundred teachers , nobles and men of 
high ranks. In addit ion to the l ec tu re s he also del ivered 
sermons on various aspects of r e l i g ion . 
The land of Baghdad those days was famous for i t s 
secular sentiments as there was fu l l freedom of expression 
for the followers of a l l the r e l i g i o n s , sec t s and sub-sects 
l i k e the Shi 'ah , SunnI, Mu' tazi lah, Chr i s t i an e t c . to profess 
and propagate t he i r b e l i e f s , Al-Ghazali used to meet a l l 
of them and understand t h e i r ideas and approaches. Here he 
thoroughly went through the works of the phi losophers , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y those of al-Farabi and Ibn-Sina, I t i s shor t ly 
a f t e r these consultat ions tha t he composed h i s famous work 
Tahafut a l -Fa las i fah . 
By the end of four years of h is stay in Baghdad he 
f e l t a serious i n t e l l e c t u a l discontent r e s u l t i n g in a deep 
s p i r i t u a l c r i s i s . He was confronted by the con f l i c t i ng 
be l i e f s in various re l ig ions and fa i ths each claiming to 
embody the t r u t h . His a t t i t u d e turned into scept ic ism. In 
h i s own words. 
"From the very beginning I had a natural 
tendency of inquiry , which gradually had 
the e f f e c t of breaking up the l i m i t a t i o n s 
of dogmatic f a i t h ( t a q l i d ) ; the value of 
b e l i e f s imprinted i n the mind from the 
childhood s tarted fading away, I thought 
that the type of b e l i e f we have i s held 
by Christ ians and Jews a l s o . Truth 
excludes any s ign of doubt. For example 
the fact that the number ten i s greater 
than the number three i s ev ident . Now, 
i f a person says , "No, three i s greater", 
and he attempts to demonstrate h i s conten-
t i o n by turning a s t i c k into a snake, I 
would say that turning of s t i c k into snake 
i s extremely amazing but i t hardly a l t e r ^ 
the b e l i e f that ten i s greater than three ," 
So h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l unrest and h i s longing to get 
arrive at s e l f - e v i d e n t truth aroused him from h i s dog-
matic slumber. This subsequently led him towards scept ic i sm. 
His was, what Hume c a l l s , 'antecedent ' s cept i c i sm. I t was 
a procedure by which, before any sort of examination of our 
f a c u l t i e s or method of reasoning, we doubt them a l l and 
demand some antecedent i n f a l l i b l e c r i t e r i o n for deciding 
which f a c u l t i e s , i f any, to t r u s t . I t i s d i f f eren t from 
the type of sceptic ism which i s ca l l ed ' consequen t ' s c e p t i -
cism, s ince i t uses doubt on ly as a means, and not as an 
end in i t s e l f . Al-Ghazali doubted , not for t h e sake of 
doubt , but for f ind ing out the p r i n c i p l e t h a t would be t h e 
foundat ion of va l id knowledge. 
During t h i s s t age a l - G h a z a l i went through a l l the 
e s s e n t i a l d o c t r i n e s concerned wi th Mutakall imun, B a t i n i y y a h , 
1. S h i b l i Numani, Al-Ghazal i (Marif P re s s Azamgarh, 1955) 
pp . 13-14 (UrduT 
philosophers and Sufis as these four schools were mainly 
on the scene those days. He studied a l a rge number of 
books on the science of r e l i g i o n but h is i n t e l l e c t u a l 
t h i r s t could not be quenched. On mysticism he studied 
whatever he found on Junaid Baghdadi, Shibl l and Bayazld 
Bustaml. He went through Qut al-Qutub of Abu Talib Makkl. 
But a l l t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge could not produce any 
pos i t i ve r e s u l t . He real ized tha t the observat ion of 
mystical p rac t i ces i s the only so lu t ion . His r e s t l e s s n e s s 
reached the s t a t e where he phys ica l ly col lapsed due to 
f a i l u r e of d iges t ive funct ioning. His deep phys ica l and 
s p i r i t u a l anguish did not allow him to continue h i s regular 
teaching. Therefore, he u l t imate ly resolved for s p i r i t u a l 
t r a v a i l . He made a l l the provis ion for the l ive l ihood of 
ch i ldren . Then he announced tha t he was going to Mecca 
while p r iva te ly he made a l l the arrangements to go to 
Damascus. Thus leaving a l l behind in H, 488/A,D. 1095, he 
proceeded towards Syria. He was t h i r t y seven years old 
at that time. The s t a t e in which he l e f t Baghdad was a 
s t a t e of great urge and remembrance. Instead of luxurious 
and cos t ly garments he covered himself with a rug and 
depended on common vegetables r a the r than de l i c ious food 
for subsis tence. 
Al-Ghazali stayed in Damascus for two years . There 
i t was his da i ly routine to go to the top of the one of 
t he minarets of the Omayyad mosque and shut himself for the 
whole day to observe r e l i g ious and mystical e x e r c i s e s . But 
soon h is presence in Damascus could remain no longer s e c r e t . 
Then he s tar ted to de l ive r l e c t u r e s on r e l i g i o u s ma t t e r s . 
After nearly two years he moved towards Jeruselam and reached 
Maqam-e-Khalil where Abraham and other prophets , I ssac and 
Jocob, are buried. For a proper detachment from the world and 
for fu l l concentrat ion towards the s p i r i t u a l l i f e he took three 
oaths there making Abraham as the witness: (1) never to p a r t i -
c ipa te in public d iscuss ions on the topics concerning various 
sec t s and the i r b e l i e f s , ( i i ) never to attend any cour t for 
honour and reputa t ion , and ( i i i ) never to accept any reward 
or post of p r o f i t . 
Later on al-Ghazali went for pilgrimage to Mecca and 
Medina with the in t en t ion of Haj. He stayed in the Holy City 
for a long time and then proceeded towards Egypt and Alexandria. 
Thus he wandered from one holy 'p lace to another for ten yea r s . 
During these days he often used to r e t r e a t in to so l i tude to 
prac t ice the mystical course of for ty days ( C h i l l a h ) , According 
to Ibn a l -Athi r , al-Ghazali wrote h is renowned book Itiya ' Ulum 
al-DIn during thi ; 
t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . 
1 
s per iod. But some scholars have questioned 
1. Shibli Nu'mani; I b i d . , p . 19. 
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Meanwhile Sultan Fakhr al-Kulk offered al-Ghazal i the 
Chair of Nizamiyyah College of Nishapur. By t h i s time a l -
Ghazali had found enlightenment and he decided to r e s to re 
the re l ig ious values disrupted by philosophers and l o g i c i a n s . 
So he accepted the proposal . But he could not stay there for 
a long time due to unfavourable p o l i t i c a l condi t ions and the 
eventual murder of Fakhr al-Kulk by a Batiniyyah. So he l e f t 
the Nizamiyyah College and returned to h is nat ive place Tus 
i n H, 4 9 9 / A . D . 1105 where he es tab l i shed a Khanqah and a 
school of h i s own and s t a r t ed teaching theology and tasawwuf 
u n t i l h i s l a s t day. Meanwhile Sultan Malik Shah, who was one 
of the followers of Imam AbU yanifah took i ssue with al-Ghazali 
because the l a t t e r had c r i t i c i s e d Imam Abu Hanifah in h i s book 
Mankhul. As a matter of fac t t h i s confrontat ion was the r e s u l t 
of false propaganda by a l -Ghaza l i ' s r i v a l s against him since 
he was a follower of Imam S h a f i ' i . But t h i s i s sue was eas i ly 
resolved by al-Ghazali by showing tha t he held Abu Hanifah 
in high esteem as was c lear from the fact tha t he had wr i t t en 
in his book Ihya^ *^ Ulum al-Din tha t h i s (AbTi Hanifah's) 
author i ty in jurisprudence was unpara l le led . On t h i s point 
the Sultan himself agreed with a l -Ghazal i . He pressed a l -
Ghazali to accept the cha i r of Nizamiyyah Academy of Baghdad 
but he refused i t as he did not wish to leave Tijs. Here he 
was ful ly devoted to study and teaching his d i s c i p l e s . Here 
he got the c e r t i f i c a t e of being an author i ty on gahih al-3ukharl 
and Muslim from a reno»vned t r a d i t i o n a l i s t Hafiz 'Umar bin Abl 
al-Hasan al-RadasI. 
The r e s t of h is l i f e was very t r a n q u i l . He died on 
the 14th of Jimad al-ThanI H. 505/the 19th of December I I I I . 
I t was Monday when he woke up ear ly in the morning and offered 
h i s usual prayer . He asked h is younger b ro the r , Ahmad a l -
Ghazali , to bring h i s white shroud. He kissed i t and s t re tched 
himself fu l l l eng th . Then he sa id , "Lord, I respect your order" 
and breathed h is l a s t . 
Works of al-Ghazali 
As an author the p r o l i f i c i t y of al-Ghazali i s a s ton i sh-
i n g . He had a span of l i f e of f i f t y four years during which 
he wrote more than seventy f ive books. I f c a l cu l a t ed , he wrote 
s ix teen pages a day. This average seen against the backdrop 
of his busy, eventful l i f e i s indeed ext raord inary . He wrote 
on theology, e t h i c s , mysticism. Jurisprudence, log ic and ph i lo -
sophy. And a l l h i s wr i t ings , during h is l i f e time as well as 
today af ter nearly nine hundred years l a t e r , have been held 
in grea ter esteem as venerable c l a s s i c s f u l l of r e l i g ious 
wisdom and phi losophical i n s igh t , A l i s t of h is works roughly 
in chronological order i s given below. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AL-GHAZALI'S WORKS IN ROUGH CHRONOLOGICAL 
ORDER:^ 
From H. 463 to H. 478; 
1. Al-Ta' l iqah f i Farugh al-Madhahab.'' 
2 . Al-Mankhul f i al-UsQl. ^ 
During Teaching and Discussion; 
3 . Al-Baslt f i al-Furu»^ 
4. Al-Waslt.. 
5 . Al-Wajizah. 
6. Khuliisah al-Mukhtasar wa Nlqawah a l -Mu' tasar . 
7 . Al-Muntasahal f l ' I lm a l - J a d a l . 
8. Makhldh a l -Khi laf . 
9 . Labab al-Nazar. 
10. Tahsil al-Ma'akhidh f i ' I lm al -Khi laf . 
1 1 . Al-Mubadi wa al-Ghayat, 
12. Shifa' a l -Ghal l l f i al-Qiyas wa a l - T a l i l . 
13 . Fatawa a l -Ghazal l . 
14. Fatawa ( f i Yazld). 
15. Ghayat al-Ghaur f l Darayah al-Dawr. 
16. Maqasid ^1-Fa las i f ah . ; 
17. Tahafut a l - F a l a s i f a h . / 
18. Mi'yar a l - ' I l m f i fan al-Mantiq. 
19. Mi'yar a l - 'Uqu l . 
20. Mahak al-Nazar f i al-Mantiq. 
2 1 . MIzan al- 'Amal. 
1 . cf . Abu Hamid Imam Muljamme^  Ghazali Tusi, Klmiya-e-Sa'^adat 
(Pers ian) , ed. Husayn Khadiw Jam, (Shirkat In t i sha ra t 
•^Ilml wa Farhangi), Vol. I , " Int roduct ion" , pp. 35-37. 
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2 2 . Al-Mustaz 'ahar i f i a l R a d ' a l a a l - B a t i n i y y a h . 
2 3 . HuJJat a l -Haq. 
24 . Qawa§im a l - B a t i n i y y a h , 
2 5 . A l - Iq t i s ad f l a l - I ' t i q a d . 
2 6 . Al-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah f i Qawaid a l . ' Aql iyyah. 
2 7 . Al-Ma*arif 'Aql iyyah wa L a b a h a l Hikamah a l - ' I l a h i y y a h . 
During the S t a t e of Reclus lon; 
From H. 488 to H. 499 
2 8 . Ihya 'Ulum al-Din.^ 
2 9 . K i t i b f i Mas^^ah Kul Mujtahid Muslb. 
30 . Jawab a l -Ghaza l i *'An Da'wah MuPd al-Mulk Lahu. 
3 1 . Jawab Mufassal a l - K h l l a f . 
3 2 . Jawab a l - M a s i ' i l al-Arba^ a l - l a t i S a ' a l a h a a l - B a t i n l y y a h 
b i Hamad an min Abi Hamid a l - G h a z a l l . 
3 3 . Al-Maqfad al—' Asna f l Asma' Allah a l -Husnah . / 
34 . Risa lah f i Ruju*" Asma-* Al lah *'ala DhSt Waljidah ' ' a la 
r a ^ i al-Mu*'tazilah w a . a l - F a l a S i f a h . 
35 . Bidayat a l -Hidayah. 
36 . Kitab al-WaJTz f l a l - F i q h . 
37 . Jawahir a l - Q u r ' a n , 
3 8 . Kitab a l Arbaln f l Usui a l - D i n . 
3 9 . KitSb al-Madnun b i h l •'AlaGhayr A h l i h i . 
4 0 . Al-Madnun b i h i 'Ala A h l i h i . 
4 1 . Kitab a l -Dur j al-Marqum. 
4 2 . Al-Qis tas al-MustaqIm. 
4 3 . F a i s a l a l -Tafarqah Bayn a l - I s l a r a wa a l - Z i n d i q a h . 
44 . Al-Qanun a l - K u l l a f i a l - t a w l l . 
u 
4 5 . Klmiya-i-Sa'adat ( P e r s i a n ) . . 
46 . Iha al Walad. 
47. Asrar Mu''amalat a l -DIn. 
4 8 . Zad-e-Akhirat ( P e r s i a n ) . 
49 . Risalah i l a Abi a l -Fath Ahmad ibn SalSmah. 
* • 
5 0 . Al-Risalah al Laduniyyah. 
5 1 . Risalah i l a Ba^ 'd ahl Asrah. 
52 . Mishkat al-Anwar. -
5 3 . Tafs ir Yaqut al-Ta-'wIl. 
54 . Al-Kashf wa al-Tabyln. 
55 . Talbis I b l i s . . 
During Return to Teaching (Second phase): 
From H. 499 to H. 503. 
56. Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal.^ 
57. Kutub fl al-Sahr wa al-Khawas al-KImiya*. 
58. Ghawr al-Dawr fi al-Masalah al-SarlJiyyah. 
59. Tahdhib al-Usul. — 
So, Kitab Haqiqat al-Qawlayn. 
61. Kitab As5s al-Qiyas. 
6 2 . Ki tab Haqiqat a l -Qur*an . 
6 3 . Al-Mustasfa min * I^lm a l - U s u l . 
64 . Al-Imla' ' 'a la-Mushkil " a l - I h y a " . 
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During the Last Years of His Life; 
From H. 303 to H. 305. 
65. A l - I s t i d r a j . 
66. Al-Durrat al-Fakhirah f i Kashf '^ Ulum al-Akhirah. 
67. S i r r al-^Alamln wa Kashf ma'fi al-Darayn. 
68. Na^ihat al-Muluk (Pe r s i an ) , 
69. Jawab Masa-*!! Sa-'al ""anha f l Nu§us Ashkalat ^ a l a ' a l -
Masai'l* 
70. Risalah al-Aqtab. 
7 1 . Minhaj al-^Abidin. 
7 2 . Al-Jam al-^Awam. 
CHAPTER - I 
PRE-GHAZALI TRADITION OF PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM^ 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AL-FARABI AND IBrJ SINA 
Islam is a religion that postulates a way of life 
ensuring social justice and goodwill. It fully endorses genu-
inely progressive sentiments, since the seeds of growth 
and development are ingrained in its flexible philosophy. 
This character of Islam enormously influenced the Muslims 
to strive to understand the truth, whether metaphysical or 
epistemological, through Reason, They receive this inspi-
ration for Truth through Reason from the Qur'ah, the Holy 
Book, since it greatly emphasises the importance of Hikmat 
or Rationalism, as it says, "and he unto whom wisdom is 
given, he truly hath received abundant good". The main 
purpose for which prophet Muhammed (S) was deputed by God 
was "...to recite unto them (the unlettered people) His 
revelations and to make them grow, and to teach them the 
2 _ 
scripture and Wisdom". Not only this, the Our'an also 
emphasized the importance of observation and experimentation 
which form the basis of scientific induction. Iqbal has 
rightly pointed it out in The Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought in I si am.-^  It may be Justifiably claimed that 
1. The Holy Qur''5n, II, 269, All the references to the 
Qur'"an are taken from the translation of Muhammed 
Marmaduke Pickthall. 
2. Ibid.. LXII, 2. 
3. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought in Islam (Oriental Publishers and Distributors, 
Belhi', 19Vb), Chap. I. 
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Isl'am sought to cultivate scientific temperament among 
Muslims. So it is clear that the followers of the Prophet (s) 
were exhorted to develop the art of Hikmat or rational 
thinking. This outlook went through various stages of deve-
lopment and acquired different forms in course of time. It 
started with the common sense reasoning of the early orthodox 
schools and gradually matured into rigorous logical approaches 
It included all the traditional branches of philosophy which 
are found in the schools of ancient classical philosophers 
like Plato and Aristotle, Early Muslim philosophers dealt 
not only with metaphysics, mysticism, logic, ethics and episte-
mology but other branches also, like astronomy, geography, 
music, medicine, arts, mathematics, physics, philology. Juris-
prudence, grammer, astrology, psychology, rhetoric, politics 
etc. They also discussed enormously the perennial problems 
of philosophy such as those of freedom of will, space and 
time, causation, creation, eternity etc. 
The approaches of Muslim philosophers covered both 
esoteric and exoteric aspect of reasoning. Some of the un-
precedented philosophical insights of Muslim philosophers 
have greatly influenced the later developments of philosophy 
in both Medieval and Modern Western philosophy. For instance, 
in the Medieval period the influence of al-Farabl can easily 
be traced in the argument regarding the relation between 
Necessary Being and Contingent Being given by St. Thomas 
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Aquinas. Similar ly , i n modern Western philosophy the 
method of doubt discussed by Descartes in Discours de l a 
Hethode i s very close to a l -Ghaza l i ' s technique discussed 
in Al~Munqidh min a l Qal'al which he wrote some f ive years 
before his death. So those who doubt the o r i g i n a l i t y of 
Muslim thinkers and hold tha t they were simply the commen-
t a t o r s of Plato and A r i s t o t l e , are gravely mistaken. In-
fact t h e i r knowledge of these philosophers i s very p a r t i a l 
and biased by re l ig ious p re jud ices . I t i s t r ue tha t the 
p e r i p a t e t i c approach occupied a large space in t h e i r works, 
espec ia l ly in that of a l -Farabi and Ibn Slna, but l a t e r on 
i t faded away. By the time of al-Ghazali t h i s impact had 
breathed i t s l a s t , Al-Ghazali himself had a great aversion 
for Greek philosophers and t h e i r Muslim followers which 
became exp l i c i t in h is Tah"afut al-fal"asif ah. And befare 
a l -Farab i , except for al-Kindi who was s l i g h t l y influenced 
by Aric^totle, the influence of Plato and Ar i s to t l e on the 
Muslim thinkers is to ta l ly absent. The Greek influence spread 
i n the Muslim i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s af ter the Greek ph i loso-
phical t ex t s became access ible to them, 
v;e find that the ground for the future phi losophical 
a c t i v i t i e s was already prepared by the Qur'ah i t s e l f when i t 
declared the super ior i ty of reason. The beginning was qui te 
natural and simple, for c e r t a i n issues of r e l i g i o u s s i g n i f i -
cance were discussed in the l igh t of reason. For ins tance 
there were differences among the companions of the Prophet (S) 
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regarding to the nature of the Prophet ' s ascension (Mi*raj) 
to heaven, whether i t was physica l or s p i r i t u a l . Within 
t h i r t y years of the Prophet ' s death the condi t ions changed 
in the Muslim world and gave r i s e to the emergence of various 
s e c t s , v i z . , AI;il al-Sunnah. the Shi*a and the Khawari.1. Among 
Abl al-Sunnah themselves, who formed the majority of the 
Muslims, there was short difference of opinions regarding 
the problem of the freedom of w i l l . The Banu Omaiyyah 
ru le r s and t h e i r o f f i c i a l s are alleged to have v io la ted the 
Islamic teaching of democracy and j u s t i c e for which they were 
c r i t i c i s e d by a sec t ion of the companions of the Prophet(S) and 
the i r descendants. These circumstances were responsible for 
the controversy regarding the human freedom. The Banu Omaiyyah 
took recourse to the Qur'ahic verses tha t emphasise a l l power-
fulness of God and contended that man was he lp les s having 
no freedom,and tha t whateveft* occurs i s willed by God. The 
supporters of t h i s view are known in the h i s to ry of Muslim 
philosophy as the f a t a l i s t s ( J a b r i t e s ) . Another group 
disputed th i s pos i t ion quoting from the Qur'an severa l verses 
which hold man responsible for h is a c t s . They champion 
freedom of man. They were ca l led the Qadr i tes . Later on the 
Qadarites view was supported by the M u ' t a z i l i t e s , who 
may be cal led the f i r s t systematic th inkers . Their philosophy 
was d i a l e c t i c a l in nature i n theologica l in cha rac te r . They 
were the people who paved the way of development of systematic 
philosophical thinking in Islam tha t culminated in the 
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philosophy of the peripatetic thinkers. Side by side 
another trend found currency in the Muslim world that 
represents the esoteric philosophy of Sufis. This was 
also a reaction against the Banu Omaivvah rule. In the 
beginning we find only some stray sayings of early Sufis 
which in course of time were developed into systematic 
Sufi doctrines. Early Sufis were not aware of Greek philo-
sophy and philosophers or any other alien philosophy. The 
claims of the orientalists that philosophy and Sufism were 
alien to Islam and were imported in the Muslim world through 
various sources are totally unfounded. It was really the 
Qur-* an and Sunn ah that may be regarded as the main sources 
of Islamic hikmah. The exegetes (Mufassirun) of the Qur-* an 
and Jurist (Fugaha) also contributed to the development of 
the rational thought through their effort to analyse and 
interpret the Qur^ an and Sunnah in the light of reason. 
An outstanding personality of the earliest gneration 
was ''Imran bin Husain al-Khuza-"!, also known as Ibn al-Kalbi, 
One of his disciples was Hasan al-Basri, a great figure of 
the time who enormously influenced the later developments 
in I^lm al-Kalam. His piety, gentleness and asceticism 
were legendary even in his life time. He founded a school 
of thought, which is responsible for the beginning of 
philosophy in Islam. He believed in the Beatific Vision 
of Ck)d. He taught theology, t?fsir or the wur'anic 
l i i 
commentary, the Kallm or d i a l e c t i c a l philosophy of r e l i g ion 
as well as law and grammar. This was the time when besides 
J a b r i t e s and Qadari tes , several other schools were propagat-
ing t h e i r views. These were Khar i j i tes who had strong 
p o l i t i c a l prejudices and acknowledged none except the f i r s t 
three Cal iphs. The Murjites claimed that f a i t h alone i s 
suff ic ient for sa lva t ion . 
Among Hasan a l - B a s r i ' s d i sc ip les some adopted the 
d i a l e c t i c a l or scho las t i c method of philosophy or Kalam 
and so were cal led Mutakallimun. They were the precursors 
of the l a t e r phi losophical development. This school, known 
as Nutazilism or Muslim ra t ional ism, was found by Wasil ibn 
'Ata (80/699-131/7-^) ih the very l i f e time of Imam Hasan 
a l -Bas r i . This school was the champion of two grea t p r inc ip le s 
viz.. Divine Unity and Divine Jus t i ce which correspond to man's 
r a t iona l equipment. Later on, the extreme r a t i o n a l i s t i c 
a t t i t u d e of the l a t e r Mu ' t a z i l i t e s was opposed by the or tho-
dox school of the Ash'arism, established by Abu al-Hasan 
*Ali bin Isma^Il al-Ash*ari (270/873-330/941). The Ash 'a r i t es 
rejected the super io r i ty of reason in favour of r eve l a t i on . 
So they had a d i rec t clash v;ith the Mu'^tazil i tes. On the 
other hand, by the time of the death of Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal 
(d, 244/855) a l l the four Sunni orthodox schools of law, 
which s t i l l e x i s t , were f ina l ly es tab l i shed . 
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The advent of philosophy, in the Muslim world, in 
the real sense, can oe associated with the Arab scholar 
Abu Yusuf al-Kindi (185/801-260/875), who was the f i r s t 
Muslim philosopher, and is r i gh t ly cal led "the philosopher 
of the Arabs". Caliph al-Mamun was much impressed by h i s 
scholarship and entrusted him with the task of t r a n s l a t i n g 
the works of A r i s t o t l e . Al-Kindi also did p r o l i f i c personal 
reseaxx;h and l e f t some two hundred works on philosophy, 
mathematics, op t i c s , medicine, astronomy, p o l i t i c s , music, 
l o g i c , astrology and psychology. But s ince most of these 
books have been l o s t , i t is d i f f i c u l t to determine h i s 
exact philosophical cont r ibu t ion . In the Dar al-Hikmah, 
establ ished by HarTin al-Rashid and l a t e r patronised by a l -
Mamdn, more than a hundred scholars t r a n s l a t e d the works of 
Greek, neo-Platonic, Indian and Buddhist works on philosophy, 
r e l ig ion , medicine, astronomy, mathematics and various branches 
of physical and na tura l sciences. But a l l of them were t r a n s -
l a to r s and did not develop any philosophy of t h e i r own. So 
i t i s a l -Fa r lb l who i s considered as the f i r s t o r i g i n a l 
Muslim philosopher. In the context of a l -Ghaza l i ' s c r i t i c i s m 
of the philosophers we are concerned with al-Far"abi and Ibn-
Sina, the two great pe r sona l i t i e s recognized by al-Ghazal i 
as the philosophers who were considered by him as t rue 
followers of Greek philosophers. The polemic of al-Ghaz51i 
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i s mainly d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t he se two p h i l o s o p h e r s , e s p e -
c i a l l y Ibn S ina , 
AL-FAR2BT: 
Mohammed i b n Mohammed ibn Tarkhan Nasr a l - F a r a b i , 
t h e g r e a t e s t p h i l o s o p h e r of IslSm before Ibn S i n a , was 
bo rn i n a Turkish fami ly i n about 258/870 and d ied i n 
339/950 . I n the words of i b n Kha l l ikan he was "a c e l e b r a t e d 
p h i l o s o p h e r , t he g r e a t e s t indeed tha t the Muslims ever had. 
He composed a number of works on l o g i c , music and o t h e r 
s c i e n c e s . No Musulman ever reached i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
s c i e n c e s the same rank as h e , and i t was by t h e s tudy of 
h i s w r i t i n g s and t h e i m i t a t i o n of h i s s t y l e t h a t Avicenna 
a t t a i n e d p r o f i c i e n c y and rendered h i s own works so u s e f u l " . 
The p r a i s e by I b a Kha l l i kan may be s l i g h t l y e x a g g e r a t e d , 
but t h e r e i s no doubt about h i s g r e a t n e s s . His ph i losophy 
s e t the s tandard fo r s c h o l a r l y s p e c u l a t i o n bo th i n the 
East and t h e West. He i s p a r t i c u l a r l y c e l e b r a t e d as a 
commentator on A r i s t o t l e . His work i n t h i s f i e l d has won 
him the name a l -Mu^al l im a l - T h a n I , t h e second t eache r i . e . , 
successor to the f i r s t t e a c h e r , A r i s t o t l e . However, h i s 
l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t i e s a re not l i m i t e d to the e x p o s i t i o n of 
1 . De Lacy 0 ' Leary , Arabic Thought and i t s P lace i n H i s to ry 
(Kegan Pau l , Trench, Trubner and Co. L t d . , London, 1939) , 
p . 143. 
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Greek t e x t s , on t he contrary, he wrote a large number of 
or ig ina l works which include h i s psycholog ica l and meta-
physical t r e a t i s e s on I n t e l l i g e n c e ( ' a q l ) and the i n t e l l i -
g i b l e , on the soul (nafs) and the f a c u l t i e s of the sou l , 
the One and the Unity substance, time, space and measure. 
He also strove for a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between Plato and 
A r i s t o t l e and for t h i s purpose he has wr i t t en Kitab a l -
Jama^ bayna Ra'ya al-Ijakimayn Aflatun a l - I l a h i wa A r i s t Q t a l i s . 
He also wrote two important books on Model c i t y , Risalah fX 
Ara AixL al-Madlnah a l -Fadi lah and t h i r t y four chapters 
which depic t s the inf luence of P l a t o . In i t he exp la ins 
h i s conception of the organizat ion of the perfect c i t y which 
should be governed by i t s wise men. Another of h i s works 
related to t h i s i s s u e i s Tabsll al-Sa*adah on e t h i c a l and 
s o c i a l philosophy. He also discussed e x t e n s i v e l y l o g i c 
and grammar e t c . According to him l o g i c stands in the same 
r e l a t i o n to i n t e l l i g i b l e s as grammar to words. Ho cons ide red 
r h e t o r i c and p o e t i c s as oranches of l o g i c . He has been 
acclaimed for h i s exposit i-^n of A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c which i s 
so luc id t h a t i t became e a s i l y unders tandab le even to the 
comnon Arabs. 
The main p a r t of a l - F ^ r S b l s phi losophy comprises n i s 
cosmological and p s v c h o l o - i c a l t h e o r i e s tha t exDOunds h i s 
theory of I n t e l l i g e n c e ( ' a q l awwal) and i n t e l l e c t ( ' a q l ) 
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which explains the Kind ol relationship beiween God and 
the Universe. This is explained in his theory of emanation. 
3y virtue of the self kno^ wledje and goodness of the Necessary 
Being the first intelligence emanates from it. Here know-
ing and oeing are identical in the pure aosolute idealistic 
sense. The first intelligence is both possible and necessary. 
It is a possible being by itself and necessary with respect 
to the Necessary Being, It is possible with regard to its 
own essence because it is its cause v/hich is responsible 
for its existence, i.e., if cause is absent, it will not 
originate. The concept of the first intelligence antici-
pates objective or pluralistic idealism. It has three 
kinds of knowledge: Of the First Being, of its own essence 
in so far it is necessary, and of its possible being. From 
the first intelligence emanates three beings: the second 
intelligence, the first soul and the first sphere. The reason 
of the emanation of the second intelligence is the contemp-
lation of the One by the first intelligence while the reason 
of the first soul and the first sphere is the first intelli-
gence's contemplation of its own necessary and possible 
existences respectively. And this process continues until 
the tenth intelligence and ninth sphere emanate. 
The emanation of the ten intelligences constitutes 
a hierarchy. The first intelligence is the nearest to the 
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First Being and has the highest place; it is superior to 
all the others. It is farthest away from matter which 
comes lowest in the hierarchy. The earth, which is immobile 
is the centre of the system. Eight planetary spheres rotate 
round the earth, and beyond the ninth sphere is the sphere 
of the fixed stars. All the spheres move eternally in circles 
and their movers are their souls which get power from the 
intelligences to which they directly belong. But the ultimate 
mover of all the spheres is the First Being towards whom are 
orientated all the ten intelligences and from whom they 
receive their forms and perfection. The tenth intelligence, 
which is the mover of the lowest sphere acts in our world. 
It produces the first matter (Hayula) which is passive and 
receives its form the intelligence it directly belongs. The 
first matter is the basis of the four elements whose inte-
gration and disentegration decide the generation and collapse 
of the bodies under the regulation of the divine law. 
The tenth intelligence, also called as active intelli-
gence, gives each body a soul. The soul is a simple unana-
lysable, unique, incorporeal and immortal substance. The 
active intelligence is the spiritual principle of the soul 
which illuminates the human intellect. The human intellect 
is constituted of three hierarchical parts. The lowest part 
is the vegetative soul whose functions are assimilation. 
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growth and reproduction. The animal soul is higher than 
the vegetative soul and has two aspects, perceptive and 
motive. The perceptive aspect has five external senses, 
of touch, sight, smell, hearing and taste, and five internal 
senses: viz. conception, perception, imagination, sensation 
and memory. The highest is the rational soul with its two 
parts practical and theoretical. Different states of 
affection, liRe pleasure, pain, love, anger, Joy etc. are 
concerned with the practical aspect. The theoretical 
aspect is further divided into four levels (l) the potential 
intellect (''Aql-e Hayulani) i.e. the intellectual power in 
the human being (2) habitual intellect ('Aql fi al-Malak) 
which is the intellect trained for the methods of understand-
ing* (3) the active intellect ('^ Aql fi al-fal) that is the 
intellect that exercises upon the intelligible, and (^ ) the 
acquired intellect ('Aql al-Mustafad) or the intellect which 
is gifted from the tenth or active intelligence ('Aql al-Faal). 
These four stages of human intellect or soul form an ascending 
series of matter and form. The potential intellect gets 
sense-data from the external world while the habitual and 
active souls or intellects derive the actual intelligibles 
from the data. The pure intelligibles are pure forms separated 
from matter and the acquired intellect gets their pure abst-
ract forms. The pure form achieved here is through a process 
of reduction or bracketing. Now, the movement of tlie spheres 
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is affected by a kind of spiritual attraction: the inferior 
sphere is always attracted towards the superior. This 
process is a spiritual dynamism similar to that of Leibuitz, 
where monads are supposed to have tne power of perception 
or representation to receive the higher degree of soirituality^ 
in spite of its dependence on unequal spiritual powers. It 
seems that al-Farabi, the musician, is attempting to introduce 
into tne world of spheres the system of musical harmony in 
the sense that various spheres in their hierarchical form 
constitute a harmonious order like different musical instruments 
in an archestra party that produce the uniform sweet melodious 
1 
tune. 
Al-Farabi holds the p a r a l l e l existence of matter and 
sou l . But they are ul t imately c rea ted . So they are not 
e t e r n a l . Further , al-Far'abi admits the v a l i d i t y of the law 
of c a u s a l i t y . He admits two types of r e l a t i ons between causes 
and ^heir e f fec t s—direc t and i n d i r e c t . The ins tances of 
d i r e c t causat ion present no problem in being t r aced . But 
ins tances of ind i rec t causat ion are too obscure to be discerned. 
This type of causat ion, according to a l -Farab i^ i s applied in 
the a s t ro log ica l c a l c u l a t i o n s . But he rejected as t rology and 
for explaining the connection between such u n i n t e l l i g i b l e 
1. Ibrahim Madkour, "Al-Farabi", M.M.Sharif's e d t . A History 
of Muslim FhilosoD|iv Vol. I , (Otto Harrassowitz, v-'lesbaden, 
1966), p . /+59. 
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connect ion between causes and t h e i r e l f e c t s he invoked 
i nd i r ec t c a u s a l i t y . Thus he be l ieves that even the i n s -
tances which are explained as the r e su l t of chance or 
coincidence have some remote cause. 
So far as a l - F a r a b i ' s theory of emanation i s concerned 
i t i s borrowed from Plot inus and the Alexandrian school 
espec ia l ly from the former. While Plotinus* theory of emana-
t i o n pos i t s three l e v e l s , v i z . Nous, the world-soul and the 
na tu re , a l -Farabi be l ieves t h a t emanation takes plAce i n ten 
descending l e v e l s . However, t h i s ^idea of emanation, though 
l a t e r on most widely accepted, i s e s s en t i a l l y a p o e t i c a l 
metaphor and not a r a t iona l concept. And such a mystical 
explanat ion of c rea t ion is sever ly questioned by some scho-
l a r s . With reference to the neo-Platonic theory of emanation 
W.T.Stace observes: 
"For philosophy i s founded upon reason. 
I t i s the effor t to comprehend, to under-
stand, to grasp the r e a l i t y of th ings 
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y . Therefore i t can not 
admit anything higher than reason. To 
exal t i n t u i t i o n , ecstasy or rapture above 
thought—this i s death to philosophy. 
Philosophy in making such an admission, 
l e t s out i t s own l i f e -b lood , which i s 
thought. I t Neo-Platonism, the re fore , 
ancient philosophy commits su i c ide . This 
i s the end. The place of philosophy i s 
taken henceforth by re l ig ion ." ' ' 
1 . W. T. Stace, A C r i t i c a l History of Greek Philosophy. 
^Macmillan India Limited, 1982;, p . 377. 
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Al-FarabI in his book al-Madlnat al-Fad11ah t r i e d to explain 
prophecy on r a t i o n a l and s c i e n t i f i c grounds. This he did to 
defend the r e l ig ious dogmas from the here t ic propagations 
prevalent at that t ime. Through an explanation of the 
psychic facul ty , he held that i t i s the power of imagination 
which i s responsible for the communion with God (here the 
word ' imaginat ion ' i s used not in the l i t e r a l sense but in 
t h e sense of the facul ty of understanding). The common 
peop le , whose facul ty of imagination i s not so powerful, 
ge t such communion nei ther at night nor during day. Some 
people who are above the common level may get t h i s communion 
i n s leep at n igh t . But the Prophets (AS) have the most powerful 
psych ica l facul ty which can free i t s e l f from the sensuous 
world and can f a c i l i t a t e d i r ec t contact with the agent 
i n t e l l i g e n c e . This would, thereby, lead to a d i r ec t contact 
with God even while awake during the day. This s t a t e i s 
inaccess ib le to the common people, Spme s a i n t s and a sce t i c s 
have achieved th i s power and had communion with God, but 
t h e i r l eve l i s lower than tha t of Prophets(AS). This type of 
t h e view of communion with God does not find a favour with 
A r i s t o t l e who jus t t a l k s about contemplation of phi losophers . 
The in ten t ion of al-Farabi i s to reconc i l i a te philosophic 
explanat ion and re l ig ious be l ie f . He intends to draw a 
p a r a l l e l between contemplation and reve la t ion . And i t wi l l 
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appear that for a l -Far§bl the concept of agent i n t e l l i gence 
as a mediator i s the same as t ha t of Angel as a mediator 
1 for the reve la t ion of r e l i g ious commands. 
So far as the r e l i g i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the concept 
of reward and punishment in the world hereaf te r concerns 
a l -Farab i repudiates bodily pain or pleasure and maintained 
t h a t i t i s the s p i r i t which suffers or enjoys and that the 
body .has nothing to do with such experiences since i t i s no 
longer preserved. This was a great offence of a philosopher 
in the view of a l -Ghaza l i . However, t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
a l -FarSbi i s not any more un-Islamic than the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
given by Muhammed I q b a l , one of the g rea tes t contemporary 
Muslim th inkers , who i n t e r p r e t s the pain in h e l l and pleasure 
i n heaven in terms of mental s t a t e s and repudia tes any spatio-
2 temporal loca t ion of such p l ace s . However, on t h i s t op i c , 
t h e main target of the at tack of a l -Ghaza l i ' s polemic was 
not a l -Fa rab i , but Ibn Sina who adopted the FarSbian symbolic 
explanat ion more se r ious ly . 
1. Ibrahim Madkour, ojg. c i t . , p . 456, 
2. Sir Muhammed Iqba l , Reconstruction of Religious Thought 
in Islam, (Orienta l Publ ica t ion, Delhi, 1975), p . 12^. 
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IBN-SINA; 
Abu All al-Husain ibn 'Abdullah ibn SIna, comronly 
known as Tbn Sina or Avicenna, was born in Afshan near 
Bukhara in 370/980 and died in 428/1037. He i s regarded 
as the f i r s t philosopher of the Arabic language who created 
a ph i losophica l system which i s r ea l ly complete. He i s 
renouned for his very profound influence on the V/est, With 
the Conversion of h i s fa ther into the Isma^il ian sec t , he 
came under t h e i r inf luence . From them he l ea rn t Greek 
philosophy, geometry and ar i thmet ic and then turned to the 
study of orthodox jurisprudence and mystic theology. Later 
on, from an A r i s t o t e l i a n he l ea rn t l o g i c . He also studied 
Eucleadian geometry and medicine. He i s regarded as the 
g r e a t e s t Muslim commentator of Ar i s t o t l e , In t h i s he was 
guided by a l - F a r a b l ' s commentary on A r i s t o t l e . He could 
not understand A r i s t o t l e ' s Metaphysics, as he himself admits, 
u n t i l he found the commentary of al-Farabi on i t . 
Ibn-Sina, l i k e a l -Fa rab i , i s an emanationist and 
h i s theory of c r ea t ion is s imi la r to that of a l - F a r a b i . God 
i s the Necessary Being from whom emanates the f i r s t i n t e l l i -
gence, the poss ib le being. From the f i r s t i n t e l l i g e n c e flow 
1 . A.^l.Goichon, The Philosophy of Avicenna and i t s influence 
on Medieval Euroue, t r . by M.S.Khan (.Motilal Banarsidas, 
£)elhi), p . 5 . ^ 
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two e n t i t i e s , the second i n t e l l i g e n c e and the f i r s t sphere. 
This dual eraanatory process continues u n t i l the emanation 
of the tenth i n t e l l i gence and the ninth sphere. The ten th 
i n t e l l i g e n c e plays the ro le of mediator between God and 
human b.eing. I t i s the Holy Angel. Ibn-SIna ' s theory of 
emanation need not be enlarged much since i t i s s imi la r 
to that of al-FarabI in a l l e s s e n t i a l r e s p e c t s . 
One important issue in the metaphysics of Ibn-Sina to 
which al-Ghazali severely reacted i s tha t of the r e l a t i o n of 
God with the world. The problem of nature could not be 
solved by the Ar i s to t e l i an method which says tha t form and 
matter are the two independent r e a l i t i e s . So Ibn-SIna 
tackled t h i s issue i n the neo-Platonic fashion by conceiving 
God as the Necessary Being, absolutely simple with no indepen-
dent a t t r i b u t e or essence. The s impl ic i ty of God e luc ida tes 
His self—Contemplation. All His a t t r i b u t e s are thus i den t i c a l 
with His being. Thus being pure s p i r i t God i s allknowing. 
But His knov/ledge of other th ings i s e s s e n t i a l l y s imi l a r to 
His knowledge of Himself since a l l things proceed from Him. 
He does not know p a r t i c u l a r s as such except in a un iversa l 
way. The knov/ledge of the p a r t i c u l n s involves sense—percep-
t i o n in a spatiotemporal framework which is not poss ib le for 
God, as He is beyond space and time. This d o c t r i n e , which 
bas ica l ly comes from neo-Platonism, was inimical to the 
perfect ion of God since i t makes Him incapable of knowing 
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an individual as an ind iv idua l . This was against Islamic 
b e l i e f which l a t e r on became the ta rge t of a l -Ghaza l i ' s 
c r i t i c i s m in Tahaful a l -Fa las i fah which we sha l l discuss 
in d e t a i l in Chapter Three, However, according to Ibn-
Sina, since God i s the emanative cause of a l l e x i s t e n t s , He 
knows them in a determinate manner. Each and every modifi-
ca t ion in the p a r t i c u l a r i s already known by God in a 
determinate way as He i s the source of a l l the modif icat ions. 
His spatio-temporal transcendence does not hinder Him from 
the knowledge of the p a r t i c u l a r as such. We sha l l l a t e r 
discuss how even though his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of God's knowledge 
of the individuals was not so much against Islam as imagined 
by al-Ghazali , i t c rea te s some new problems. 
Another very con t rovers ia l i ssue in Ibn-Sina ' s meta-
physics i s about the e t e rn i t y of the world. Ibn-Sina argues 
that from the fact of God's being F i r s t Cause, Omnipotent 
and Creative, i t follows that the effects and manifestat ions 
of His c r e a t i v i t y and Omnipotence must be coterminus with Him. 
His reasoning i s that i t i s inconsis tent with God's e t e rna l 
Omnipotence to maintain that He abstained from i t for a time 
and then released his power in crea t ing tne world. 
Thus crea t ion i s e ternal because God's c r ea t ive power 
i s e t e r n a l . Such a concept of e t e rn i ty i s self-confounding 
because Ibn-Sina i s not aware that he i s l imi t ing the divine 
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l i b e r t y in holding that God must create not only by vi r tue of His 
goodness but also as a necessary consequence of His Omnipo-
tence. And thus , i nd i r ec t l y Ibn-STna l i m i t s God's Omnipo-
tence to what He has produced. This would mean tha t He can 
not produce more than what he has produced because His power 
does not reach fu r the r . The problem here i s r e l a t ed to the 
emphasis on God's a t t r i b u t e of omnipotence and c r e a t i v i t y in 
such a fashion as to p r ac t i ca l l y leads His l i m i t a t i o n . This 
i s the consequence of not taking God's wi l l in to account as 
the c ruc ia l f ac to r . Infac t , God's wil l which was l a t e r on 
elaborated properly by al-Ghazall , i s compatible with both 
God's omnipotence as well as His c r e a t i v i t y . Therefore, i t 
can be held tha t God i s not being l imited by His c r ea t ion or 
what He has produced because the l imited c rea t ion i s in 
accordance with His w i l l . However, the explanat ion, being 
against Islamic be l ie f , was subjected to considerable debate . 
Ibn-STna's contr ibut ion to log ic , medicine and the 
natural sciences also i s of great importance. He laboured 
hard to give equivalent vocabularies in Arabic for Ar i s t o t e l i an 
lof^ic. Certain moods and figures were be t t e r expressed by 
Ibn-SIna in Arabic, About universals h is view i s i d e n t i c a l 
with that of the conceptual i s t s ; i . e . universa ls have no 
existence over and above the pa r t i cu l a r s . They are c l a s s , 
essence subsisted by pa r t i cu la r s without any objec t ive r e a l i t y . 
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They are simply the common characters of the things which 
f a l l under the same c l a s s . Thus, in A r i s t o t e l i a n manner 
Ibn-Sina repudiates the r e a l i t y of the Platonic i d e a s . 
His psychology c o n s i s t s of three types of s o u l ; vege -
t a b l e , animal and human soul . The human soul i s described 
as the rat ional s o u l . The a c t i v i t y of the v e g e t a t i v e soul 
i s l imited to n u t r i t i o n and generat ion and accre t ion by 
growth. The animal soul posses ses the vegetable f a c u l t y plus 
others (perhaps locomation) , The human soul adds yet others 
to these . According to Ibn-Sina the human soul c o n s i s t s of 
two types of f a c u l t i e s - f a c u l t y of perception and that of 
ac t ion . The former includes both external and in terna l per-
cept ions . The facu l ty of external perception c o n s i s t s of 
e ight s e n s e s , v i z . , of s i g h t , hearing, t a s t e , smel l , percep-
t i o n of heat and co ld , of dry and moist , of r e s i s t a n c e by 
hard and sof t and pe rcep t ion of rough and smooth. The four 
f a c u l c i e s of i n t e r n a l p e r c e p t i o n are format ive (al-Musawwirah) 
c o g i t a t i v e (a l -Mufakkirah) op in ion (al-'.<ahm) and t h a t of 
memory ( a l - H a f i z a h ) . I t i s to be noted t h a t the f a c u l t y of 
e x t e r n a l p e r c e p t i o n under which Ibn-SIna i n c l u d e s e igh t senses 
i s g e n e r a l l y held by o the r ph i l o sophe r s to have f i ve s e n s e s . 
1. Quoted by O'Lepry (££. ci_t. , p . 176) fix)m I b n - S I n a ' s 
Ni,i?t, p . ^ 3 . However, t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s A r i s t o t e l i a n 
in t o t o . See Eduard Z e l l e r , Ou t l i ne s of the H i s t o r y of 
Greek Phi losophy. (Meridian Books, I n c . New York, 1950) , 
p . 202. 
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I n f a c t , the l a s t three senses can be brought under the 
perception of touch. Even his four i n t e r n a l f a cu l t i e s 
of perception are general ly t rea ted as one s ing le facul ty 
v i z . , introspect ion^by Western phi losophers . And t h i s gross 
ca tegor i sa t ion i s safer because one can always find several 
shades of perceptions within ' i n t rospec t ion which can not 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y be accommodated in Ibn-Sina ' s ' i n t e r n a l f acu l ty ' 
without multiplying h is ca tegor ies of i n t e r n a l percept ion to 
an unwieldy ex ten t . The s o u l ' s second f acu l ty , i . e . , the 
faculty of action^ i s the governing p r inc ip le of motion. 
Bodily organs function under the law of th i s f acu l ty . 
Regarding the concept of space and time, Ibn-Slna 
holds a type of r e l a t i v i s t theory. Time for him has no 
independent r e a l i t y apar t from the movement of the bodies. 
But i t i s considered as the locus of movement. I t can be 
measured. Similar ly , there i s no empty space apart from the 
objects occupying i t . In the same context Ibn-SIna also 
refutes the concept of non-existence (Fi^adun) as a metaphysical 
category. According to him those who hold the concept of 
non-existence believe that among those things which we can 
know and ta lk about are things to which non-existence belongs 
as an a t t r i b u t e . Such a notion, for Ibn-Sina i s non-sens ica l . 
CHAPTER - I I 
MAIN ISSUES IN TAHAFUT ^-FALASIFAH 
I t i s commonly be l ieved t h a t t h e s t r u g g l e between 
phi losophy and theology in I s l am, ph i losophy was de f ea t ed 
and the f i n a l blow to phi losophy was g iven i n a l - G h a z ' a l i ' s 
a t t a c k on p h i l o s o p h e r s . Tahafut a l - F a l ' a s i f a h i s t h e r ecord 
of t h i s blow. As for t h e E a s t , t h i s n o t i o n i s to some 
e x t e n t J u s t i f i a b l e , but phi losophy was not t o t a l l y wiped 
o u t , for i t cont inued t o develop i n t h e Western p a r t of t h e 
I s l a m i c world f i n d i n g cu lmina t ion in the ph i lo sophy of Ibn 
Rushd. In the East a l so a f t e r some time p h i l o s o p h y was 
r ev ived i n the form of a s y n t h e s i s of I s h r a q I and r a t i o n a l 
p h i l o s o p h i e s . However, for the d e f e a t of ph i lo sophy i n t h e 
f i f t h - s i x t h / l 1 - 1 2 t h c e n t u r i e s was mainly due to a l - G h a z a l i ' s 
a t t a c k on p h i l o s o p h e r s . Tahafut a l -Fa l l f s i f ah was t r a n s l a t e d 
by the Medieval and L a t i n t r a n s l a t o r s as D e s t r u c t i o P h i l o s o -
p ho rum. This r ende r ing i s c e r t a i n l y not e x a c t . The word 
"Tahafut" i s t r a n s l a t e d by modern s c h o l a r s i n d i f f e r e n t ways 
and t h e t i t l e of a l - G h a z a l i ' s book has been g iven as t h e 
breakdown,the d i s i n t e g r a t i n g or the i n c o h e r e n c e , of t h e 
p h i l o s o p h e r s . • In the i n t r o d u c t i o n to h i s book a l - G h a z a l i 
says t h a t a group of people hear ing the famous names of 
S o c r a t e s , H i p p o c r a t e s , P la to and A r i s t o t l e and knowing t h a t 
they had a t t a i n e d eminence i n such s c i e n c e s as Geometry, 
Logic and Phys ics have l e f t the r e l i g i o n of t h e i r f a t h e r s i n 
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which they were brought up, to follow the philosophers. 
He says that these people had begun to accept falsehood 
uncr i t i ca l ly . So he decided to write th i s book in order 
to refute the ancient philosophers.- I t would expose the 
incoherence of their be l ie fs and the Inconsistency of their 
metaphysical theories . The book demonstrates that the 
ancient philosophers who were the ideals of the atheis ts 
of those days, were real ly untainted with what was imputed 
to them. They never denied the va l id i ty of the re l ig ious 
laws. Al-Ghazali maintains that Muslim philosophers follow-
ing their Greek peers believe in God and did have fa i th in 
His messengers. But in regard to the minor de ta i l s they 
sometimes faltered and went astray, and caused others to 
go astray, from the even path. Tah'afut al-Fal"asifah i s 
intended to show how they slipped into error and falsehood. 
Thus what al-Ghazali seeks to prove in Tah'afut al-Fala"sifah 
i s that the Muslim phi losophers, who had in te rpre ted Islamic 
b e l i e f s about God, Soul and »Vorlcl with t h e i r own formulation 
of pe r ipa t e t i c thought and neo-Platonism, had ^one a s t r ay . 
Al-Ghazali* s at tack on the philosophers in Tah'afut 
comprises twenty po in t s , beginning 'with c rea t ion and ending 
vvith r e su r rec t ion . In i t he endeavours to shov,' that the 
phi losophers ' dogmas of the e t e rn i t y and the everlnscingness 
of the world are f a l se ; that t he i r asse r t ion that God i s the 
c r ea to r of the world is incompatible and incons is ten t with 
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t h e i r dogma of the e t e r n i t y of the world; that they fa i led 
to prove the exis tence, the uni ty , the s impl ic i ty and the 
incorporeal i ty of God and God's knowledge e i t h e r of the 
universals or of the p a r t i c u l a r s ; tha t t he i r views with 
regard to the souls of the c e l e s t i a l spheres, and the 
spheres ' knowledge of the p a r t i c u l a r s and the purposes of 
t h e i r movement are unfounded. He refutes the theory of 
causation which assumes ef fec ts to be the natura l outcome 
of t h e i r causes , and also refutes the doctr ine of the 
na tura l s p i r i t u a l i t y of the soul , i t s se l f -ex i s t ence and 
immorality. And, f i n a l l y , he condemns by arguments the 
phi losophers ' denial of the resur rec t ion of the bodies in 
the l i f e he reaf te r . At the end of the Tahafut, in the 
conclusion, al-Ghazali charges the philosophers of being 
i n f i d e l s on three accounts: 
( 1 ) . Their contention tha t the world i s co-e te rna l 
with God, 
( 2 ) . Their asse r t ion that Divine knowledge does not 
encompass individual objects,and 
C3). Their denial of the resurrec t ion of bodies . 
1. Al-Ghazali, Tahafut a l -Fal5s i fah . English t r a n s l a t i o n by 
Sabih Ahmad Kamali (The Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 
Lahore, 1958), p . 249. All references to the Tahafut are 
to t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n . 
;3 
Besides the above t h r e e , among the main i s sues in Tahafut 
we wil l discuss four other problems in t h i s chapter , v i z . , 
t he philosophers ' denia l of the Divine At t r ibu tes as inde-
pendent from the Divine Essence^their i n a b i l i t y to prove 
by ra t iona l arguments that there i s a cause or c r e a t o r of 
the world, the i r r e j ec t ion of a necessary connection between 
cause and effect and h is r e fu ta t ion of what the phi losophers 
hold about the se l f -ex i s tence of the sou l . 
. The most important problem in the Tahafut i s the 
re fu ta t ion of the phi losophers ' contention about the e t e r n i t y 
of the world. The theory i s Ar i s to t e l i an i n o r i g i n Ar i s to t l e 
was the f i r s t th inker who affirmed tha t the world or the 
whole cosmos i s e t e r n a l . At the same time A r i s t o t l e believed 
i n the f in i tude of causes and, thereby^the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e 
from which a l l movement i s der ived. This whole conception 
i s untenable. If the world i s e t e rna l then the re can not 
be f ini tude of cause but , ins tead , an i n f i n i t e s e r i e s of 
causes and an i n f i n i t e s e r i e s of movers. This se l f cont ra-
d ic tory view was again held by a l -Farabl and Ibn-Sina when 
they propounded t h e i r cosmological views. What they r e a l l y 
did was to combine the Ar i s to te l ian theory of c r ea t ion with 
the neo-Platonic emanatory theory of c r e a t i o n . They explained 
i t by taking Ck3d as the c rea to r of the universe from whom 
t h e world emanates e t e r n a l l y . Now, the chief objec t ion from 
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the s ide of al-Ghazali i s to the con t rad ic t ion inherent in 
the concept of an ' e t e r n a l c rea t ion* . The r e l a t i o n between 
two co-exis tent e n t i t i e s can not be regarded as causa l . An 
e te rna l and unchangeable God can not be regarded as the 
cause of an e t e rna l ly moving and changing world. I t i s sense-
l e s s to speak of a c r ea t ion tha t e x i s t s e t e r n a l l y . 
Al-Ghazali d i s t ingu i shes between what he c a l l s God's 
e t e rna l wi l l and the object of His w i l l . God, for example, 
can e te rna l ly w i l l t ha t Socrates and Plato should be born at 
such and such a time and tha t the one should be born before 
the o ther . Hence i t i s not l o g i c a l l y i l l e g i t i m a t e to affirm 
the orthodox bel ief that God e t e r n a l l y wil led tha t the world 
should come into being a t such and such a moment in t ime. 
Likewise al-Ghazali argues against the concept of the i n f i n i t y 
of t ime. If time i s assumed as i n f i n i t e , i t means tha t time 
i s both beginningless as well as endless . But at any given 
moment of time the i n f i n i t e may be thought as having been 
brought to an end. But a time that has an end i s not i n f i n i t e . 
I t i s f i n i t e . This argument of a l -Ghazl l i resembles a s imi lar 
one posited by Immanuel Kant in his f i r s t antinomy. 
In his discussion of the re fu ta t ion of the e t e r n i t y of 
the world al-Ghazali deals with the three most appealing 
arguments from the side of phi losophers . The f i r s t argument 
of the philosophers contends the imposs ib i l i ty of the 
procession of the temporal c rea t ion from the Eternal being. 
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For if the Eternal is supposed to have existed when the 
world did not exist, then the reason why the world had not 
oriKinated simultaneously must be that there was no deter-
minant for its existence. Nov;, when the world comes into 
existence, we have to choose one of the two alternatives 
to explain its origin; i.e., the creation was made possible 
either by a determinant or without a determinant. In the 
latter case there seems no reason that may bring the possi-
bility of the world into actuality, i.e. the world would 
not have ever emerged. If the former is the case, then the 
question arises as to who is the originator of the deter-
minant and why it did not come into being earlier. In fact 
the real question implied in this argument is: why did the 
Eternal not originate the world before its actual origination ? 
One may answer that the world came into existence only when 
God willed it to be originated. But the problem still 
remains; i.e. why did the will originate now and not before ? 
Besides, similar objection about the application of the time 
order may be raised. 
Al-Ghazali meets with this charge of the philosophers 
on two points. On the one hand he tries to show that the 
will to create the world is eternally associated with God. 
This will he calls the "Eternal Will". On the other hand, 
he argues tnat the procession of a temporal being from an 
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e t e r n a l being i s p o s s i b l e , for there are temporal beings in 
the world caused by another temporal being and t h a t , in tu rn 
caused by another and so on. I t i s impossible tha t t h i s 
s e r i e s should go on ad inf in i tum. This must stop somewhere 
and that l i m i t be ca l l ed the E te rna l . Further al-Ghazal i 
proves tha t a l l the temporal events have been contrived by 
God. 
In t h e i r second argument in favour of e t e rn i t y the 
philosophers take in to account the p r i o r i t y of the exis tence 
of God to the world. They argue that the p r i o r i t y of God's 
exis tence may be e i t h e r on to logica l o r temporal. 
If God i s p r i o r in essence then t h i s p r i o r i t y wi l l be equal 
to the p r i o r i t y of one over two or the p r i o r i t y of the move-
ment of a person to the movement of h is shadow. If t h i s i s 
the case then the co-exis tence of both God and the world i s 
possible oust as the co-exis tence of a person and h i s shadow 
i s poss ib le . Moreover, if God's p r i o r i t y means that He i s 
p r i o r to the world and time in t ime, not in essence, then i t 
follows tha t before the exis tence of the world and time 
there was a time when the world did not e x i s t . This means 
that there was an i n f i n i t e time before that time which o r i g i -
nated with the world. But t h i s i s s e l f - con t rad ic to ry . So 
1. Perhaps t h i s i s the reason that St. Thomas Aquinas developec 
the concept of an i n f i n i t e "imaginary t ime", as cont ras ted 
with r ea l f i n i t e time in order to explain the c r ea t i on . But 
he held that t h i s imaginary time i s our projec t ion and does 
not r e l a t e to the a c t i v i t y of God which is conceived as 
t imeless . John Elof Boodin, Three In t e rp re t a t i ons of the 
Universe, (New YorK: The Mac Millan Company, 1939), p.460. 
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t he r e was no o r ig ina t ion of time as well as of the world, 
in other words, both are e t e r n a l . 
Al-Ghazali 's response i s r i g h t l y based on emphasizing 
the l i n g u i s t i c l im i t a t i on . He says that the words we use 
for th i s empirical world are also used for the t ranscendenta l 
world. Words l i k e ' p r i o r ' , ' p o s t e r i o r ' e t c , have a l l some 
temporal connotatiOB. So when i t i s said tha t Ltod existed 
before the world, i t does not mean tha t God exis ted in a 
temporal s e r i e s . This has a p a r a l l e l in the attempts of the 
l a t e r Thomists when they were t ry ing to defend Thomas Aquinas' 
cosmological argument for the existence of God from the 
scep t i c s ' a t t ack . The reason of the inconsis tency l i ed in 
the dichotomy tha t Thomas Aquinas made between r ea l time and 
imaginary t ime. 
In t h e i r th i rd argument in favour of the e t e r n i t y of 
the world, says al-Ghazali , the philosophers a s se r t the 
independence of the world from God by refut ing the notion 
that before i t s c rea t ion the world was a poss ib le being. If 
i t i s t rue to say that the world had a beginning then i t s 
being before i t s beginning was Impossible; i . e . the world 
had no possible being before i t s c rea t ion . In fact the 
1. E. L. Mascall, He .Vho I s , (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
19A3), Chapter 5. 
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philosophers want to prove that the rejection of the world 
as a possible being before its creation would mean that God 
had no power over it. And this would establish the co-
existence of the world with God. In response al-Ghazali 
stresses the distinction between possible being and actual 
being and shows that to suppose the existence of possible 
being before its creation has nothing to do with its actual 
being. A possible being is simply in thought, and the faculty 
of imagination may develop some nations which are impossible. 
For this al-Ghazali quotes philosophers' own saying in the 
case of space: 
The supposition of the world as larger than 
it is, or the supposition of the creation of 
Body above the world (and the creation of a 
second body above the first one, and so on 
ad infinitum) is possible; for the possibility 
of making additions is unlimited. In spite 
of this, however, an absolute and infinite 
void space is impossible.1 
Al-Ghazali proceeds by maintaining that the commence-
ment of world's existence being early or late can not be 
specified. It is only its being an originated thing which 
is specified and called as a possible being. 
There is another argument of the philosophers, says 
al-Ghaz"ali, which intends to prove the precedence of matter 
to anything created, since it is the substratum on which 
1. Al-Ghaz"ali, ££. cit., p. A6. 
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every change takes place. Philosophers argue that every-
thing created must have some substratum. Matter is consi-
dered as the universal substratum. Now, if matter itself 
is created then the question arises as to what is the sub-
stratum of matter ? or what is the substratum of the sub-
stratum ? or what is the matter of matter ? Since it is 
obviously meaningless, the philosophers maintain that matter 
is uncreated and, therefore, eternal. This problem is 
tackled by al-Ghazali by taking the denotative character of 
the terms "possibility", "impossibility" and "necessity". He 
shows that these terms do not assert existence. For what 
could he the existent being which impossibility refers to ? 
Similarly, necessity of a substratum is also refuted. When 
our intellect fails to suppose the non-existence of something 
as impossible then that thing is supposed to be necessary. 
So is the concept of substratum. But al-Ghazali asserts 
that these terms do not stand for something existent. Hence 
the argument of the philosophers for the necessity of a subs-
tratum does not prove the real existence of it. 
The next problem, given in the sixth discussion of the 
Taha"fut is related to the age-old controversy between the 
Muslim rationalists and the scholastics on the issue of the 
Divine Essence and the Divine Attributes. Mu'tazilites 
believed in Divine Unity. So they rejected the reality of 
the Divine Attributes as independent of the Divine Essence. 
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Ash'rites, on the other hand, advocated the independent 
reality of the Divine Attributes. Now, al-Ghazali, being 
the champion of the Ash*rite school, argued against the 
philosophers, as the latter were in agreement with the 
MU'tazilites on the matter of Divine Unity. The philoso-
phers, like Mu'tazilites, agree that it is impossible to 
ascribe to the First Principle knowledge, power and will. 
These terms, which we have received from the Holy Book, 
should not be affirmed as such. It is not permissible to 
accept an attribute additional to the Divine Essence in the 
way we may consider, as regards ourselves, our knowledge, 
power and will as attributes of ourselves, are additional 
to our essence. If Divine Attributes were admitted as 
independent from the Divine Essence, it would amount to 
plurality. For this philosophers provide two proofs. First, 
they say that when subject and attribute are not identical 
either both can exist independent of each other, or each 
will need the other, or only one of them will depend on the 
other. The first two positions are not admissible because 
the former involves the absolute duality while in the latter 
position neither the essence nor the attribute would be a 
necessary existent. In the third alternative say the philoso-
phers, one which was dependent would be an effect and the 
other would be the necessary existent. Now the problem is 
that the dependent being is something which would be caused 
by some external being. This would necessitate positing an 
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entity connecting the cause with the caused; and this 
connective entity in its turn, would need another entity 
for its relation with them, and so on ad infinitum. Thus 
none of the three alternatives can be held to prove the 
Divine Attribute as independent of the Divine Essence. 
Similarly, the philosophers posit their second argument to 
show that the attributes, like knowledge power etc., are acci-
dents, not necessary. They are always subordinate and 
relative to the essence. 
Al-Ghazali argues that both the arguments of the 
philosophers are incoherent. In his argument he takes the 
first and third alternatives of the first problem. For 
the first alternative he argues that the rejection of what 
the philosophers call the concept of the absolute duality 
is not supported by a sound argument. The position would 
have been relevant if they had disproved the plurality of 
God. And al-Ghazali claims that he has shown while dis-
1 
cussing the fifth problem the inability of the philosophers 
to prove that God is One. Then al-Ghazali takes up the 
third alternative which maintains that the Divine Essence 
does not depend on the attributes while the Divine Attributes 
depend on the Divine Essence. Here he points out *-he philo-r 
sophers' own affirmation that a necessary being is that which 
does not have an efficient cause. Since the Divine Attributes 
1 . Ibid., p. 96 - 108. 
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do not nave an efficient cause, they are necessary 
which would mean that the Divine AttriDutes are not depend-
ent on the Divine Essence. Similarly, al-Ghazali meets 
with the second argument of the philosophers. For the attri-
butes philosophers use the terms like 'possible', 'contingent', 
•subordinate', 'inseparable', 'accidents', 'effects' etc. 
Al-Ghazali is prepared to accept these terms provided that 
they do not imply that the attributes have some efficient 
cause. He says: 
"If the meaning is that the attributes 
have an efficient cause, then that mean-
ing is unacceptable. But if the meaning 
is that the attributes have, not an effi-
cient cause, but a substratum in which 
they exist then w^hatever word one may 
choose to express this meaning there is 
no impossibility involved in it."' 
Another important pixDblera to be discussed here is 
elaborated in the Tenth Chapter of the Tahlfut where al-
Ghazali tries to show the inability of the philosophers to 
prove by rational argument that there is a cause or creator 
of the world. He claims that only those people who believe 
the world as created have a right to claim that there is a 
cause or creator of the world. But the philosophers are 
deorived of such a right because they believe in the eternity 
of the world. According to the philosophers, says al-Ghaz'ali, 
1. Ibid., p, 113 - ^ . 
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on ly temporal events have a cause. But the bodies are 
e te rna l and hence^neither o r i g i n a t e nor p e r i s h . Only 
temporal forms and accidents o r ig ina te in t ime. S imi la r ly , 
the four elements which are the stuff of the sublunary 
world, and the i r bodies are e te rna l too . The human soul 
and the vegetative soul o r ig ina te and end in t ime. Now, 
a l -Ghazl l i claims that the doctr ine of the phi losophers 
tha t bodies ex i s t through a cause makes no sense at a l l . 
I n fac t , he who does not believe in the o r i g i n a t i o n of bodies 
has no basis on which h is be l ie f in the c r ea to r may be founded, 
He says that the i r argument to prove the exis tence of God i s 
p r imar i ly based on causal argument. The exis tence of a nece-
ssary being i s supposed to be the cause of the empir ical or 
contingent being. Since the philosophers lose t h e i r r igh t 
to prove the existence of a c rea to r as soon as they hold the 
e t e r n i t y of the world, i t i s only a m a t e r i a l i s t who can s i g -
n i f i c an t l y use the causal argument to prove the forms and 
the accidents as the only r e a l i t i e s which are complementary 
to each o ther . Al-Gha2"ali' s argument here appears very 
sound. The philosophers show a causal r e l a t i o n among the 
bodies and from the existence of the empirical r e a l i t y they 
t ry to prove the existence of a t rans-empir ica l e n t i t y , 
namely, God. If they wish to take resource to t h i s s tand-
poin t , they should refra in from t h e i r claim to prove the 
e t e rn i ty of the world. Even Ibn Rushd • s defence of the 
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philosophers is hardly satisfactory: 
"....the philosophers hold that body, 
be it temporal or eternal, can not 
be independent in existence through 
itself, and this principle is, accord-
ing to the philosophers, binding for 
the eternal body in the same way as for 
the temporal, although imagination does 
not help to explain how this is the 
case with the eternal body in the way 
it is with the temporal body."'' 
Al-Ghazali rejects the distinction made by the philo-
sophers between necessary and possible beings. He says 
that the terms 'necessary existent' and 'possible existent* 
do not convey any sense. Yet what we can understand by the 
term 'possible existent', for example, is that a body may 
or may not have a cause. The materialists affirm the latter. 
And, likewise, with the help of some arguments we can hold 
that there is no reason to deny that body is necessary, not 
possible being. 
What al-Ghazali here tries to disprove is the applica-
tion of the conventional use of the terms 'necessary existent' 
and 'possible existent'. './hat the philosophers hold is that 
these terms stand for the absolute necessary neinj; pnd for 
1. Ibn Rushd, Tahafut al-Tah^fut, English translation by Simon 
Van den Bergh (Published by Messrs. Luzac and Co., 46,Great 
Russel] Street, London, .v.C. 1, 195^), Vol. One, p. 250. 
All reference to the Tahafut al-Tah'afut are to this trans-
lation. The abbreviation TT will refer to this work. 
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the genuinely poss ib le beings r e spec t ive ly . Thus, heaven 
i s a necessary being in reference to the mater ia l bodies . 
But i t happens to be a poss ib le being when taken in r e l a -
t ion with the being a t which the causal s e r i e s of a l l being 
terminate . This i s what Ibn Rushd wants to h ighl igh t in his 
r ep ly to a l - G h a z a l i ' s charge at t h i s po in t . S t i l l the 
problem does not cease because we do not have an access ib le 
d i v i s i o n of necessary and poss ib le in an absolute sense in 
the world of exper ience . I n f a c t , the use of the term 
•necessary ex i s t ence ' to prove the exis tence of an incorpo-
r e a l being was f i r s t introduced by Ibn-SIna. He considered 
i t as superior to o the r proofs of the ancient philosophers 
who used to a r r i ve a t the immaterial being through de r iva t i ve 
t h ings . So the t a rge t of a l - G h a z l l i ' s a t tack a t t h i s point 
i s Ibn-SIna exc lus ive ly . Here Ibn-SIna ' s p o s i t i o n can be 
defended by making c l ea r the exact sense of the terms 
•poss ib le ' and 'necessary* be ings . The poss ib le ex i s t en t in 
bodily substance must be preceded by the necessary ex is ten t 
in i t and the necessary ex is ten t in bodily substance must 
be preceded by the absolute necessary ex i s t en t which does 
not possess any potency whatsoever e i the r in substance or in 
any other of the d i f fe ren t kinds of movements. And such an 
e n t i t y i s not a body. 
The next important issue in the Tahafut discussed under 
the t h i r t e e n t h point i s the r e fu ta t ion of the philosophers* 
1. I b i d . , p . 254. 
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b e l i e f tha t God does not know the pa r t i cu la r things which 
are divided in time in to pas t , present and fu tu re . This 
i s one of the three major charges against the philosophers 
for which al-Ghazali charges them with i n f i d e l i t y . For 
him i t IS r e a l l y un-Islaraic to say that God's knowledge 
does not encompass individual ob jec t s . His charge i s p a r t i -
c u l a r l y leveled against Ibn-SIna who held that God knows 
the p a r t i c u l a r s in a universal way. Influenced by the neo-
P l a t o n i s t theory of eraanatioh Ibn-Sina had held the view 
tha t God's self-knowledge i s knowledge of other th ings as 
wel l because knowing Himself, He also knows a l l the ex i s t en t s 
which proceed from Him, He does not know the p a r t i c u l a r 
exis tence because th i s can be known only through sense-percep-
t i o n which i s within the temporal dimension, while God i s a 
changeless and supra-temporal being, Ibn-Sina says t ha t 
although God can not have perceptual knowledge, He neverthe-
l e s s knows a l l pa r t i cu la r s in a universal way. Since God i s 
the emanative cause of a l l e x i s t e n t s , He knows both these 
e x i s t e n t s and the re la t ions subsis t ing between them in a 
determinate manner, 
Al-Ghazali explains the philosophers ' view by c i t i n g 
an i l l u s t r a t i o n from so l a r - ec l i p se . In an ec l ipse there 
are three s t ages . F i r s t , there was a s t a t e when the ec l ipse 
did not e x i s t . The second s t a t e i s that when i t ac tual ly 
e x i s t s . In the third s ta te i t i s again non-ex i s ten t . These 
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a r e t h r e e d i f f e r e n t c o g n i t i o n s about the e c l i p s e s i n c e 
t h e r e i s a temporal sequence, t he se d i f f e r e n t and m u l t i p l e 
c o g n i t i o n s n e c e s s i t a t e a change i n the cogn i san t be ing 
o the rwise any of these c o g n i t i o n s would be s u b s t i t u t e d 
f o r ano the r . In o t h e r words, knowledge fo l lows the o b j e c t 
of knowledge. '<vhen the object of knowledge changes the 
knower's p o s i t i o n must also change . Since change i n t h e 
ca se of God i s imposs ib l e , t h i s would, t he r eby , mean t h a t 
God knows the e c l i p s e and a l l i t s a t t r i b u t e s and acc idents 
by a knowledge which charac ter i se s Him from e t e r n i t y to 
e t e r n i t y . His knowledge remains the same pr ior or during 
or pos ter ior to the event. And, therefore . His knowledge 
n e c e s s i t a t e s no change m His Essence. Now, what i s un-
acceptable to al-Ghazal i i s the ant ic ipated unpleasant 
consequence. In h i s own words: 
"It impl ies t h a t , for i n s t a n c e , whether 
Zaid obeys God or d isobeys Him, God can 
not know h i s newly emerging s t a t e s , s i n c e 
He does not know Zaid as an i n d i v i d u a l 
i . e . , as a person whose a c t i o n s come to be 
a f t e r they had not been . So i f He does 
not know the person , He can not know h i s 
s t a t e s and a c t i o n s . Nor can He know of 
Z a i d ' s i n f i d e l i t y or I s l am, s ince He knows 
only thie i n f i d e l i t y or Islam of man i n 
genera l i n the abso lu t e and u n i v e r s a l 
manner, not in s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n to i n d i v i -
d u a l s . Even so, tney are bound to say t h ^ t 
KuhamiTiad (may God b l e s s him and gran t him 
peace) proclaimed h i s prophecy, whi le Jod 
did not know that he hnd done s o . And the 
same w i l l be t rue oi every o the r p r o p h e t , 
for God only Knows t h a t amonj^  men the re are 
some who proclaim prophecy, 3nd tnnt such 
1 . Al-Ghazal i , op . ^ i t . , p p . 153 - ^ . 
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and such are t h e i r a t t r i b u t e s ; but 
He can not know a r^^rticular rrophet 
as an in(]ividual, for that i s to De 
knovm by the senses - lone ." ' ' 
Al-Ghazali at tacks at the root premise vvnich leads phi loso-
Dhers to deny God's knowledge of t e p a r t i c u l a r s . He says 
that philosophers d i f f e r e n t i a t e between what i s severance 
and change. Simple a l t e r a t i o n of pos i t i on from r igh t to 
l e f t or from backward to forward does not amount to change. 
A similar a l t e r a t i o n in tne process of knowledge does not 
change the essence of the knower. Similar ly the movement 
of a body other than and caused by the subject does not 
bring any change in the subject . But the pos i t i on when the 
subject comes to know something which i t previously did not 
know i s a case of change in the essence of the knower. In 
the philosophers ' view God's knowledge of each and every 
p a r t i c u l a r in terms of ' p a s t ' , ' p r e s e n t ' and ' f u t u r e ' does 
imply a change in the Essence of God, Al-Ghazali argues 
that God's knowledge of the p a r t i c u l a r s , e . g . , the occurence 
of a pa r t i cu l a r ec l ipse does not need to pass through these 
three s tages . His knowledge of an ec l ipse i s the same at 
a l l the t imes. F i r s t , i t i s 'Will Be' then ' I s ' and then 
the knowledge that the event has expired. His knowledge of 
a pa r t i cu l a r event in th i s way does not mean a change in His 
Essence. A d e t a i l account of i t i s given in the succeeding 
chapter . 
1. I b id . , ^ p . 155 - 6. 
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The view tha t God has only a universal knowledge can 
not be maintained due to another reason. There i s , says 
al-Ghazal i , a large number of species and genera with 
various heterogeneous f a c t o r s . The knowledge of an animal, 
for example, can not be subs t i tu t ed for that of an inorganic 
being. Knowledge of the p a r t i c u l a r s in a universa l way does 
not make any sense unless var ious instances of heterogeneous 
knowledge are sorted out . And, in fac t , there i s nothing 
homogeneous in the s t r i c t sense . There i s a hierarchy of 
universals which always possesses some heterogenei ty . So 
to maintain God's universal knowledge would amount to ascribe 
to Him a bundle of confused knowledge. Moreover, even assum-
ing, argues al-GhazSli , tha t God's knowledge of the p a r t i c u l a r 
implies a change in His essence, t h i s does not c r ea t e any 
problem. This can be proved by the phi losophers ' own thes i s 
(accepted by the Karramites and the Mu ' t az i l i t e s ) that God 
i s the substratum of the temporals and that His knowledge 
of the temporal is cemporal. The philosophers* pos i t i on 
again becomes unacceptable as they hold the e t e r n i t y of 
the world and yet acknowledge change in i t . I f there i s no 
contradic t ion in the phi losophers ' notion of an e t e rna l and 
yet changing world, i t i s no cont radic t ion to hold the view 
tha t God knows the p a r t i c u l a r s without any harm to His e ternal 
knov/ledge. 
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In the seventeenth chapter of t;ie Tah'gfut al-Ghazali 
discusses tne problem of causation in detail. Astonishingly, 
about seven hundred years before Hume, he had anticipated 
the Humean refutation of any causal efficacy. His position 
here is that of extreme intellectual scecticism. Through 
the force of his arguments fee disproves any type of necessary 
connection between two successive events and favours the 
regular sequence theory of causation. According to him we 
do not know anything that connects the two events, the cause 
and the effect but only that one thing follows another. The 
notion that fire has the power of burning, and that being 
an agent by nature it can not refrain from doing so provided 
that all conditions are fulfilled, is correct, God is the 
only agent exclusively possessing the power to make fire 
burn either directly or through the intermediacy of angels. 
The will of God is the real factor which determines it for 
something to produce an effect. The general notion of an 
intrinsic, necessary connection between cause and effect 
or any active power on the part of the cause is untenable. 
It does not in the least help to explain why the effect 
happened. He says: 
"Fire, which is an inanimate thing, has 
no action. How can one prove that it 
is an agent ? The only argument is from 
the observation of the fact of burning 
at the time of contact with fire. But 
observation only shows that one is with 
the other, not it is b^ it and has no 
other cause than it."1 
1. Ibid., p. ie6. 
Al-Ghazali r e j e c t s the idea that the agent or the 
cause acts not d iscr iminate ly but uniformly by na tu re . 
For him tr.ere is no general applic^'t ion of tne force of 
the -^gent on the r ec ip i en t . I t var ies from p a r t i c u l a r 
to p - r t i c u l a r . I t is t e wi l l of God vvhich is responsible 
for great r or l e s se r impact of the cause on the e f f e c t . 
So if two s imi lar pieces of cot ton, for example, ere brought 
in to the contact .vith f i r e , i t decends on the w i l l of God 
whether both the pieces burn or only one or neither. Through 
t h i s approach, al-Ghazali explains how Prophet Abraham (AS) 
remained unburnt when he was thrown into the f i r e . Here 
a problem can be raised that in the absence of any causal 
efficacy the s i t ua t i on wil] turn in to a t o t a l pandemonium. 
If mustard seed i s not the cause of o i l tnen i t should be 
obtainable from sand. Similar ly, f i r e would quench our 
t h i r s t and '/.ater would burn, i . e . , anything would turn into 
any other thing whatever. This type of d i f f i c u l t y was already 
ant ic ioated by al-Ghazal i . He says that although Goo's will 
i s the real p r inc ip le which is responsible for an ef fect 
to t"ke p l : c e , i t ra re ly works against the laws of na tu re . 
But th is does not mean that the so cal led cause has some 
independent ef f ic iency. Things may not always haprien in 
the ' u sua l ' way. All events, be they natura l or against 
nature , are equally good as they are the expression of God's 
w i l l . 
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Al-Ghaz^i, on the basis of this argument gives an 
explanation of miracles. There can be either of the tv;o 
reasons when a prophet is thrown into fire and still remains 
unburnt. One is that God or His angels might have impar-
ted immediately some new attributes in the fire which con-
fined its heat to itself in order to save the prophet. Or, 
secondly, although the prophet remained in his form of 
flesh and blood, God might have imparted certain attributes 
in his own person so that fire could not burn him, just as 
when a person covers himself with " asbestos he remains un-
burnt in the blazing fire. As for those who do not know 
the character of the asbestos it is a miracle to remain 
unburnt in the fire, similarly, for those who do not know 
power of God to invest certain attributes in fire or a 
prophet's body to prevent it from burning, the escape of the 
prophet is a miracle. Miracles are those unintelligible and 
unbelieveable events which a prophet sometimes practices on 
the behest of God in order to remove the doubts of the 
common people to prove his authority. These acts are abso-
lutely beyond the natural laws. A miracle is performed not 
due to the inherent power in the person of the prophet, but 
it is the capacity which God bestows upon the prophet. Chang-
ing of matter into an animal being, for example, is quite 
natural in course of time. It happens when matter, with 
other elements, is transformed into plant and plant, eaten 
by animal, transforms into blood; blood changes into sperm 
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and sperm, when f e r t i l i z e d in womb, becomes a l i v ing being. 
This i s the na tura l process . But the Almighty can use His 
power in order that th i s long process may happen i n s t a n t a -
neously which human mind f a i l s to grasp. This i s what 
happens in the case of a miracle when, for example, a s t i ck 
turns into a snake on the behest of God who shortens absolutely 
the natural course of development. This i s a l -Ghaza l i ' s ex-
planat ion of the miracles . However, i t must be admitted tha t 
such an explanation of miracles ra ther weakens the force of 
h is argument against causal i ty . 
In the eighteenth discussion of the Tah'Sfut al-GhazTEli 
takes a large space to show the i n a b i l i t y of the philosophers 
to prove the independent, non-spatiotemporal, non-bodily, 
s p i r i t u a l p r inc ip le in man. He r e j ec t s the philosophers* 
claim that human soul i s a non- re l a t iona l , self-conscious 
being similar to God and angels . He f i r s t descr ibes how 
philosophers d i s t ingu ish between two types of f a c u l t i e s , 
known as animal and human f a c u l t i e s . The animal facul ty i s 
fur ther l a rge ly divided into motive and percept ive f a c u l t i e s 
and the perceptive faculty i s yet further subdivided into 
i n t e r n a l and external f acu l t i e s and so on. Similar ly , the 
human faculty i s also further divided into various other 
sub-facul t ies which do not need a d e t a i l account here as 
they more or l e s s follow the same c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as given 
by the p e r i p a t e t i c th inkers . Al-Ghazali 's account of the 
60 
philosophers' view on these various facult ies shows an 
obvious reference to Ibn-Sina who alone holds the animal 
faculty to be independent of the imaginative faculty which 
he ca l l s estimative faculty. However, after having cited a l l 
the channels of human knowledge, al-Ghazali questions the 
philosophers' claim that the self i s a se l f - ex i s tent substance, 
On this topic he has given ten arguments but most of them are 
either repetative or unimportant. So only a few s ignif icant 
arguments are discussed here. 
According to al-Ghazali philosophers prove the soul as 
a se l f -exis tent substance by showing i t s independence from 
the body. If i t i s proved that the cognitive faculty i s not 
a part of the body, i t would mean that the cognitive principle 
i s other than the body and, thereby, an independent substance. 
Philosophers argue from the point of d i v i s i b i l i t y that i n t e -
l l e c t u a l cognit ion, which inheres in the human soul , has 
ind iv i s ib le u n i t s . This -ne^ns that the substratum of i t vvould 
•^ .Iso oe i n d i v i s i b l e . Since boaies are d i v i s i b l e , they are 
something o th t r than the substratum of tne i n t e l l e c t u a l 
cognit ion. Al-Ghazali objects tnat merely proving cne non-
d i v i s i b i l i t y of the substr^'tum of knowledge does not make 
i t necessary th^t i t is non-m^^terial. I t may oe neld that 
the substratum is an individual atom which nas the charac ter 
of i n d i v i s i o i l i t y . If so, then the substratum of knowledge 
,^ill PISO be a material e n t i t y . Further the philosophers 
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assert that the substratum of knowledge as well as ignorance 
is something other than the body because otherwise if knowledge 
were to subsist in the body, then it would be impossible for 
ignorance to subsist in the same substratum, since two cont-
raries can not subsist in the same loci. It is for instances 
impossible for a man to love and hate something at the same 
time, for this will be a contradiction. But this does not 
mean that hatred and love do not subsist in bodies. It is 
possible for hatred to exist in one part and love to exist 
in another part. 
A^ain, to prove the independence of the soul from the 
body the philosophers argue that the perceptual act of the 
intellect is independent of the bodily organs. This can be 
proved by the fact that the intellect can perceive its own 
organs, like brain and the heart. If the intellect had been 
a part of the body it would not have been possible for it 
to perceive its organs as, for example, in the case of sight 
it is not possible for the visual organs to see themselves. 
Now in his obljection against the above view of the philosophers, 
al-Ghaz"51i tries to show that their argument is based on hasty 
generalization and stresses that it is not improbable that 
sight should perceive its own substratum. According to him 
the philosophers wrongly want to make a universal judgement 
based upon a few particular instances. He says: 
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"For instance i t i s believed that every 
animal moves i t s lower jaw at the time 
of ea t ing . This inference i s made be-
cause, through the inductive observation 
of animals, we have found that a l l the 
animals whom we saw did the same. But 
t h i s shows our f a i lu re to take cognisance 
of the crocodile which moves i t s upper jaw." ^ 
The argument of al-Ghazali here i s obviously i r r e g u l a r . 
I n f a c t , the analogy i s p re t ty f a l s e . The i l l u s t r a t i o n of a 
fac tual exception has nothing to disprove the so ca l led hasty 
genera l iza t ion by the philosophers when they say tha t s ight 
can not perceive i t s own substratum. There i s always a 
dua l i ty of knower and the known, subject and the object when 
some knowledge i s obtained. That a subject can know i t s e l f 
would thereby mean as t r ea t ing the subject as both subject 
and object simultaneously. This i d e a l i s t i c approach i s 
c e r t a i n l y not conducive to a l -GhazSl i ' s rea l ism. 
The l a s t chapter, i . e . , the twentieth problem, in the 
Tab'sfut deals with the problem of r e su r rec t ion , i . e . , refu-
t a t i o n of the philosophers, who do not admit the l i t e r a l 
bodily resurrect ion as described in the Qur'an and says 
t ha t t h i s and such other descr ip t ions are only metaphorical . 
According to philosophers s p i r i t u a l experience of pleasure 
or pain is superior to the physical experience of the pleasure 
or pain bestowed by reward or punishment. Besides, the resurre-
c t i on of body seems to the philosophers untenable due to 
1. I b id . , p . 211. 
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v a r i o u s other reasons . There are some phi losophers 
(among the Mutakallimun) who, according to a l -Ghaza l i , 
descr ibe the s e l f as an epi-phenomenon, i . e . , they main-
t a i n that the soul i s the by-product of the combinations 
of d i f ferent c o n s t i t u t i v e elements in a p a r t i c u l a r pro-
port ion . So, for these people, resurrect ion means the 
r e s t o r a t i o n of body, i . e . , the general idea of r e surrec t ion 
i s denied by them. According to one vers ion of t h i s d o c t -
r ine the resurrect ion means the recreat ion of both, body 
and the sou l . Another vers ion holds that a f ter death body 
i s not t o t a l l y annihilated but i s decomposed in to ear th . 
The resurrec t ion , therefore , means the assemblage of the 
parts of the body and recreat ion of l i f e i n t h i s body. The 
problem with philosophers i s to admit the common b e l i e f in 
resurrect ion i s that whether the soul ge t s the same body 
which i t had during i t s l i f e on earth or i t acquires a new 
one . I f the former i s true then the problem i s how i t happens 
because t he body of a man i s reduced to dust or ea t en by 
worms and birds and evaporates and i s reduced into wa t e r . 
Or, appraoching i t d i f f e r e n t l y , we may say t h a t t h e dus t of 
t he human body becomes plant and p l a n t , e a t en by an animal , 
becomes i t s f l e s h and blood v;hich l a t e r on, when e a t e n by 
a man, becomes a man's f lesh and blood. Thus the s'.me m^ t ' e r 
becomes the body or pa r t of the body of d i f f e r e n t p e o p l e . So, 
a t the time of r e s u r r e c t i o n many souls ^'ould need t h e common 
n a t t e r . Again according to the r h i l o s o o h e r s , the sou l s depa r t e ; 
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from the bodies are i n f i n i t e i n number • he reas the number 
of bod ies i s l i m i t e d . The problem i s t h a t the number of 
the sou l s --ill be j ^ r e n t ' r rhan the nunber of the b o a i e s . 
Al-Ghazal i meets with the above argument by s t i c k i n g 
to h i s b e l i e f that i t i s the soul , not the body, v/hich 
makes us what we are. According to him i t i s not impor tan t 
whether the soul ge t s the same body or a new one. God i s 
Omnipotent and so . He can provide the same body to t he soul 
by preventing the dead body of a person to become the body 
of the other so that a common body would not be shared by 
many s o u l s . Again, the phi losophers ' argument that the 
s o u l s would be outnumbered i s not i r r e f u t a b l e . And i f 
t h i s happens then God has power to create a number of bodies 
from new matter. S imi lar ly , al-Ghaz'51i a l so departs from 
and re fu te s what the philosophers opine on the s p i r i t u a l 
reward or punishment i n heaven. He s t r i c t l y and l i t e r a l l y 
abides by what the Holy Scripture t e l l s about l i f e with 
f l e s h and blood in heaven. 
CHAPTER - I I I 
AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO TAHAFUT 
SECTION - «A* 
ON STERNITY OF THE WORLD 
I n Western Medieval theo logy t h e r e a re t h r e e t h e o r i e s 
of c r e a t i o n by v o l i t i o n , d i v i s i o n and e m a n a t i o n . The 
f i r s t i s expressed by S t . Augustine i n h i s concep t ion of 
c r e a t i o n as an e t e r n a l a c t . The second i s found i n Er igena 
i n whose theory every th ing proceeds from t h e u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
f i r s t p r i n c i p l e by d i v i s i o n i n t o d i s t i n c t i o n s of good and 
e v i l , being and non-be ing . The n e o - P l a t o n i c t heo ry of emana-
t i o n i s adopted by St,Thomas Aquinas, But i t i s g e n e r a l l y 
b e l i e v e d t h a t neo-Platonism i s e s s e n t i a l l y p r e s e n t i n a l l 
t h e medieval i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of c r e a t i o n . The o r d e r of 
c r e a t i o n fo r a l l i s from h ighe r t o the l ower . T h e i r d i s -
agreement IS a t one p o i n t , v i z . , whi le f o r n e o - P l a t o n i s t s 
c r e a t i o n i s a spontaneous and u n i n t e n t i o n a l over f low, accord-
ing to t h e Medieval i n t e r p r e t e r s i t i s an i n t e n t i o n a l a c t . 
On another important i s s u e the Medieval C a t h o l i c t h e o -
l o g i a n s d i f f e r sharp ly from n e o - P l a t o n i s t s , t h a t i s , on the 
c r e a t i o n of the va r ious s t ages of the h i e r a r c h y of b e i n g s . 
According to the neo -P la ton ic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the h i g h e s t 
l e v e l i n the h i e r a r c h y of c r e a t i o n emanates from the One i . e . , 
God, but i n tu rn every s tage gene ra t e s the next s t a g e . I n 
1 . John Elof Boodin, Three I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the Universe 
(New York, The Mac Millan Company, 193^} , p . 44 . 
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this way all the succeeding stages after the first are 
directly connected with their preceding one, not with the 
One, for their motion. Thus intelligence is an emanation 
from the One, the world-soul is an emanation from intelli-
gence and the sensible world is an emanation from the world-
soul. Every level generates the level below it. So only 
the first level has the direct relation with the One, though 
all the succeeding levels also have indirect relation with 
it. But St. Augustine and St, Thomas Aquinas both rejected 
this kind of relationship between God and His creation. 
They and their followers held that God alone is the Creator 
of the world and all creatures therein, bodies and souls. 
Thus the idea that God is the creator of the creators 
is foreign to the Medieval tradition. The relation of the 
Creator to the created is throughout immediate and direct. 
According to St. Thomas Aquinas it is the creative Light 
of God which flows through the whole hierarchy, a direct 
procession. However, there is a degradation of the quality 
of creation in proportion to the distance from God. More 
being the distance weaker is the energy of the creative 
light. It is a feeble light when it comes to man and is 
finally lost in matter. 
We find here that the Medieval Catholic philosophers 
who borrowed their many important ideas from the neo-Platonisra 
were not loyal to this philosophy as their Muslim counterpart, 
spec ia l ly al-Farabl and Ibn STna. Though the process of 
c rea t ions according to these Muslim th inke r s i s a longer 
process than tha t of neo-Pla tonis t , e . g . , they discussed 
about ten i n t e l l i g e n c e s , nine spheres and t h e i r nine sou ls , 
e s s en t i a l l y i t i s the same doc t r ine . A problem associated 
with the Chris t ian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the c r e a t i o n l i e s in 
t h e i r bel ief tha t the impure ear th ly world has evolved 
from God d i r e c t l y . The solut ion given by St . Thomas i s not 
so convincing as t h a t one given by St . Augustine, which i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y a v o l i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in theo log ica l 
f lavour . As for the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Muslim t h i n k e r s , 
t h e i r approach seems to be s e l e c t i v e . They take up what 
appears to them a b e t t e r doctr ine.whether i t was neo-Platonic 
or Ar i s to te l i an . Due to t h i s approach,coupled with the 
e f fo r t to remain fa i thfu l to the Islamic be l i e f , t h e i r specu-
l a t i o n gets stranded in the confusion of homogeneity and 
heterogenei ty. Generally, they are more A r i s t o t e l i a n than 
neo-Platonic , But there i s very meagre and untenable view 
of God in Ar is to te l ian metaphysics where there i s no passage 
from God to the world. Following the views of neo-Platonism, 
on the other hand, they hold that God remains in Himself high 
above the created world, nevertheless these are intermediary 
l i n k s . This concept of intermediate being i s r a t i ona l i zed by 
connecting i t with the Muslim bel ief in ange l s . 
A serious d i f f i cu l ty which a r i ses i s about the recon-
c i l i a t i o n of the theory of emanation with Islam. According 
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to the neo-Platonic theory of emanation every lower l e v e l 
s t r i v e s to move towards the h i g n e r l e v e l in order to become 
one with God u l t imate ly . This in terpre ta t ion has p a n t h e i s t i c 
world-outlook which make t h e i r p o s i t i o n a subject to the 
ser ious c r i t i c i s m of orthodox Muslim. A s imi lar charge of 
pantheism was l e v e l l e d against S t . Thomas. But he saved 
himself by s t r e s s i n g that God i s the e f f i c i e n t cause , present 
by His operat ion i n everything. This meant that everything 
needs not to be submerged o n t o l o g i c a l l y in Divine Being. I t 
i s present i n God only because of being dependent upon 
His operat ion and control . What i s important here i s that 
God does not create through intermediar ies , but He r a d i a t e s 
through the hierarchy. In t h i s sense God c r e a t e s the world 
d i r e c t l y . But in the case of the Muslim phi losophers the 
problem i s d i f f e r e n t . In order to escape from the charge 
of pantheism or anthropomorphism both al-FarabT and Ibn Slna 
seek support from A r i s t o t l e . According to Ibn SIna God alone 
i s abso lute ly simple, while a l l other beings have dual nature, 
Being abso lute ly simple the Essence of God i s i d e n t i c a l with 
His Exis tence . So His ex i s tence i s necessary. But the 
ex i s t ence of other things i s not necessary because except 
God there i s no other being whose essence i s i d e n t i c a l with 
i t s e x i s t e n c e . Being cont ingent , the ir ex i s t ence i s only 
p o s s i b l e . This means that idea of the non-exis tence of God 
involves an inherent c o n t r a d i c t i o n but there i s no c o n t r a -
d i c t i o n i n supposing the non-ex i s t ence of o t h e r t h i n g s . 
1 . The d i s t i n c t i o n between necessary and p o s s i b l e being led 
Ibn Sina t o formulate h i s famous proof fo r the e x i s t e n c e 
of God according to which the ex i s t ence of the p o s s i b l e 
being needs a necessary being for i t s e x i s t e n c e . Moses 
Maimonide-s and S t . Thomas Aquinas accepted t h i s proof 
while Ibn Rijshd rejected i t . 
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The possible being can never become necessary. Thus 
there is neither pantheism nor anthropomorphism in Muslim 
philosophers' view of God. 
Aristotle's metaphysics is quite far from this type 
of implicatioji that could explain an exhaustive relation 
between God and the universe. According to him the evolu-
tion from the lower level to higher is so categorised that 
no level can have the identity with God: 
"But the forms of living creatures do 
not evolve nature includes a series^ 
a hierarchy, of fixed ends, and it is 
only within the limits of these ends 
that individual members of species evolve. 
No animal ever changes into a different 
or a new species. In short, Aristotle 
believed in a doctrine of the fixity of 
the species. The highest development 
possible for any living creature is to 
become a fully functioning and fully 
developed^member of its own particular 
species." 
But the account of creation in terras of i itellectual 
emanation by Muslim philosophers (for convenience let us 
concentrate on Ibn Sina alone) is antagonistic to the ortho-
dox Ash'arite belief in the will of God. There is no room 
to accommodate the will of God significantly in the emanatory 
process of creation given by the Muslim philosophers. Here 
1. Bewkes _et_ al., and Keene, The Western Heritage of Faith 
and ReasonTHaroer and Row, Publishers, New York, 1963), 
p, 29b, 
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God's wi l l means nothinp but the necessary procession 
of the world from Him, and Ciod's c rea t ive process i s 
expressed through t h i s . In o ther words, the process of 
the emanation of tlie world from God i s not against His 
w i l l . And t h i s would need another discussion as to 
whether or not to say that something i s not against the 
w i l l i s d i f ferent from i t s being in accordance with the 
w i l l . I t may be argued tha t there i s no r o l e for God's 
wi l l because there i s no choice at a l l . Something more 
c l ea r l y i s s ta ted as follows: 
"Rationally determined a c t i v i t y i s , 
of course , compatible with w i l l and 
choice and can a lso be said to be 
done with choice but t h i s choice 
has to be brought in an addi t iona l 
element both I n i t i a l l y and f i n a l l y . 
For, suppose, a man chooses to think 
about a c e r t a i n problem. Now the 
i n i t i a l choice i s h i s own to think 
about t h i s r a the r than that problem 
and then at any moment he can also 
choose or w i l l to terminate t h i s 
process of th inking. What goes on 
between the beginning and the end 
wi l l be a r a t i o n a l l y determined process 
of thought, and not a s e r i e s of choices , 
though the process as a whole i s also 
chosen and voluntary . But in the 
phi losophical account of God there i s 
Just no room for t h i s addi t ional factor^ 
e i t h e r at the end or at the beginning," 
Whether a r a t i o n a l l y determined a c t i v i t y of God 
;ives Him a chance to choose and, thereby, to w i l l or not 
1. Fazlur Rahman, "Ibn Sina", M.M.Sharif's e d t . A History 
of Muslim Philosophy, 0£. c i t . , p . 503. 
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becomes obvious by what Ibn SXna and o thers hold, t h e i r 
doctr ine of the e t e r n i t y of the world, one of the three 
most serious doctr ines on the ground of which al-Ghazal i 
a l l eges them for heresy. Although the Muslim philosophers 
be l ieve that God i s an e t e rna l c rea to r of the world, they 
in terpre ted i t in the l i g h t of Ar i s to t e l i an doc t r ine of 
p o t e n t i a l i t y turning in to a c t u a l i t y . The formless prime 
matter , in i t s f u l l p o t e n t i a l i t y , i s co -e t e rna l with God. 
Thus, the crea t ion does not mean tha t something i s brought 
i n to existence from nothing. I t i s something which already 
existed that was responsible for the exis tence of the world. 
Since time i s the locus of body, the l a t t e r can not ex i s t 
without time. Meaning, thereby, tha t time also i s co -e t e rna l 
with matter . 
According to al-Ghazali majority of the phi losophers 
except Plato who held the c rea t ion of the world in time 
Galen, who was neut ra l on the question of e t e r n i t y due to 
inherent d i f f i c u l t y in i t and a few o t h e r s , agree upon 
the e t e rn i ty of the world. Their approach to th i s problem 
"What caused the nature of time to be hidden from the 
majority of the men of knowledge so tha t tha t notion 
perplexed them — l i k e Galen and o thers — and made 
them wonder whether or not time had a t rue r e a l i t y 
in that which e x i s t s , i s the fact that time i s an acc i -
dent subs is t ing in an acc ident . " Moses Maimonides, 
"The Guide of the Perplexed", t r a n s . S.Pines in Philosophy 
in the Middle Ages, e d t s . Arthur Hyman and James J.Walsh 
(Harper and Row, Publ ishers , New York, 1967), p . 3 8 1 . 
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is substantial than any other metaphysical problem. So 
al-Ghaz'ali puts this problem first in Tahafut and gives 
it the largest space. In order to refute the philosophers' 
arguments in favour of the eternity of the world, al-Ghaz"ali 
systematically divides them under four heads and discusses 
thera one by one. So we should also proceed in the same 
order. 
The First Proof; 
Basic to the first argument of the philosophers in 
favour of the eternity of the world is their adherence 
to the Aristotelian concept of cause and will, Al-Ghazali 
illustrates the philosophers' argument on the impossibility 
of the creation of the world as follows: 
"The procession of a temporal (being) 
from an eternal (being) is absolutely 
Impossible. For, if we suppose the 
eternal at a stage when the world had 
not yet originated from Him, then the 
reason why it had not originated must 
have been that there was no determinant 
for its existence, and that the existence 
of the world was a possibility only. So, 
when later the world comes into existence, 
we must choose one of the two alterna-
tives (to explain it) namely, either 
that the determinent has, or it has not 
emerged. If the determinant did not 
emerge , the world should still remain 
in the state of bare possibility in which 
it was before. But if it has emerged, 
who is the originator of the determinant 
itself ? And why does it come into being 
now, and did not do so before ? Thus, the 
question regarding the origin of the 
determinant stands. In fine, since all 
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the s t a t u s of the Eternal are a l i k e , 
e i t h e r nothing sha l l o r ig ina t e Iwia Him, 
or wnatever or ig ina tes sna i l concmue 
to o r ig ina t e lor ever." ' ' 
Although the argument in present form i s found in 
Ibn Sina, i n fac t , i t i s Ar i s to te l i an . Ibn SIna takes i t 
from a book De ae t e r n i t a t e mundi of John Philoponus, a 
l a t e Greek Chr i s t i an conmentator of A r i s t o t l e . John 
Philoponus argues against e t e r n i t y in h is r eac t ion against 
a neo-P la ton i s t , Proclus , who gave eighteen arguments in 
favour of e t e r n i t y of the world. While rep ly ing , Philoponus 
mentioned the arguments of Proclus a l so , jus t as Ibn Rushd 
did i n h i s reply t o al-Ghaz'ali, I n fac t , the phi losophers 
have always been aware of the d i f f i c u l t y of proving the 
world as a temporal c rea t ion . This i s the reason perhaps 
t h a t there are only two important systems where we find a 
r e j e c t i o n of the theory of the e t e r n i t y , namely, in P l a t o -
n i s t s and S to ics . Although Plato himself believed in the 
temporal c rea t ion of the world, not by God, but by a demiurge, 
h i s followers disagreed from him. And the Stoics are thus 
the only pos t -Ar i s to te l i ans who held the doc t r ine of 
o r i g i n a t i o n and des t ruct ion of the world. Even Philoponus 
himself borrowed the Stoic arguments in order to defend his 
2 
view of temporal c rea t ion . 
1 . Al-Ghaz'ali, Tahafut, p . 1^. 
2, Simon van den Bergh, TT, Vol. I, "Introduction", p.xvii. 
Thus according to the philosophers i t i s qui te 
inexpl icable to hold that the world has come into exis tence 
i n t ime. Any attempt to explain i t s c rea t ion from an act 
of the wi l l of God implies the in t roduct ion of a determinant , 
i . e . , an external fac tor which causes a change in Him which 
i s quite impossible to conceive. Another problem with such 
an i n t e rp r e t a t i on of the c rea t ion of the world l i e s in the 
question that why God willed to create He at a p a r t i c u l a r 
moment wi l led , and not e a r l i e r . 
To answer the foregoing arguments of the ph i losophers , 
1 
al-Ghazali makes two objec t ions , 
( i ) . In the f i r s t par t al-Ghazali a s s e r t s tha t God 
willed from e t e r n i t y the world to a r i se at the p a r t i c u l a r 
time when i t ac tua l ly came into ex is tence . S imi lar ly He 
had been e t e rna l l y wil l ing the non-existence of the world 
u n t i l i t ac tua l ly arose . Addressing the philosophers he 
argues: 
'•How wi l l you disprove one who says 
tha t the world came into being because 
of the e te rna l wi l l which demanded i t s 
existence at the time at which i t ac tua l ly 
came into existence and which demanded 
the non-existence (of the world) to l a s t 
as long as i t l a s t e d , and (demanded) 
1. The f i r s t object ion covers pp. l6-32, and the second 
pp, 32-55 in Tahafut. 
7. 
the exis tence to begin where 
i t ac tua l ly began ? So on t h i s view^ 
the exis tence of the world was not 
an object of the e t e rna l w i l l , before 
the world ac tua l ly ex is ted ; hence 
i t s non-ac tua l iza t ion . And i t was 
an object of the w i l l . a t the time 
when i t ac tua l i zed , " 
The above argument given by al-Ghazali makes a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the act of wi l l and the object of w i l l . 
I t i s God's act of w i l l which i s e t e r n a l , and l a t e r on 
the re comes a moment when the object of w i l l , i . e . the 
world , i s ac tua l ized . The argument i s i n conformity with 
t h e s ix teenth argument of John Philoponus tha t he advances 
aga ins t Proclus . Philoponus also makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
God's e t e rna l ly wi l l ing something and God's wi l l ing i t to 
be e t e r n a l , between God's e t e r n a l wil l and the e t e r n i t y 
of the object of t h i s w i l l . I t would not be i r r e l e v a n t 
here to compare t h i s argument with a s imi la r argument given 
by G.E.Moore to disprove Berkeley 's dictum esse est p e r c i p i , 
where I4oore, l i k e a l -Ghazal i , d i s t inguishes between the act 
of perception and the object of percept ion. Ibn Rushd 
c r i t i c i z e s al-Ghazali that the object of the w i l l of God 
i s actual ized at a p a r t i c u l a r s tage . In t h i s s i t u a t i o n i t 
can not be cal led as His wi l l but as His dec is ion . Ibn Rushd 
1. Al-Ghaz'ali, ££. c i t . , p . 16. 
2 . Van den Bergh, TT, Vol. I I , p . 303. 
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makes d i s t i n c t i o n between wil l and decis ion arguing tha t 
in the case of a decision a delay i s poss ib l e , while in 
the case of wil l there is no delay. I t means tha t wi l l 
i s something d i f fe ren t from decis ion. However, he r e j e c t s 
the whole discuss ion because^in his view, the argument 
given by al-Ghazali assumes that God's wi l l and the human 
wi l l are both a l i k e . What we understand by wi l l i s t h a t 
the w i l i e r needs something. But t h i s i s not what i s meant 
by God's Will, for He has no need, otherwise He may not 
be a perfect and absolute Being. 
The philosophers argue that i f God has an e t e r n a l 
wi l l and nothing was further needed as a determinant to 
c rea te the world then what was that which prevented 
world to emerge e a r l i e r ? And the answer here given by a l -
Ghazali does not seem to be convincing. He asks the ph i loso-
phers whether t h e i r asser t ion that the imposs ib i l i ty to 
ascribe the o r ig in of something to e te rna l w i l l i s se l f -
evident or demonstrable. If i t i s se l f -evident then t h e i r 
opponents, v i z . , Ash^arites, should also bel ieve in i t . 
Since i t i s not so, t h e i r asser t ion i s not s e l f - e v i d e n t . And 
i f i t i s demonstrable then what i s the middle term to connect 
the major and the minor terras ? Here al-Ghazali does not 
mention, as he does at other p laces , the poss ib le answer on 
behalf of the philosophers. However, the phi losophers 
may make a demonstrable premise by connecting the middle 
term 'an e te rna l w i l l ' with the major term ' t h e imposs ib i l i ty 
of ascribing the or igin of something to God', and the minor 
> 
term 'the will of God', In this way the three membered 
syllogism will be: 
"It is impossible to ascribe j:he ' 
origin of something to an eternal j > 
will. The will of God is an" 
eternal will. Therefore, it'is -^  ^  - > ^ ^
impossible to ascribe the origin . ^ f^-' 
of something to the will of God'*! i ,. ^  '^ 
Although we do not find any fallacy in the above 
syllogism, it hardly proves anything. Strictly speaking, 
there is no hard and fast rule in formal logic to use the 
substitutive constants for the variables. In order to get 
a consistent conclusion one is to be sure whether the 
substitutive constant by nature is simple or complex. And 
even after such assurance the possibility of an unsatisfactory^ 
though not invalid, conclusion can not be over ruled. For 
example, in hypothetical syllogism out of four alternat ive 
propositions, viz. (a) antecedent is true and consequent is 
true; (b) antecedent is true and consequent is false; (c) ante-
cedent is false and consequent is true; and (d) antecedent is 
false and consequent is false, only one namely, antecedent 
is true and consequent is false, is considered to be false. 
Thus the proposition having false antecedent and true conse-
quent will be true, for example, "If coal is white then 
Socr^ ites is a man". But the proposition is obviously incon-
sistent because there is no relation between coal's being 
white and Socrates' being a man. 
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Throughout the whole d iscuss ion in Tah'^fut al-Ghazaili 
has to play double r o l e , i . e . , f i r s t he argues from the 
views of the philosophers and l ^ t e r as an orthodox be l iever 
he refutes them. In h is d i a l e c t i c a l method sometimes i t 
seems that al-GhazSli , wi l l ing ly or unwi l l ingly , avoids some 
serious quest ions from the side of the phi losophers . For ins t ance , 
in the f i r s t problem re l a t i ng to e t e r n i t y many times he uses 
the expression that God a r b i t r a r i l y chooses a moment for 
c r ea t ion . Now, the more important object ion here than any 
other from the side of the philosophers may be on the use of 
the term •moment'. The term represents a time dura t ion . But 
since time i t s e l f i s created and cannot be conceived apart 
from some beings in i t which are yet not c r ea t ed , to 1^ t a lk 
about i t i s something quite unwarranted, 
AL-Ghazali in his d i a l e c t i c reaches to the middle 
term between God and the man, namely, the un ive r se . He shows 
the imposs ib i l i ty of the e t e r n i t y of the world by arguing 
tha t i t leads to the view tha t the c e l e s t i a l spheres have 
an i n f i n i t e number of ro ta t ions with f i n i t e p a r t s . And t h i s 
involves con t rad ic t ion . He says: 
"The e t e r n i t y of the worlo i s impossible . 
For i t leads to the affirmation of spher ica l 
revolut ion which are i n f i n i t e in number, 
and consis t of innumerable u n i t s . The fact 
i s that these revolut ions can be divided in to 
one-s ix th , or one-fourth, or a half . For 
ins tance , the sphere of the Sun completes 
one revolut ion in one year, while t ha t of 
Saturn makes one in t h i r t y years . Therefore^ 
) ; 
the revolution of Saturn are one 
thirtieth of those of the Sun. And 
the revolutions of Jupiter are one-
twelfth of those of the sun, for 
Jupiter completes one revolution in 
twelve years,"'' 
This is very important argument against the eternity 
of the world. Here al-Ghazali wants to show the inconsis-
tency involved in the assertion of the philosophers by 
giving the account of the number of revolutions of the 
celestial bodies within a certain period. This method in 
logic is known as reductio and absurdum or Indirect Proof. 
In it the thesis of the opponent prima facie is assumed 
to be true, but its conclusion later on is shown to be 
contradictory or absurd, Al-Ghazali says that one celestial 
body takes a period of one year to complete one revolution 
while the other takes thirty years, and an other takes 
twelve years. Now, it is clear that the number of revolu-
tions of one body which takes shorter period to complete 
one revolution would be greater than that one which takes 
a longer period. The same thing is true in the case of 
other celestial bodies also. Since all the bodies are moving 
eternally, it would, thereby, mean that the eternity of the 
faster body would be more than the slower one. And this is 
evidently impossible. To maintain that the eternity of one 
celestial body is greater than th^t of other is self-contra-
dictory. So, in order to explain the revolution of these 
bodies we must have to acknowledge the beginning of their 
1. Al-Ghazali, 0£, clt., p. 20. 
su 
movement. 
Here we can not charge al-Ghazali for h i s ignorance when 
he says tha t . the sphere of the Sun takes one year to complete 
i t s one revolu t ion , because he belonged to the geocentr ic 
age of Ptolemy who held that the earth was immobile and 
const i tu ted the cent re of the universe and that the Sun, 
Moon, planets and s t a r s revolve round the e a r t h . I t may 
be noted that the period of a l - G h a z ^ i i s 1058 AD-1111 AD 
while that of Copernicus, the founder of the h e l i o - c e n t r i c 
theory, i s 1473 AD-1543 AD. However, t h i s fac t has nothing 
to do with the force of the argument given by al-Ghaz"ali. 
Two things are important here to n o t i c e . One, the 
argument given above i s not a l -Ghaza l i ' s own b r a i n — c h i l d . 
This he has c e r t a i n l y borrowed, again, from John Philoponus 
who, in h is argument against Proclus ' theory of the e t e r n i t y 
of the world, argues^ 
"Since the c e l e s t i a l spheres do not move 
with equal periods of revolu t ion ,but one 
in 30 years , the other in 12 years , and 
others in shor ter p e r i o d s , , . , and if the 
c e l e s t i a l motion were without a beginning, 
then necessar i ly Saturn must have performed 
an i n f i n i t y of revolu t ions , but J u p i t e r 
nearly three times as many, the Sun 30 
times as many, the moon 36O times as many 
and the sphere of the fixed s t a r s more than 
10,000 times as mahy. I s i t not beyond any 
absurdity to suppose a ten thousandfold 
i n f in i t y or even an i n f i n i t e time of i n f i n i t y , 
Si 
while the in f in i te can not be comprised 
even once ? Thus necessarily the revo-
lut ion of the c e l e s t i a l bodies must have 
had a beginning."'' 
In order to show the absurdity in the philosophers' 
posit ion i t i s argued that the number of the revolutions 
of these c e l e s t i a l bodies i s either odd or even or both 
or neither. The la s t two alternatives can not rat ional ly 
be maintained as they are evidently contradictory and 
absurd. So i t i s either odd or even. Now, to say that i t 
i s odd means that i t i s l e ss by one revolution in order to 
become even. Similarly, i f i t i s even, then i t needs one 
more to become odd. But the question i s that how i t can 
be the case that that which i s inf ini te O'-ist needs one 
to become even or odd, Al-Ghazali further argues that the 
philosophers can not here say that terms odd or even are 
applicable to f i n i t e , not to in f in i t e . The so cal led infi-
n i t e series i s made by f in i t e units which can be divided 
into one-sixth or one twelfth etc . on account of their 
revolutions. So i t i s wrong to say that t he i r number of 
revolut ions i s neither odd nor even. 
Secondly, the argument PISO intends to disprove the 
e t e r n i t y of the world by showing another inherent con t ra -
d ic t ion in the pos i t ion of the ohilosophers, To assume 
the world to have no beginning in time means that at any 
1. Shmuel Sambursky, "Note on John Philoponus' Rejection of 
of the I n f i n i t e " , Islamic Philosophy and the Class ica l 
Tradi t ion e d t s . S.h.Stern, A Kourani, V. Brown (Bruno 
Cassi rer Fublishers Ltd . , Oxfoi"d, 1972), D. 353. 
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moment which we can imagine an infinite series must 
have ended. According to this view a particular time 
duration is a finite unit which can be considered to 
be an effect of an infinite series of causes as well as 
a cause of an infinite series of effects. Every moment 
is a finite junction of an infinite series of an infinite 
past as well as an infinite future. But the problem is 
that an infinite, by definition is that which can not 
be traversed. This means that the world is not infinite. 
Ibn Rushd argues by holding, what Aristotle taught, that that 
which has no beginning has no end. We can not say that 
the infinite series of time can be traversed somewhere. 
But his answer is not convincing because there is certainly 
finite time. The problem is not confined to the Medieval 
period alone. The argument of al-Ghazali anticipates what 
Immanuel Kant later on posited in the thesis of his Ir first 
antinomy. He argues: 
"If we assume that the world has 
no beginning in time, then upto 
every given moment an eternity 
has elapsed, and there has passed 
always in the world an infinite 
series of successive states of 
th ings . Now the i n f in i t y of a s e r i e s 
cons i s t s in the fact that i t can 
never be completed through succe-
ssive synthes is . I t thus allows tha t 
i t i s impossible for an i n f i n i t e 
world-series to have passed away, and 
1. Ibn Rushd, OJD. c i t . , p . 11. 
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tha t a beginning of the world i s 
therefore a necessary condit ion of 
the world 's exis tence." ' ' 
The problem with the philosophers in general and 
here with Ibn Rushd in p a r t i c u l a r i s that they f a i l to 
give a cons is tent account in favour of the i r two he te ro-
geneous t h e o r i e s , v i z . , e t e r n i t y of the world and the 
F i r s t Cause. Ibn Rushd denies that i n f i n i t e time involves 
an i n f i n i t e causal s e r i e s . He says tha t if an i n f i n i t e 
causal se r i e s i s proved then i t wi l l be . d i f f i cu l t to 
prove the F i rs t Cause because i n f i n i t e means beginningless 
as well as endless . So he says that the causal sequence 
in time i s only acc identa l , not e s s e n t i a l . I t i s God alone 
who i s e s s en t i a l l y the F i r s t Cause. For t h i s reason Ar i s to t l e 
has denied the s p a t i a l i n f i n i t e whole. I t means that the 
world i s l imi ted in space while time i s i n f i n i t e . And t h i s 
i s a pos i t ion which can hardly be maintained because i t 
means tha t there i s time without space. Time i s infac t a 
locus of events , an order of r e l a t i o n of th ings in i t . But 
things exis t in space so the r e a l i t y of time without ©space 
can not be conceived jus t as there i s no space without t ime. 
So both are co-exis tent and none of the two can be thought 
to exis t without the other . Now if the philosophers can 
hold the f in i tude of space, they should admit the f in i tude 
of time a l so . 
1. Iramanuel Kant, Cri t ique of Pure Reason, t r ans la ted by 
Norman Kemp Smith (Mac Millan and Co. Limited, London, 
1929), p . 397. 
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The phi losophers ' theory of e t e rn i t y of the world 
i s based on what Kant l a t e r on posited in the a n t i t h e s i s 
of h is f i r s t antinomy where he argues that i f we assume 
tha t the world has a beginning then we are obliged to 
assume that time must precede the world so t ha t the world 
may be originated in i t . But i t i s not poss ib le for a 
thing to be originated in an empty time because no pa r t 
of such a time possesses , as compared with any o the r , a 
d is t inguish ing condit ion of existence r a the r than of non-
ex is tence . Exactly the same thing al-Ghazal i s t a t e s in 
_Tahafut. The philosophers argue: 
" . . . . t h a t a l l the moment being equal 
with respect to the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
the r e l a t i o n of the e te rna l wi l l to 
them, there can not be anything to 
d i s t ingu i sh one p a r t i c u l a r moment from 
a l l those before and a f te r i t ? " 2 
"We know i t as a se l f -evident fact tha t 
nothing can be dis t inguished from i t s 
l i k e , unless there be something which 
gives i t a specia l charac te r . If 
without such a thing --i d i s t i n c t i o n 
between two l i k e things were poss ib le 
then i t would follow that in the case 
of the world, which was possible of 
existence as well as of non-exis tence, 
the balance would be t i l t e d in favour 
of existence notwithstanding the 
fact that non-existence possessed an 
equal measure of p o s s i b i l i t y and tha t 
there was nothing to ,g ive exis tence a 
special cha rac t e r . " 
1 . I b i d . , p . 3 9 7 . 
2. Al-Ghazali, ££. c i t . , p . 23 . 
3 . I b i d . , p . 2 4 . 
Thus,according to the philosophers one time would 
be as good as another for the creat ion of the world. If 
t h e r e is no diffei^entiatiag p r inc ip le , i t i s impossible 
for God to choose one time ra ther than tne o ther one 
completely s imi la r in order to create the world. This 
i s the attack of the philosophers on, what George F.Kourani 
c a l l s , the A s h ' a r i t e ' s "time bomb" theory of c r e a t i o n . 
Al-Ghaz"ali answers the philosophers arguing tha t 
God's wil l i s not the subject of choosing by d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . 
The argument of the philosophers i s based on the assumption 
tha t man has the faculty of wi l l which functions through 
choices by d i f fe ren t i a t ing between two s imi lar t h ings . 
After t h i s d i f fe ren t i a t ion a person prefers one to the o ther . 
Now, two object ions can be level led against such assumption. 
F i r s t , such a faculty of wi l l can be proved to be self cont-
radic tory as well as u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Just as there i s 
freedom of choice between two d iss imi la r t h i n g s , s imi l a r ly 
nothing can prevent i t when two tnings are exact ly s im i l a r . 
I f , for example, there are two exactly s imi la r dates kept 
before a hungry man who i s asked to choose only one, he wi l l 
c e r t a i n l y take one of them. I t i s nonsense to hope that 
the man wi l l continue to remain in a s t a t e of constant 
h e s i t a t i o n looking at them without taking e i t h e r . He wi l l 
choose one of the two dates a r b i t r a r i l y . This i s a p r a c t i -
ca l l y demonstrable fact which needs no explanat ion as to why 
1. George F. Hourani, "The Dialogue between al-Ghazal i and 
the Philosophers on the Origin of the iVorld" The Muslim 
World (1958) Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, p . 186. 
he prefers t h i s to t h a t . The case is same with God 
also as why He chooses one moment ra ther than the o the r . 
I t may be held that time and the world are both s imul ta-
neously c rea ted . This means tha t before the world exis ted 
there was no t ime. So there i s no quest ion of choice 
between two moments because there was no moment at a l l 
before the c rea t ion . And t h i s i s the l i m i t a t i o n of our 
i n t e l l e c t u a l facul ty that i t f a i l s to imagine the function 
of God's wil l in absence of space and time. To use Kantian 
terminology, our ca tegor ies of understanding can not go 
beyond the realm of the forms of s e n s i b i l i t y , i . e . , space 
and t ime. They are the condit ions and the mode of our 
thought. Any venture to understand the metaphysical r e a l i -
t i e s , which are over and above these forms, would r e s u l t 
in to f u t i l e . Hence, a r a t i o n a l theology i s impossible . 
Secondly, there i s difference between God's Will and 
the human w i l l . If we assume tha t human w i l l i s determined 
to choose through d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , i t does not follow that 
the Divine Will also chooses in the same manner. The choice 
of the Divine Will may be a rb i t r a ry (or the re may be some 
other factors which we do not know). However, the charge 
that if God's will i s not determined by any motive at a l l and 
tha t i f God crea tes a r b i t r a r i l y then i t would mean tha t the 
crea t ion does not involve any reason or purpose can be 
protested We can not say that God's choice of a p a r t i c u l a r 
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moment (term 'moment' should not be taken here in strict 
technical sense) for the creation of the world violates 
teleology. In the context of God the purposiveness is 
applied for the world as a whole. It is impossible, 
indeed, to say something positively about the Divine .Vill 
on the basis of our limited sources of knowledge. This is 
what Hourani says about: 
"The question of the eternity of the 
world can not be solved from consider-
ations of the Divine Will, for we do 
not know enough about the nature of 
that will, though we may guess a great 
deal."I 
The second part of the original argument is very 
brief, Al-Ghazali summarizes his proof by addressing the 
philosophers in the following words: 
"You reject as impossible the procession 
of a temporal from an eternal being. But 
we have to admit its possibility. For 
there are temporal phenomena in the world. 
And some other phenomena are the causes 
of those phenomena. Now, it is impossible 
that one set of temporal phenomena should 
be caused by another, and that the series 
should go on ad infinitum. No intelligent 
person can believe such a tiling. If it 
had been possible, you would not have 
considered it obligatory on your part to 
introduce the Creator (into your theories) , 
or affirm the Necessary Being in Whom all 
the possible things have their ground. 
So if there is a limit at which the series 
of temporal phenomena stops, let this limit 
be called the Eternal, 
1 . Ibid., p. 187. 
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And this proves hov/ the possibility 
of the procession of a temporal from 
an eternal being can be deduced from 
their fundamental principles."'' 
This lengthy illustration can be expressed through 
four statements (i) there are temporal phenomena in 
the world; (ii) they are caused by other temporal phenomena, 
(iii) the series of temporal phenomena can not go on infini-
tely, therefore, (iv) the series must stop at a point. Now 
let us examine these statements. The first point is a 
straightforward as we experience things of the world subject 
to generation and corruption. So there is no dispute about 
it. At the second point we find al-Ghazali assuming the 
concept of secondary causation which he generally repudiates, 
According to him it is God alone who is the real cause, and 
any power or efficacy attributed to any other agency to 
produce some effect is unaccepted. It seems here that his 
acceptance of the secondary causation is only for the sake 
of argument, as he has said at another place that tne main 
purpose of Tah"afut is to refute the philosophers, not to 
2 
give his own view. It may also be said by ascribing causa-
tion to the temporal phenomena he infact means the prece-
dence of one temporal phenomena to the other. However, let 
us assume here that he implicitly admits the validity 
1. Al-Ghazali, O_D. cit. , p. 52, 
2. Ibid., p. 55. 
So 
of secondary causation. The third premise th^t the 
series of temporal phenomena can not go on infinitely 
is very important, because it is through this assumption 
that he attacked the philosophi^rs' belief in the etermity 
of the world. This he disproved earlier by giving an 
account of tne difference of time duration among the 
revolutions of the celestial bodies. There he has success-
fully shown that the motion of these planets must have 
started at some time. And this is asserted in the fourth 
point, that is, all the temporal series must stop at a 
point. And that point is what may be called Eternity. 
Ibn Rushd protests by making difference between caused 
and the created. Eternal Being does not create the temporal 
series. Although It causes the temporal series, it is done 
not in the sense as al-Ghazali interprets. 'Only the whole 
eternal series is caused essentially by an eternal Being 
acting upon the whole. Thus the eternal Being is not a 
cause of temporal Being qua temporal, and so the philoso-
phers have not admitted that God can act directly in time. 
The philosophers hold that God is the mover of the world, 
not in the sense that the world is a temporal series, but 
as a logical series. God is the mover in a logical sense. 
«v'. T. Stace says: 
1. G. F. Hourani, OD. cit., p. 188. 
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"It sounds as if he ^Aristotle^ meant 
that the first mover is something at 
the beginning of time, which, so to 
speak, gave things a push to start 
them off. This is not what Aristotle 
means. For the true efficient cause 
is the final cause. And God is the 
first mover only in this character 
as absolute end. As for as time is 
concerned, neither the universe, nor 
the motion in it, ever had any beginn-
ing. Every mechanical cause has its 
cause in turn, as so ad infinitum God 
is not a first cause, in our sense, 
that is, a first mechanical cause which 
existed before the world, and created 
it. He is a teleological cause working 
from the end. But as 5uch, He is 
logically prior to all beginning, and 
so is the first mover."'' 
Now, it is obviously difficult to understand what 
the philosophers mean by logical priority of God to that 
which is an empirical fact and yet co-eternal with God. 
The examples like the priority of the premises of a syllogism 
to their conclusion, or that of a body to its shadow, does 
not solve the problem. For these examples are not similar 
to that of the relation between God and the world. y^ gain, 
it is quite possible to give an apprehensible explanation 
about the precedence or priority of a body to its shadow 
or that of a premise to its conclusion. But the relation 
between the Eternal and the world is not so. f^e do not 
understand how God can be the cause of an eternal and un-
created world. Simon Van den Bergh rightly states the 
1. W.T.Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, 
op. cit., pT 28A-5. 
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inadequacy in the argument of the phi losophers: 
"Ghazali 's argument i s perfec t ly sound. 
The unchanging i n f i n i t e e te rna l and the 
transcendent f i n i t e individual are in -
commensurable. No change can depend on 
the unchangeable, and to posi t as a l ink 
an en t i ty p a r t i c i p a t i n g in both natures 
does not solve the d i f f i c u l t y but doubles 
i t , for the r e l a t i on of the primary terms 
to the intermediate term remains as 
obscure^as the r e l a t i o n between the primary 
terms." 
The Second Proof: 
The second argument of the phi losophers , as a l -
Ghazali p r e sen t s , on the e t e r n i t y of the world, revolves 
around the p o s s i b i l i t y of e s s e n t i a l or temporal p r i o r i t y 
of God to the world. To bel ieve that God i s p r i o r in 
essence would mean that His p r i o r i t y i s l i k e the p r i o r i t y 
of number one to number two, or the p r i o r i t y of the cause 
to the e f f ec t . And a l l these types of p r i o r i t y do no 
prove tha t both God and the world are not c o - e x i s t e n t . The 
philosophers argue that the e s sen t i a l p r i o r i t y of God does 
not hinder us to maintain tha t God and the world are not 
co -e t e rna l . The argument from essence i s given as follows: 
"He ^who bel ieves tha t the world i s 
pos te r io r to God^  may mean by i t tha t 
God i s p r io r in essence, not in t ime, 
as one i s pr ior to two. For one i s 
pr ior to two by na tu re , although i t 
i s possible that both should co-ex i s t 
in time. Or, God's p r i o r i t y w i l l , on 
1. Van den Bergh, TT, Vol. I I , 36 .3 . 
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this view, be like the priority 
of the cause to the effect—e.g,, 
the priority of the movement of a 
person to the movement of the 
shadow which follows him, or the 
priority of the movement of hand 
to the movement of the ring on 
it, or the priority of the move-
ment of a hand in water to the 
movement of the water. Both the 
movements in each one of these 
instances are simultaneous; and 
yet one is the cause, while the 
other is the effect,,,. If this 
is what God*s priority to the world 
means, it will be necessary that 
both should be either eternal or 
temporal. It will be impossible 
for one to be eternal while the 
other is temporal,"^ 
Another possible form of the priority of God to the 
world may be temporal in nature. According to the philoso-
phers, says al-Ghazali, if God's priority means that He is 
prior to the world and time in time, then this would mean 
that before the existence of the world and time there was a 
time when the world did not exist. This means that there was 
time before time. But this is self-contradictory,'^ This 
argument from time is originally Aristotelian, According to 
him time is the measure of motion. Now if time is proved to 
be eternal, then motion also must be eternal. This means the 
eternity of that which is in motion. And this is the world. 
So the world is eternal. We find here that the argument is 
restricted and exclusive. The argument is exclusive is the 
1. Al-Ghazali, _02» £il» t P» 35-6. 
2. Ibid., p. 36. 
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fact that becomes clear from the argument from essence. 
The argument shows that the essential priority of God does 
not necessitate to refrain us from believing the temporal 
co-existence of both, God and the world. It proves neither 
the temporal priority of God nor the posteriority of the 
world, but the co-existence. Thus, if God is eternal then 
the world also is eternal. Similarly if God is in time the 
world also is in time. Since the philosophers have shown the 
contradiction involved in believing the temporal priority of 
God to the world. He is prior in essence. 
If we look at the construction of the argument, the 
entire proof is constituted of two hidden premises and the 
implied conclusion. The conclusion that the world is eternal 
is not proved directly, but by reductio ad absurdum. The two 
arguments, namely from time and from essence, in fact are 
two premises of the conclusion that the world is eternal. They 
are certainly not constructed to prove the eternity of the 
world directly. They prove the co-existence of God and the 
world by constituting a disjunctive syllogism: 
God is either essentially or temporally 
prior to the world. 
He is not temporally prior to the world 
because it involves self-contradiction. 
Therefore, He is essentially prior to 
the world. 
Since priority in essence, as illustrated by the examples 
of the movement of a person to that of his shadow, or the 
movement of the hand to that of the ring on i t e t c . , means 
co-exis tence of the two, i t means tha t e i t he r both are 
e t e r n a l or both are temporal. I t i s not proper to be l ieve 
tha t God i s temporal. So both God and the world should be 
e t e r n a l . The d is junct ive pos i t ion imp l i c i t l y used in t h i s 
argument i s in fac t a type of syllogism which Ibn STna terms 
as "a hypo the t i ca l* t ru ly ' d i s junc t ive syllogism" (qiyas 
i s t i thna^iyy^ shar'^iyy munfagil haqiqatan) where two d i s -
junc t ive ly connected proposi t ions ar« given in which the 
den ia l of one r e s u l t s in the affirmation of the o the r or the 
•1 
aff i rmat ion of one r e su l t s i n the denial of the o t h e r . 
However, t n i s exposi t ion of d i s junc t ive syxlogism i s d i f f e r en t 
from that of modern log ic , Fbr i n modern logic although the 
negation of one proposit ion r e s u l t s in the af f i rmat ion of 
the o the r , the affirmation of the one does not r e s u l t in the 
negation of the o ther . 
Another important point in t h i s argument i s i t s c i r cu -
l a r i t y . According to Ar is to t le time i s the measure of motion. 
The r e a l i t y of t ime, thus , i s deduced from the r e a l i t y of 
motion. So time i s an accidental consequence which i s 
necessa r i ly attached to i t in the sense that the former can 
not be conceived by the i n t e l l e c t except together with motion. 
1, Michael E. Marmura, "The Logical Etole of the Argument from 
Time in the Tahafut 's Second Proof for the World's Pre-
e t e r n i t y " . The Muslim World. (1959), Vol. XLIX, No. A, 
p . 311. 
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So we have no r igh t to infer the r e a l i t y of motion from 
t ime. But the argument here i s the subject of the f a l l acy 
of p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i . The philosophers in fe r the e t e r n i t y 
of time by the e t e r n i t y of motion and v ice -versa . I n f a c t , 
Ar i s to t e l i an concept of time and space in i t s e l f i s not 
dea l t with cons i s t en t ly . He held time as i n f i n i t e and space 
as f i n i t e . On the other hand he also maintains the i n f i n i t y 
of motion. But the consequence of such a not ion i s d i s a s t r o u s . 
The i n f i n i t y of time and motion i s not compatible with the 
concept of the f in i tude of space. The view that motion is 
i n f i n i t e an t ic ipa tes the existence of the body which i s in 
motion. And the existence of a body presupposes the r e a l i t y 
of space. Thus the e t e rn i t y of motion i s impossible unless 
t he e t e rn i t y of space i s assumed. These assumptions and the i r 
incompatible nature to each other are not conducive for the 
Ar i s to te l i an argument to prove the e t e r n i t y of the world, 
Al-Ghazali*s answer i s simple and s t ra igh t forward . He 
says tha t time i s created with the world. And when i t i s said 
t h a t God i s p r io r to the world and time i t impl ies , f i r s t , 
t h a t God existed with time and the world did not e x i s t , and, 
secondly, that He existed and the world also ex is ted with 
Him. The f i r s t statement p o s i t s the exis tence of the essence 
of God and the non-existence of the essence of the world. 
The second statement pos i ts the existence of the essence of 
both , God and the world. The possible object ion t h a t may be 
raised by the philosophers is about the use of the term 
'afterwards' in the second statement which has temporal 
implication. Infact, the objection made by the philosophers 
against the temporal priority of God is based on this issue. 
The use of the term 'afterwards* or 'before' before creation 
of the world and time is self-contradictory because it means 
that there was time before its creation. Al-Ghazali replies 
that the term 'afterwards' does not imply a time order. This 
is due to the inability of our faculty of imagination, to 
think in temporal terms and this necessitates to use the 
verbal term in order to convey the meaning. He says; 
"And all this results from the inability 
of the Imagination to apprehend the 
commencement of a being without supposing 
something before it. This 'before', 
which occurs to the Imagination so inevi-
tably, is assumed to be a veritable 
existent—^viz., time."' 
The whole discussion on time in Tahafut is Aristotelian. 
Neither al-Ghazali nor Ibn Rushd challenges it. Aristotle 
held that time is the measure of movement. This is some-
thing different from saying that time is the framework of 
movement. Aristotle*s is the relative definition of the 
concept of time. Such a treatment is certainly incapable 
to prove its eternity. Time is, truly the measure of the 
movement, yet it is something more than this. This is the 
reason why modern thinkers reject the Aristotelian concept 
1. Al-Ghazali, o^. cit., p. 38. 
of time. Whether time is subjective or objective is a 
matter of controversy. But whatever it is, its reality 
or existence does not depend on the reality of its measuring 
standards, namely, the movement. In fact movement is helpful 
in order to understand time. But this does not affect the 
independent existence of time from the measuring stick. Then 
it can be understood as having an existence beyond any known 
actual movement. It can rightly be thought of as a framework 
for any possible movement. But such a view does not prove 
the eternity of the world, because the concept of a temporal 
framework does not necessarily provide us the notion of 
infinity. 
It has been an important presumption that space and 
time are inseparable concepts. The culmination of the 
adherence to such a view is found in Kaaitian exposition of 
the transcendental aesthetics. He considered space and time 
to be the necessary conditions of sensibility and, therebyj 
of experience. Later on this view was vehemently criticized 
by logical positivists. Kant tried to provide a mathematical 
ground to his view of space and time, i.e., geometry to space 
and arithmetic to time. They were treated as the forms of 
outer and inner experiences. In Aristotle we find a theore-
tical separation of them as he held time to be infinite while 
space to be finite. However, his assumption had to meet with 
the fatal blow due to the inherent contradictions in the 
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notion. But the concept of time in Bergson is not so 
inconsistent. Like Aristotle he separated the concept 
of time from that of space and held its eternity by making 
distinction between time of physics or mathematical time 
and the real time or what he calls duration (duree). He 
says that the mathematical time is good for all practical 
purposes. But when we penetrate deeper into the conception 
and try to understand its meaning and implications logically, 
we are confronted with various difficulties. We generally 
infer the reality of time through succession of states. But 
these successive states of the external world, says Bergson 
are nothing more than the simultaneous presentations of the 
world arranged by mind. If we succeed to eliminate the 
mental activity from the successive order to the eternal 
world, we will find nothing but the simultaneity. This means 
that the concept of time inferred through succession of 
events is superficial one and our thoughts, sensations and 
emotions are subject to it. But the real and eternal time 
is something which is free from our thoughts, sensations 
etc., not arranged in any order of succession. It is inter-
penetrative which forms one concrete whole. 
Although al-Ghazall points out the inconsistency in 
the philosophers' view of space and time by argumentum 3d 
hominem, yet it is appealing and successfully exposes their 
1, D.M.Datta, The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy 
(The University of Calcutta, 1972), Chap. v. 
weakness. He says tha t they consider body to be f i n i t e . 
Since space i s an a t t r i b u t e of body, i t i s also f i n i t e . But 
a f t e r such an assumption the philosophers have no r igh t to 
regard movement as i n f i n i t e because motion, apart from body 
as such i s impossible . 
Another important contr ibut ion of al-Ghazali in the 
second argument i s concerning the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
log ica l imposs ib i l i t y or necess i ty and hypothet ica l impKDssi-
b i l i t y or neces s i t y . The philosophers argue tha t i t was not 
poss ible for God to have created the world a b i t smaller 
or l a rge r than what i t i s at p resen t . Al-Ghazali says t ha t 
to c rea te the world smaller or la rger by a cubit than what 
i t i s i s not l i k e supposing something as black and white or 
ex i s ten t and non-existent simultaneously. For to suppose 
something to be both black and white simultaneously i s se l f -
con t rad ic t ion . But to suppose the world to be l a rge r or 
smaller than i t i s at present does not l og i ca l l y involve any 
con t rad ic t ion . I t s being so or otherwise i s a matter of 
fac tual hypothes is . And i t was obviously poss ib le for God 
to a l t e r what appears to be hjrpothetically impossible. I t 
means t h a t , according to a l -Ghazal i , to ascr ibe s e l f - c o n t r a -
d ic t ion to God i s impossible. This important d i s t i n c t i o n 
between l o g i c a l and hypothetical imposs ib i l i t i e s i s an o r ig ina l 
idea of a l -Ghaza l i . In modern philosophy t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
1, Al-Ghaz"ali, 0£. c i t . , p . A4, 
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was pointed out first by Leibnitz when he distinguished 
between logical fact, e.g., 'A* is 'not not-A' and the 
empirical fact or, what he calls,'the sufficient reason', 
e.g., fire burns. Some of the Muslim thinkers, like Ibn 
Hazm, hold that God is capable to do even the impossible or 
•4 
the contradiction, whereas the Ash'rites deny this. 
The concept of time, whether it is Aristotelian, Kantian 
or Bergsonian, is, infact, ful of complications. Aristotle 
generally infers its reality from motion. But, on the other 
hand, as we saw in this second proof, he asserts the reality 
of motion and the moving body by assuming the reality of time. 
And all this fails to prove the eternity of the world. Kantian 
approach, which ends into agnosticism, restricts the reality 
of time to the empirical level, Transcendentally it is ideal. 
Bergson is more careful. He significantly distinguishes 
between real time or duration and the time of physics. But 
such a concept of time has, perhaps, nothing to do with theo-
logians' contention that time is created and that God alone 
is eternal. For duration, according to Bergson, is that 
'period' when God created the world. We can not say that 
time and the world were created in time. Yet we have to 
say that there was a 'time' when they were created. This 
'time' is the 'duration' in the terms of Bergson. Such an 
interpretation also does not favour the concept of the eternity 
of the world. The argument from time after all is complex 
1. Van den Bergh, TT, Vol. II, 53.1 
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And it is certainly difficult to prove the eternity of the 
world from the eternity of time. Al-Ghazali ultimately says: 
"Our answers have brought out the truth 
that the possibilities supposed by the 
philosophers are meaningless. What 
must be taken for granted is that God 
is eternal and Omnipotent, and that if 
He wills, no action is impossible for 
Him. And this much does not necessi-
tate the affirmation of an extended 
time—unless the Imagination in its 
artful way should add something (to the 
meaning of 'action')"'' 
The Third Proof; 
The third part of the argument given by the philoisophers 
2 
to prove the eternity of the world is the shortest. It 
revolves around the issue of the possibility of the world. It 
is fundamentally based on the notion that whatever is possible 
must at some stage be realized. Nothing can be supposed to 
be eternally possible, i.e. never coming into existence. And 
that which is possible can never be impossible. Hence the 
possibility of the world has no beginning. But if something 
can possibly exist eternally, it must do so actually, i.e., 
the world must actually exist eternally. It has neither 
beginning nor end. The philosophers argument is as follows: 
"The existence of the world must have 
been possible, before the world had 
come into being. For it is impossible 
that, having been impossible, it should 
1. Al-Ghazali, o£. cit., p. 45. 
2. Ibid., pp. 45 - 6. 
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have become possible. And this 
possibility had no beginning— 
that is, it never lacked being. 
And the existence of the world 
never ceased to be possible; 
for there was no state when it 
could be described as impossible. 
Since the possibility never 
ceased to be, therefore, commen-
surately with it, that which is 
possible never ceased to be."^ 
The philosophers argue that the beginning of the 
world would have been asserted only by arguing the absence 
of its possibility. But since it is proved that it had 
always been possible, it is false to say that it had a 
beginning. And that which has no beginning has no end. This 
means that the world is eternal. 
The argument, looked from the logical point of view, 
is subject to the fallacy of petitio principi. The philoso-
phers state that what is possible must at some time come into 
existence and that nothing is eternally possible.They do not prove 
the eternity of the world from its not not-having been 
existed. But they prove its not not-having been existent 
by assuming its eternity. The source of the argument can be 
traced in Aristotle who says that what existed during an 
infinite time could neither become nor perish, and that what 
was both ungenerated and incorruptible could not be naturally 
2 
possible, i,e., subject to generation or corruption. 
1. Ibid., p, k5, 
2. Van den Bergh, TT, 57.1. 
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The assumption of the philosophers that the possibi-
lity of the world's existence is eternal and then to infer 
its actual eternity from its possible eternity is objection-
able. This is rightly pointed out by Van den Bergh. He 
says that if we substitute "Socrates" for "the world" then 
we find a quite different proposition. We can not deny that 
the possibility of Socrates' existence is eternal. But from 
this we can not infer an eternal existence of Socrates. This 
objection was also raised by al-Ghazali. He says that eternal 
possibility does not imply eternal actuality. Actually, 
according to him, is incongruent with possibility, i.e., not 
commensurate with it, and this is in harmony with what the 
philosophers themselves held. As they held that the possi-
bility of making addition is unlimited, the supposition of 
the world infinitely larger or smaller than it actually is, 
is possible. But from the possibility of such a world it 
does not follow that it actually exists. He argues that an 
existence whose limits are not determined is impossible. 
Moreover, the existence of the world with finite 
surface is possible while that without any finitude or any 
determinate surface is impossible. So corresponding to this 
possibility the origination of the world is possible. He 
says: 
1. Ibid., 57.1 
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"It is only its eWorld's^ being an 
originated thing which is specified; 
and only that specific character is, 
therefore, called a possible thing."' 
The Fourth Proof; 
The fourth proof of the philosophers in favour of 
eternity of the world is primarily concerned with the meaning 
and applicability of the concept represented by terms possible, 
impossible and necessary. The philosophers maintain that 
the world existed as possibility long before it actually came 
into existence. This possibility is beginningless as well 
as endless. They argue that the world is in continuous 
change. So matter is continuously changing into some form 
which is actuality. This means that before its realization 
the actuality was in the form of possibility. Now, we are 
bound to admit that every new actual being was eternally 
possible. But nothing can be thought to be possible without 
a substratum. This substratum is matter on which every 
change takes place. Therefore, this substratum or matter 
must be eternal in order that the possibility may turn into 
actuality. The philosophers argue: 
"Before its origination, every originated 
thing must have been either possible, or 
impossible, or necessary. Now, it is 
impossible that it should have been impo-
ssible, for that which is impossible in 
itself is never brought into being. Again 
it is impossible for it to have been 
necessary in itself; for that which is 
1. Al-Ghazali, ££. cit., p. 46. 
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necessary in itself is never deprived 
of existence. It follows that it must 
have been possible in itself. Therefore, 
the possibility of its existence was 
there before it existed. But, the possi-
bility of existence is a relative attri-
bute which can not exist in itself. There 
must be a substratum to which it could 
be related. But, there is nothing but 
matter to serve as a substratum. So it 
was related to matter."'' 
According to the philosophers it is matter which 
receives qualities like heat, coldness, blackness, whiteness, 
motion and rest etc. Possibility of these qualities precedes 
to their actuality with their substratum, i.e., matter. But 
there is no possibility as such which is independent of matter. 
This means the possibility of everything exists in their subs-
tratum from eternity. This proves the eternity of matter. 
According to al-Ghazali the supposition of the philoso-
phers that things exist before their actual existence because 
they are possible, is unwarranted. The terms like possible, 
impossible and necessary are the product of our mind. Words 
do not necessarily represent some object. When our intellect 
does not suppose the existence of something as inadmissible, 
we call that thing possible. When its supposition is quite 
inadmissible we call it as impossible. And when the reason 
fails to suppose its non-existence then we call it as necessary. 
Thus, these terms represent simply the judgement of our inte-
llect. To hope for the existence of something corresponding 
1. Ibid., p. 47. 
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to these terms i s f a l l a c ious . Hence, the phi losophers ' 
assumption that ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' re fers to some e n t i t y which 
l a t e r on, i s rea l ized i s incor rec t . Had i t been the case , 
the term ' i m p o s s i b i l i t y ' would also have refered to something 
of which imposs ib i l i ty i t i s . I t i s jus t l i k e the term 
'no th ing ' which also does not stand for any th ing . Ibn 
Rushd argues that both the terms ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' a n d ' imposs ib i -
l i t y ' demand some substratum. And the substratum for the 
' imposs ib le ' i s the non-existence or , what he says , the 
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exis tence of an empty space i s impossible. I t i s n o t i c i a b l e 
here tha t both, the Mu ' t az i l i t e s and the ph i losophers , regard 
non-existence as something p o s i t i v e . And t h i s obviously i s 
unacceptable to al-Ghazali who at tacks a l l the phi losophica l 
concepts which are u n c r i t i c a l l y assumed by them. 
Al-Ghazali c i t e s three arguments to disprove the 
ph i losophers ' be l i e f that the p o s s i b i l i t y of something must 
stand for some p a r t i c u l a r being before i t s ex i s t ence . Through 
t h e s e arguments he proves t ha t the terms p o s s i b i l i t y , impossi-
b i l i t y or necessary e t c , are r e l a t i v e terms and judgements 
of the i n t e l l e c t . Not only the term imposs ib i l i ty does not 
stand for any r e a l thing but many other terms are also of 
the same na ture . He argues that colours l i k e black and white 
e t c , are nothing in themselves. They are meaningful only when 
1 . I b i d . , p . A8. 
2 . Ibn Rushd, TT, p . 6 1 . 
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they are attached with somebody. To suppose the reality 
of blackness or whitness in abstraction apart from the subs-
tratum or the body to which it belongs is meaningless. In 
his argument al-Ghaz'ali uses philosophers' own view that 
the human soul is self-subsisting substance which is neither 
body nor matter. Before its origination it is a possibility. 
But it is not material. This means that there is something 
which is impossible, yet immaterial. According to the philo-
sophers although the human soul is self-subsistent, it is 
relative because it is always associated with some body or 
matter. Thus, there lies a self-contradiction in philosophers' 
own position. They believe in the existence of something 
which is possible yet not exists; which is immaterial, yet 
needs matter or body for its existence; which is self-subsis-
tent yet relative, i.e., which always needs a body for its 
realization. 
The philosophers' belief that the possibility of a 
being means the existence of a corresponding entity is based 
on some wrong assumption. Neither a particular term necessarily 
stands for an existent nor a proposition for a fact. This is 
what Wittgenstein later on declared forsaking his earlier 
thesis that the elementary propositions are the pictures of 
atomic facts. Moreover, the attempt of the philosophers to 
prove the eternity of matter from the necessity of the 
substratum of the possible being is utterly unwarranted. Their 
belief, infact, is based on their confused assertion that 
possibility requires a substratum of matter. But such an 
ms 
assertion is quite vulnerable to the attack of an empiricist 
who may ask that how did they know that. It would be very 
difficult for them to answer a person who claims to have 
quite opposite intuition in this regard. The main problem 
with the peripatetics is that they fail to give up the emo-
tional attachment with Aristotle unless the consequence is 
extremely grave. Certain Aristotelian axioms themselves are 
1 
not compatible with his own views. 
Now, if we make a survey of all the four proofs given 
by the philosophers to prove the eternity of the world, we 
find that none of them is able to solve the purpose. This 
is partly due to the penetrative skill and clarity of al-Ghazlili 
and partly due to the inherited inconsistencies in the assump-
tions of the philosophers. Their approach has been dogmatic 
in the sense that they imported Aristotelian axioms un-
critically and treated them as something above the principles 
of logic. All the four proofs of the philosophers are based 
on such axioms. In the first proof there is the principle 
of the determination of wills which they apply on God's Will 
also in order to show the impossibility of the origin of the 
world; and also that the effect immediately follows the 
cause. The second proof is based on their belief that time 
implies movement. From this supposition they infer the 
existence of body in motion and, therefore, the eternity of 
the world. In the third proof the philosophers assert the 
1. Van den Bergh lists forty contradictions in Aristotle's 
system. TT. Vol. II, p. 215. 
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non-or ig ina t ion of the world from i t s e t e rna l p o s s i b i l i t y . 
S imi lar ly , the fourth proof i s based on the assumption 
of the e t e r n i t y of matter as a substratum of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the world. 
I t i s due to the commitment of the Muslim phi losophers to 
the Aris to te l ianism that makes t h e i r pos i t ion odd. The 
Ar i s to te l i an axioms were wrongly considered to be a n a l y t i c , 
known to be t r u e by mere ana lys i s of language. This f a l se 
impression completely s h a t t e r s when a non - t r ad i t i ona l th inker 
l i k e a l -Ghaza l i , quest ions t h e i r v a l i d i t y . Al-Ghazal i ' s 
approach i s r a d i c a l . He mistrusted the v a l i d i t y of reason 
to explain the kind of r e l a t i o n between Gtod and the world 
tha t the phi losophers sought to prove. Reason i s va l i d to 
a c e r t a i n extent only, but i t does not cover as much ground 
as the phi losophers th ink . This i s the point where al-Ghazlili 
disagrees with the phi losophers . The l a t t e r place more 
emphasis on i n t u i t i o n and, the re fore , on axioms of reason 
which al-Ghaz'ali r e j e c t s . If the statement "The world i s 
e t e rna l i s meaningful (not i n the log ica l p o s i t i v i s t i c sense)^ 
the statement "The world i s created" i s also meaningful i n 
the sense that both the s ta tements , in Kantian sense, are 
syn the t i c . And thus the acceptance of one of them does not 
hinder us to accept the o the r . The philosophers claim that 
the statement "The world i s e t e rna l " i s t rue because i t i s axio-
matic breaks down when someone denies the v a l i d i t y of 
i n t u i t i o n and p o s i t s an opposite asser t ion "The world i s 
c rea ted . " 
1, G.F.Hourani, The Muslim World, op. c i t . , No. A, p .315. 
SECTION-JB' 
ON PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 
CAUSALITY. DIVINE KNOWLEDGE MP DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 
Under the Third Problem of TahSfut a l - G h a z a l i a rgues 
a g a i n s t t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s ' a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e world i s t h e 
a c t i o n or t h e produc t of God. For t h i s he g ive s t h r e e r e a s o n s : 
i ) , due to n a t u r e of the agen t ; 
i i ) . due to n a t u r e of the a c t i o n ; and 
i i i ) . due to r e l a t i o n between the a c t i o n and t h e a g e n t . 
For t h e f i r s t r eason a l - G h a z a l i says t h a t i t i s neces sa ry 
f o r an agent to have the w i l l f o r t h e a c t i o n ^ t o have f r e e 
choice and to know what he w i l l s . But the p h i l o s o p h e r s say 
t h a t God has no w i l l , hence t h e i r a s s e r t i o n t h a t God i s the 
agent , i s u n j u s t i f i a b l e . I t i s n o t i c e a b l e he re t h a t accord ing 
t o Muslim p e r i p a t e t i c s t h e world n e c e s s a r i l y p roceeds from 
t h e e t e r n a l . I t i s l i k e a n e c e s s a r y consequence . The second 
reason which a l -Ghaz 'a l i advanced r ega rd ing t h e n a t u r e of a c t i o n 
was tha t an act must have a beg inn ing i n t i m e . But t h e p h i l o -
sophers c la im the world to be e t e r n a l . An e t e r n a l , by d e f i n i -
t i o n , means t h a t which has no b e g i n n i n g . Thus t h e world can 
not be an ac t of God. And, a rgu ing on t h e r e l a t i o n between 
an agent and an a c t , t h i r d l y , a l - G h a z a l i says t h a t only one 
t h i n g proceeds from one a g e n t , God i s one . But the world i s 
composed of d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . So i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r a 
Hi 
number of heterogenous things to proceed from One God. This 
th i rd argument of al-Ghazali i s c e r t a i n l y a reaff i rmat ion 
of what the ancient philosophers had argued. If the u l t imate 
Reali ty i s simple and absolute , how i s i t poss ib le for p lu r a -
l i t y to proceed from i t ? One can not provide to o thers a 
thing which one does not have. This i s what Democritus 
meant when he says tha t one thing can not come into exis tence 
from two and vice~versa« And the Muslim philosophers also 
accept the Ar i s to t e l i an p r inc ip l e that from the one only one 
1 
can proceed, yet they carry on with t h e i r i l l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n 
in the neo-Platonic fashion and maintain the procession of 
mu l t i p l i c i t y from the uni ty . 
Al-Ghazali*s re fu ta t ion of the phi losophers ' a s s e r t i o n 
t h a t God i s the Agent or the Maker of the world i s c lo se ly 
re la ted with what he argued i n the Fourth Chapter of Tahafut, 
where he shows the i n a b i l i t y of the philosophers to prove 
the existence of the creator of the world. At both the 
places he uses the phi losophers ' view, the e t e r n i t y of the 
world, as an instrument to re fu te them. An ac t , as he defined 
above, i s tha t which has a beginning in time; but since the 
philosophers bel ieve that the world i s e t e r n a l , i t can, t h e r e -
fore , not be an act of God. S imi lar ly , in the Fourth Problem 
1. Simon Van den Bergh, TT, Vol. I I , 87 .2 . 
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a l -Ghaza l i refutes the philosophers arguments for the 
exis tence of the Creator by t h e i r be l ie f in the e t e r n i t y 
of the world. He argues: 
"But the philosophers bel ieve tha t 
the world i s e t e r n a l . And s t i l l 
they would ascr ibe i t to a Creator, 
This theory i s , t he re fo re , even in 
i t s o r ig ina l formulation, se l f -
cont rad ic tory . There i s no need 
for a re fu ta t ion of i t . " ^ 
The reason why the philosophers are committed to 
develop the concept of a Creator i s tha t i t seems to them 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e that the causal s e r i e s should go on ad 
inf ini tum, Al-Ghazali asks tha t why should we not assume 
t h a t the world, although a composite e n t i t y , be the f i r s t 
cause . I n i a c t , the force of the argument of the phi losophers 
l i e s in the dilemma, tha t i s , t he re should be a F i r s t Cause 
otherwise an i n f i n i t e regress i s i nev i t ab l e . The philosophers 
ru le out the p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n f i n i t e regress and assume a 
F i r s t Cause. But for al-Ghazali the pos i t ion i s ju s t r everse . 
He does not find i t necessary to hold the imposs ib i l i t y of 
an i n f i n i t e r eg re s s . His pos i t ion has great a f f i n i t y with 
tha t of scept ics as they argued in favour of the u n i n t e l l i -
g i b i l i t y involved in the cosmological argument when a s imi la r 
2 dilemma was ci ted before them, Al-Ghazali says: 
1. Al-Ghazali, Tahafut. op. c i t . . p . 89. 
2 . John H, Hick, Philosophy of Religion (Prent ice-Hal l of 
Ind ia . New Delhi, i ^ a i ) , p . ^ 3 . 
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"If it is possible that something 
tthe world] infinite should come 
into existence, why should it not 
be equally possible for it to 
have some of its parts working as 
the causes of others, so that on 
the lower side the series termina-
tes into an effectless effect, 
without, however, terminating on 
the upper side into an uncaused 
cause? This will be like the Past^ 
which reaches its terra in the fleet-
ing 'Now', but had no beginning.""^ 
2 
Similarly in the tenth argument also al-Ghazali refers 
to the philosophers' belief in the eternity of the world as 
an argumentum ad homlnem against their argument that there 
exists a Cause or Creator. He has a force in his argument. 
To hold that God is a Creator means that the world is created, 
But it is senseless to conceive something eternal as well as 
created. If the world is eternal, God can not be said to be 
its creator. He says: 
"So he who reflects over the points 
we have mentioned will see the 
inability of all those who believe 
in the eternity of bodies to claim 
that they have a cause. These people 
are in consistency bound to accept 
Materialism and Atheism as some 
thinkers, who gave clear expression to 
the presuppositions of the philoso- , 
phers' theory have actually done." 
1, Al-Ghazali, 0£. cit., p. 91. 
2, I t i s to be noted that the Fourth and the Tenth Problems 
of Tahafut are e s s e n t i a l l y same. 
3 , I b i d . , p . 141. 
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The above two arguments for the existence of the 
Creator are also supported by a third one given in the 
Fifteenth Discussion. Here the philosophers are quoted 
to have believed that the heavenly bodies are controlled 
by a natural law. Their movement has some ultimate purpose 
namely, to get nearness with God, not in the spatial sense, 
but in the sense of acquiring and perfectine: the attributes. 
The arguments are levelled from common sense without any 
philosophical implication. All the three arguments given by 
the philosophers roughly constitute the teleological, the 
cosmological and the causal arguments. The argument given 
from the natural law is not teleological in strict senses 
because it does not contain all the essential implications 
of the argument because of which the terms 'design' and 
•purpose' become very controversial. However, it may be 
said that it has the elements of both the arguments, viz,, 
from design and from natural law, ostensibly. Here al-Ghazali 
stresses the inconsistency in the philosophers' position by 
arguing that the movement of the bodies has nothing to do 
with the concept of the nearness with God, either spatial or 
in attributes. It is just like saying that a person who 
thinks that he will get more and more nearness to God if he 
turns round and round in his house or in the city. Without 
giving a more detailed account we can say that al-Ghazali 
has misinterpreted what Aristotle meant when he said that 
every living being is subject to progress in its own class; 
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God i s an idea l which can never be achieved in the r ea l 
sense and the utmost a t t a inab le pos i t i on for a being i s to 
achieve the highest rank in i t s own c l a s s . 
In order to show the i n a b i l i t y of the phi losophers 
to prove the exis tence of an Agent or the Maker of the 
world, the Creator or the F i r s t Cause, a l -Ghaza l i , for the 
sake of argument, takes the pos i t i on of an agnos t i c . He 
does not say tha t the non-existence of God can be proved 
but that the arguments given by the phi losophers are incohe-
r en t , and t h a t they do not solve the r i d d l e of the notion of 
purpose. One of the most important objec t ions i m p l i c i t l y 
raised by al-Ghazali against the F i r s t Cause argument i s that 
if everything must have a cause then God also must have a 
cause . But if there can be anything without a cause , there 
i s nothing to prevent us to suppose tha t such a thing i s the 
world. If God can ex is t without a cause, then why not the 
world can e x i s t . This argument i s impl ic i t i n a l -Ghaza l i ' s 
argument when he prefers the i n f i n i t e regress of the causal 
se r ies to the notion of a F i r s t Cause. 
The phi losophers ' t he s i s that we must accept the F i r s t 
Cause to avoid the s i t ua t i on of an i n f i n i t e regress i s un-
acceptable to al-Ghaza^li for an o ther reason. According to 
him there is no causal law in the s t r i c t sense in the world 
of experience. Hence, he r e j e c t s the concept of the secondary 
causat ion. I t i s quite un jus t i f i ab le to ascr ibe pov/er and 
l i b 
efficacy to the worldly things. So, the philosophers' 
insistence to accept the First Cause to avoid the infinite 
regress is inadmissible to al-Ghaz'ali, because there is no 
causal series in the strict sense. This issue is discussed 
under the Seventeenth Problem of al-Tah'afut in detail. 
There he argues that there is no causal connection between 
two material things. If a piece of cotton, for example, is 
brought into contact with fire and it starts to burn, its 
burning is not due to any action of the fire on the cotton. 
For the fire is inanimate and, therefore, incapable to act 
voluntarily. The cotton burns because of the Will of God. 
He says; 
"We say that it is God who through 
the intermediacy of angels, or directly 
is the agent of the creation of 
blackness in cotton; of the disintegra-
tion of its parts, and of their trans-
formation into a smouldering heap or 
ashes. Fire, which is an animate thing, 
has no action. How can one prove that 
it is an agent?"' 
According to al-Ghazali if we think of the natural 
phenomena in terms of causes and effects, it is only through 
habit that we are accustomed to perceive the co-existence of 
the fire and burning. There is no necessary relation between 
the two. It is only possible which may or may not happen. 
'<^ at we know through the observation is only the simultaneity 
of two events, not causation. As a matter of fact, concludes 
1. Ibid., p. 186. 
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al-Glr^azali, there i s no other cause but God. So i t depends 
on the w i l l of God whetner or not a piece of cot ton burns 
when i t i s brought into contact of the f i r e . I t i s equal ly 
poss ib le for i t to happen otherwise. Al-Ghazali says: 
"And one i t i s proved that the Agent 
c rea tes by His w i l l the burning of 
a piece of cot ton at the time of i t s 
contact with f i r e , Reason wi l l consider 
i t to be possible tha t He may not c rea te 
the burning which the contact has taken 
place ," ' ' 
The aim of al-Ghazali by put t ing these arguments to 
ascr ibe the ul t imate causat ion to God i s two-fold. F i r s t , 
he wishes to asser t that God i s the ul t imate Agent of the 
Existence of the world. Although the philosophers also 
e x p l i c i t l y argue in favour of the Agent or the Maker of the 
world, as mentioned in the Third Problem of the Tahafut, 
t h e i r arguments, according to al-Ghazali are u n j u s t i f i a b l e 
because t h e i r adherence to the concept of the e t e r n i t y does 
not allow for t h i s . The phi losophers ' argument for the 
e t e r n i t y of the world does not leave room to accommodate God's 
wi l l without which He can be considered to be an Agent. Now 
through the re fu ta t ion of the concept of the secondary causa-
t ion al-Ghazali wants to res tore the digni ty of God which was 
damaged by the philosophers. So, he maintains tha t God i s 
the Primary Cause and the Agent of world in rea l sense. 
Secondly, from the discussion of the concept of c a u s a l i t y 
1. I b i d . , p . 188. 
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a l -Ghaza l i aims to prove that miracles are poss ib le as a 
r e s u l t of the d i r ec t in te rven t ion of God in the a f f a i r s 
of the world. This means tha t the common be l ie f in na tura l 
laws are denied. Miracles , according to al-Ghaziil i , are no 
more miraculous than nature i t s e l f . To e s t a b l i s h h i s p o s i -
t ion he c i t e s an example from the Qura'nic account of 
Abraham (AS) who was thrown in to a huge f i r e but remained 
safe and unburnt. He accuses the philosophers for holding 
un-Islamic view in case they deny the concept of mi rac les . 
Since the agent of burning, according to a l -Ghaza l i , i s God, 
in the case of Abraham (AS) He made f i r e to abs ta in from 
the act of burning. For the common people the escape of 
Abraham (AS) i s a miracle , while for God i t i s nothing but 
an expression of His wi l l as usua l . Al-Ghazali says: 
"Things to which God's power extends 
include mysterious and wonderful f a c t s . 
We have not observed a l l those mysteries 
and wonders. How, then, can i t be proper 
on our par t to deny t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y , or ^ 
pos i t i ve ly to asser t t he i r imposs ib i l i ty 7" 
I t appears tna t on the problem of causa l i t y the 
a t t i t u d e of Ibn Rushd to al-Ghazali i s the same as tha t of 
Kant to Hume. Ibn Rushd considers i t to be se l f -ev iden t 
tha t a l l events have four causes , v i z . , e f f i c i e n t , ma te r i a l , 
formal, and the f i n a l . They are the necessary condi t ions 
for the existence of a th ing . The denial of the e f f i c i e n t 
1. I b i d . , p . 191. 
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cause, argues Ibn Rushd, is but a sophistry. If we do not 
find we must investigate for it more carefully, because it 
is quite possible that, in some cases, one is present while 
the other is absent. But from its apparent absence we can 
not infer its non-existence. The efficiency of an agent, 
say fire, is proved by its definition. Fire is so only 
because it burns. If it does not burn then it ceases to 
be called as 'fire'. To argue against, it is to keep aside 
all reason and logic. He says: 
"Now intelligence is nothing but the 
perception of things with their causes, 
and in this it distinguishes itself 
from all the other faculties of appre-
hension, and he who denies causes must 
deny the intellect. Logic implies the 
existence of causes and effects, and 
knowledge of these effects can only be 
rendered perfect through knowledge of 
their causes. Denial of cause implies 
the denial of knowledge, and denial of 
knowledge implies that nothing in this 
world can be really known, and that 
what is supposed to be known is nothing 
but opinion, that neither proof nor 
definition exist, and that the essential 
attributes which compose definitions are 
void. The man who denies the necessity 
of any item of knowledge must admit that 
even this, his own affirmation, is not 
necessary knowledge." 
Now, before any further discussion of the position 
of al-Ghazali on this issue, let us see the main types of 
theories of causality. The general belief in causality is 
based on the repeated occurence of a certain kind of event 
1. Ibn Rushd, TT, Vol. I, p. 319. 
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under certain conditions. Some thinkers deny this view 
because they argue, it is merely a sequence of sensations 
while others accept it as a necessary law fabricated by 
the self. Objective idealists, although recognise the 
validity of causality as independent of the self, regard the 
self to be its root. But all the thinkers generally agree 
that causality is a relation, atleast, of precedence and 
consequence of events. But it is a controversial issue among 
them to explain how the preceding event is connected with 
the succeeding one. This relation is explained through three 
-I 
theories, viz., entailment, activity and the regularity. 
The entailment theory, which is generally held by rationalists, 
seeks to establish a connection of logical necessity between 
cause and effect, for by entailment is meant the same kind 
of relation that is found between the premises and the 
conclusion in a syllogism where the latter necessarily follows 
the former. Here it is assumed that there is some necessary 
intrinsic relation between the two. The entailment theory 
had been dominant till the time of Hume. The regularity 
theory, secondly, denies any intrinsic necessary connection 
between cause and effect. It does not ascribe any active 
power to cause; nor does it explain why the effect happened. 
It simply states that two events have contiguity in space and 
succession in time under certain conditions. Activity theory, 
1. A.C.Ewing, The Fundamen 
Publishers Private Limi 
atal Questions of Philosophy (Allied 
ted. New Delhi, 1982), Chapter Eight 
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f i n a l l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y held by Berkeley, seeks to define the 
meaning of cause in terms of w i l l , A cause, according to 
t h i s theory, i s an ac t ive agency which w i l l s . Locke and 
Berkeley both have used this theory as an argument to prove 
the existence of God, a God who acts and w i l l s . Locke argued 
that since causat ion means the agency tha t w i l l s , i t must 
u l t imate ly be a being that i s a s p i r i t . 
I f we examine a l -Ghaza l i ' s pos i t ion i n the l i g h t of 
these three theor ies of causa l i t y , we find that none of them 
as such i s acceptable to him. The general be l i e f tha t h i s 
view on causa l i ty i s tha t of regular sequence i s co r r ec t but 
p a r t i a l l y . Although al-Ghazali argues that there i s no 
necessary connection between two events causa l ly connected 
and that we do not find any power or eff icacy in cause that 
necessa r i ly produces the ef fec t , he never gave up h i s be l i e f 
t ha t the ul t imate causal power i s in the Divine Omnipotence. 
He holds that a l l the causal agencies in the world, including 
na tura l laws, are obedient to the wi l l of God. God i s the 
only Active Being which i s u l t imate ly responsible for the 
act ion and movement in a l l the worldly agents . This i s the 
reason why he refuted the phi losophers ' argument for the 
proof of the Creator , Maker or the Agent of the world. 
I t sounds that a l -Ghaza l i ' s acceptance of r egu la r 
sequence theory was aimed at asser t ing the kind of r e l a t ionsh ip 
on empirical gix)und which, though ascribed to be so,not infact 
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es tab l i sh the causal connection between the so-called 
cause and effect. The real causal agency should be traced 
i n the Divine Will, God i s the real cause of the world. 
All the natural laws are obedient to His Will wherefrom they 
are regulated and controlled. Gk)d i s the cause of a l l the 
pseudo causes of the world. Al-Ghazali unites both the causal 
theories—regular sequence and the ac t iv i ty . His approach to 
the regular sequence theory, which anticipates Hume's cri t icism 
of causali ty, attacks on the dogmatic a t t i tude of the ea r l i e r 
philosophers towards the t radi t ional concept of causa l i ty . He 
asserted that neither the negation or affirmation of one event 
en t a i l s the negation or the affirmation of the other nor the 
existence or non-existence of one event renders the existence 
or non-existence of the other as necessary. The ac t iv i ty theory, 
on the other hand, introduces the idea of action and wi l l in 
order to prove that God i s the only cause. The regular sequence 
theory has negative function while that of ac t iv i ty theory is 
affirmative. The former refutes while the l a t t e r a s se r t s , a 
unique combination of two causal theories in order to prove the 
One, the Ultimate Cause. 
Another important implication in al-Ghazali 's treatment 
of causality i s that he attempts to establish the idea of 
miracles. He is ready to admit that f i re burns. This belief 
i s good for our pract ical purposes. But he i n s i s t s on the 
introduction of God's intervention. I t makes the miracles 
possible. On the theoretical level i t i s the combination 
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of two causal t heo r i e s , namely, regular sequence and tne 
a c t i v i t y , which explain the p o s s i b i l i t y of the mi rac l e s . 
However, i t seems tha t al-Ghazali does not oppose c a u s a l i t y . 
What he infact aims at i s to introduce the v i t a l ro l e of 
the Divine Will. This becomes more c lea r when we see him 
as accepting causa l i ty imp l i c i t l y while explaining how a 
miracle may take pl-^ce without v io la t ing the na tu ra l laws. 
According to his explanation a s t i ck may change in to a snake 
i f i t i s reduced into dust and dust into p l an t ; and p l a n t , 
when used by a snake d i r ec t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , become the f l e sh , 
and then sperm of that snake; and the sperm, when f e r t i l i z e d 
proper ly , turns in to a snake. This i s the na tu ra l process in 
which the preceding stage causes the succeeding one. This 
process , i . e . , turning of a s t i ck into a snake, i s very long. 
But God can use h i s power to acce lera te t h i s na tu ra l process 
so tha t a s t ick may change in to a snake i n s t a n t l y . And t h i s 
would be a miracle. The int roduct ion of the Divine <"/ill i s 
t h e main reason for al-Ghaz"ali to refute the idea of necessary 
connection. Had th i s not been h is aim to introduce the 
Divine .Vlll in the concept of causa l i ty , he probably would 
not have refuted the idea of necessary connection between 
cause and the e f f ec t , 
Al-Ghaz'ali ce r t a in ly ant ic ipated the Humean view of 
causa l i ty t r ea t ing i t to be without any n e c e s s i t y . But a f te r 
t h i s there is hardly any s i m i l a r i t y , Hume exclus ive ly 
rejected tne p o s s i b i l i t y of any causal agent; but for al-Ghazali 
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God is the ultimate and the only Agent who governs all the 
worldly phenomenon through His Eternal Will. Again, on 
the issue of miracle, a concept which is very close to that 
of causality, there is a wide gulf of opinion between al-
Ghazali and Hume, According to Hume miracle is a violation 
of the laws of nature, violation of that which has very 
strong empirical evidence. Appearance of a missionary or a 
prophet from the heaven and performing the miracles, in his 
view, is nothing but a pious fraud. Such claims, according 
to Hume, are all unwarranted. No proof can be given in 
favour of miracles since they violate the norms of proof, 
i.e., the empirical evidences. He says: 
"The plain consequence is (and it is a 
general maxim worthy of our attention), 
'that no testimony is sufficient to 
establish a miracle, unless the testimony 
be of such a kind^that its falsehood 
would be more miraculous, than the fact, 
which it endeavours to establish; and 
even in that case there is a mutual dest-
ruction of arguments, and the superior 
only gives us an assurance suitable to 
that degree of force, which remains, 
after deducting the inferior.' When any-
one tells me, that he was a dead man 
restored to life, I immediately consider 
with myself, whether it be more probable, 
that this person should either deceive or 
be deceived, or that the fact, which he 
relates, should really have happened, 
should really have happened. I weigh the 
one miracle against the other; and accord-
ing to the superiority, which I discover, 
I pronounce my decision, and always reject 
the greater miracle. If the falsehood 
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of his testimony would be more miraculous, 
than the event which he relates; then, and 
not till then, can he pretend to command 
my belief or opinion."^ 
Hume says that the feeling of surprize and wonder 
caused by the miracles arise emotional tendency, not only 
in those people who are present on the spot, but also in 
those people who are absent. The unusual and the fantastic 
accounts of the adventures of travellers or other like people 
also produce a sense of excitement and thrill in the listeners, 
But their effects are somewhat different from the miraculous 
accounts with a religious overtone. The most important effect 
of it is to betray the common-sense. He says: 
"The many instances of forged miracles, 
and prophecies, and supernatural events, 
which, in all ages, have either been 
detected by contrary evidence, or which 
detect themselves by their absurdity, 
prove sufficiently the strong propensity 
of mankind to the extraordinary and the 
marvellous, and ought reasonably to 
beget a suspicion against all relations 
of this kind. This is our natural way 
of thinking, even with regard to the most 
common and most credible events,"^ 
According to Hume it would be a real prodigy to prove the 
falsity of the testimony on which a miracle is based. His 
1. Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1927), p.121-2. 
2. Ibid., p. 124. 
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s c e p t i c a l pos i t ion goes on to re jec t both causa l i t y and 
mirac les . His account of them i s in pu re -enp i r i ca l terms. 
But the pos i t ion of al-Ghaz'ali, on the o ther hand, i s 
qu i te d i f f e r e n t . He doubts the v a l i d i t y of causa t ion , not 
for the sake of doubt^ for he i s not an empi r ic i s t l i k e 
Hume, but for some higher ends. According to the philosophers 
f i r e bums and water wets because there i s some necessary 
connection between them. But al-Ghazali says that these 
events imply nothing but a sequence in t ime. One may c a l l 
i t causat ion if he l i k e s . The r e a l cause i s the w i l l of God. 
God does not work l i k e the unconscious mater ia l th ings which 
follow some speci f ic course without any choice or w i l l . I t 
i s not only al-Ghaz'ali but the Ash^^arite school i t s e l f refuted 
c a u s a l i t y . For the Ash^arites even our ac ts which are 
supposed to be the r e su l t of our choice and w i l l , are not 
i n f ac t performed by us . I t i s God who i s the r e a l Agent of 
them while we are merely the instruments . To ascr ibe the 
causal efficacy to the l i f e l e s s things i s a kind of fe t i sh i sm. 
A view s imi la r to that of al-Ghazali i s held by Ernst 
Mach (1858-1916) also who says that to speak of causat ion or 
ac t ion in material things i s a kind of animism. The reason 
behind such asser t ion i s the idea that while supposing some 
in t r i ca t ed capacity in the l i f e l e s s and unconscious things we 
pro jec t our o\'m wi l l and act ions into them. So far the 
na tu ra l law is concerned, i t v/as already re jected during the 
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d i s c u s s i o n on p o s s i b i l i t y and a c t u a l i t y under the F ir s t 
Problem where al -Ghazal i pos i ted t h a t e v e r y t h i n g , except 
tha t which i s l o g i c a l l y imposs ib le , i s p o s s i b l e f o r God. 
This means that miracles are not l o g i c a l l y impossible or 
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . In other words we can say that ne i ther 
a miracle nor the v i o l a t i o n of the natural law i s l o g i c a l l y 
imposs ib le . What i s s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y according to a l -Ghazal i 
I s to observe or imagine blacky and white in the same tiling s imultaneously . 
Hence, the miracles are qui te p o s s i b l e . Fire for example, may 
or may not burn. Natural laws are not absolute i n themselves . 
They are i n f a c t subordinate to the Divine Wi l l . This i s the 
reason that f i r e could not burn Abraham (AS) when he was 
plunged into i t . 
1 . Instances of miracles in the Qur^an are found at many 
p l a c e s . Some of them ascribed to prophet Abraham, Moses, 
Jeses(AS) and Mohammad(S) are mentioned here r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
( i ) ."They sa id: Build for him ([_Abraham]|a bu i ld ing and 
f l i n g him in the red-hot f i r e . And they designed a 
snare for him, but We made them the undermost." 
(XXXVII - 97 - 8 ) . 
"They c r i e d : Burn him and s tand by your gods , i f ye 
w i l l be doing, V/e sa id: 0 f i r e , be coo lness and 
peace for Abraham!"(XXI - 68 - 9 ) . 
( i i ) ."And what i s t h a t i n thy r i g h t hand, 0 Moses ? He s a i d : 
This i s my s t a f f whereon I l e a n , and v/herewith I bea t 
down branches fo r my sheep , and where in I f ind o t h e r 
u s e s . He [^ Godl s a i d : Cast i t down, 0 Moses! So he c a s t 
i t down, and l o ! i t was_a serpent g l i d i n g He^GodJ s a i d : 
Grasp i t and f e a r n o t . We s h a l l r e t u r n i t _ t o i t s former 
s t a t e . And t h r u s t thy hand within t h i n e a r m p i t , i t 
w i l l come f o r t h white wi thout h u r t . (That w i l l be) 
another token . That we may show thee (some) of Our 
g r e a t e r p o r t e n t s . " (XX - 17 - 2 5 ) . "Throw down thy 
s t a f f . And when he saw i t writhing as i t had been a 
demon, he turned to f l e e headlong (and i t was sa id 
unto him): 0 Moses! Draw nigh and f e a r n o t . Lo! thou 
art of those who are s e c u r e . " (XXVIII - 3 1 ) . 
C o n e d . . . . 
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Al-Ghazali, in h i s treatment of mirac les , makes a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between l o g i c a l necess i ty and the phys io logica l 
necess i ty . The necessary connection that we see in a cause 
and i t s effect i s the habi t of our mind. I t i s not l o g i c a l , 
but psychological . I t i s psychological in the sense that 
i t s denial does not involve cont rad ic t ion ; while in the case 
of log ica l necess i ty i t does so . Al-Ghazali be l ieves that 
as mentioned e a r l i e r , everything i s possible for God except 
?oornote continued from previous, page: ( i l l ) , "And w i l l make him [Jesus] a messenger unto the 
children to I srae l , (saying); I come unto you 
with a s ign from your Lord, Lo! I fashion for you 
out of c lay the l ikeness of a b i r d , and I breathe 
into i t and i t i s a b i r d , by Al lah ' s l e ave . I 
heal him who was born b l ind , and the l e p e r , and 
I r a i s e the dead, by Al lah ' s l eave . And I announce 
unto you what ye eat and what ye s tore up in your 
houses•Lo! herein v e r i l y i s a por ten t for you, i f 
ye are to be b e l i e v e r s . " ( I l l - 49 ) . "When Allah 
s a i t h : 0 J e sus , son of Mary! Remember My favour 
unto thee and unto thy mother; how I strengthened 
thee with the Holy S p i r i t , so that thou spakest 
unto mankind in the c rad le as immaturity; and how 
I taught thee the Scr ipture and wisdom and the 
Torah and the Gospel; and how thou d ids t shape of 
c lay as i t were the l ikeness of a b i rd by My permi-
ss ion, and d ids t blow upon i t and i t was a bi rd by 
My permission, and thou d ids t heal him who was bom 
blind and the l eper by My permission; and how thou 
didst r a i s e the dead by My permission; and how I 
res t ra ined the Children of I s r a e l from(harming)thee 
when thou comest unto them with c l e a r proofs , and 
those of them who disbel ieved exclaimed: This i s 
naught e lse than mere magic!" (V - 110). 
( i v ) . "The hour drew nigh and the moon was rent i n twain." (LIV - 1 ) . 
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Al-GhazHi, in his treatment of miracles , makes a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between log ica l necess i ty and the psychological 
necess i ty . The necessary connection that we see in a cause 
and i t s effect is the habit of our mind. I t i s not l o g i c a l , 
but psychological . I t i s psychological in the sense that 
i t s denial does not involve con t rad ic t ion ; while in the case 
of log ica l necess i ty i t does so, Al-Ghazali be l ieves t h a t , 
as mentioned e a r l i e r , everything i s possible for God except 
the l og i ca l l y impossible. Since the connection between 
two s t a t e s i s not log ica l ly necessary, i t i s qu i te poss ib le 
for one to happen while the o ther does not . Hume's r e j ec t i on 
of miracles , on the ground that i t v io l a t e s the na tu ra l 
laws is inconsis tent with his o^ /m pos i t ion because he nimself 
has rejected the idea of necessi ty in the na tura l laws. Accord-
ing to him these laws are the resu l t of our habit to assoc ia te 
the ideas with the more l ive ly ideas v/hich are highly probable. 
His notion about cause is that 'anything nay cause anything, 
and cause and effect are always d i s t i n c t ' . Hence, i t means 
that f i re may or may not burn, water may or may not quench 
t h i r s t , and food may or may not nourish e t c . Thus, t:io concept 
of miracle should not appear very strange thing to riuine. 
One of the most cont rovers ia l issues in Taha"fut is 
God's icnowledge of the p a r t i c u l a r s . Ibn 3ina re jec ted to 
believe thnt God knows the p a r t i c u l a r s as pa r t i cu l ' - r s because 
i t involves condi t ion. He knov/s ihom but in a 'univer?--'] v^v'. 
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This means thot His knowledge is not subject to tne ti-s.e 
factor. He does not know, for instances, ray actions in terms 
of 'past', 'present' and 'future', but in terms of subsequence. 
He knows that such and such actions are subsequent to my 
birth. Thus, for instances, He does not know that at present 
I am writing this sentence on this plain paper but that my 
writing is preceded by a number of other actions which I 
have been performing since my birth. The reason behind holding 
this type of view is to exclude the possibility of perceptual 
knowledge. A perceptual knowledge is subject to the spatio-
temporal conditions. Temporal events occur and pass away. 
They are subject to a continuous change. Change in the object 
of perception implies a change in the content of the subject. 
And change in the content of the subject implies change in 
the subject itself. In other words, change in the knowledge 
means change in the knower. So, according to Ibn Sina, if 
God has the perceptual knowledge of things, it implies a 
change in His Essence corresponding to the change in the 
perceived object. But change in God is unthinkable. Therefore, 
God does not h^ve the perceptual knowledge of the particulars. 
Ibn STna says: 
"...and if you have knowledge not of 
the eclipse in general, but of any 
eclipse whatever, then the existence 
or non-existence of any definite 
eclipse v/ill not produce a change in 
you or your knowledge, for what you 
know is that one definite eclipse 
is later than another; and this 
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knowledge of yours w i l l be true 
during, before, and a f t e r any 
ec l ip se . But when you introduce 
the concept of time, and know at 
one def in i te moment tha t the 
ec l ipse i s not actual and at another 
that i t i s , then your knowledge i s 
not una l t e rab le . The F i r s t , how-
ever, who i s not in time or subject 
to i t s r u l e , can never re fe r to any-
thing in t h i s or tha t de f i n i t e time, 
since t h i s would imply tha t He Himself 
was in i t and would imply in Him a . 
new judgement and a new knov/ledge," 
Ibn Sina ' s pos i t ion seems to be well grounded. Logically 
and r a t i ona l l y i t i s qu i te understandable that God's knowledge 
cannot be subject to the condit ions of space and t ime. His 
knowledge can not be subject to the condit ion of space because 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between two s p a t i a l objects i s poss ib le only 
through senses in terms of ' h e r e ' and ' t h e r e ' . I t means tha t 
one thing would be nearer to God than the o the r , and t h i s i s 
unacceptable. Again, in a temporal knowledge th ings are known 
in succession. One event is always succeeded as well as p re -
ceded by other events . But God's knowledge is simultaneous 
and whole. Knowledge of things in terms of 'now' and ' t hen ' 
implies chanoe in the pos i t ion of the knower, i . e . , my p o s i -
t i o n at present , v;hen I come to know that something 'X' has 
happened, i s ce r ta in ly dif ferent from my e a r l i e r pos i t i on when 
I did not know t h i s . To suppose that God's knowledge of the 
1. cf. Simon van den Bergh TT, Vol. I I , 276.5. 
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p a r t i c u l a r s is simil- 'r to our .-.nowledge would ascr ioe a 
change in Him, which i s unacceptable. Therefore, according 
to Ibn SIna, God does not know rhe p a r t i c u l a r s except in a 
universal way. But v/hat al-Ghazall understands i s qui te 
d i f f e r en t . According to him the pos i t ion of Ibn Sina i s 
d i sas t rous to r e l i g ious law. According to the phi losophers , 
particulr^r] y to Ibn SIna, says a l -Ghazal i , knowledge i s 
always re la ted with the object of knowledge in tne sense that 
when the object of knowledge changes the pos i t ion of the 
knower also changes. And they r e j ec t t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . But 
according to a l -Ghazal i , a nev; problem would a r i se in t i . is 
s i t u a t i o n . If God does not knov/ the changing pos i t ions cf 
the p a r t i c u l a r s , He would remain unaware of very important 
fundamental chant,es taking place in the p a r t i c u l a r s , a s i t u a t i o n 
which i s equally unaccentable. He says: 
" I t implies tr.ot, i c r ins tance , v/iiethar 
Ilaia ooe,'^ Go or disobeys Him, God can 
not kno.v r.ir newly PTorging s t a t e s , since 
..e Goes not knov/ Zaid as an individual— 
i . e . , as a person whose act ions cone to 
•)e af ter they had not been. So if .He does 
not knov/ the rerson, He cannot kno'v nis 
s t a t e s and - c t i c n s . i-'or can He knc".; of 
^ a i d ' s i n i i a e l i t y or' Islam, since He knows 
only the i n f i d e l i t y or Islam of l\an—in— 
general in t'.ie absolute and universal 
mf^nner, not in snecif ic r e l a t i on to 
ind iv idua l s . "'^ 
1 . ;H -Ghr z"p ! i , Tah~f u t , vr. 1 5'3-56 . 
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In his answer to the ^-Philosophers al-Ghazali s t a t e s 
tha t God i s Omniscient and His knowledge i s simultaneous 
whole. God immediately knov/s a l l the pas t , present end future 
v/ithout any refer-jnce to space and time. He objec ts to the 
phi losophers ' view that a change in the object would, in the 
context of God, cause a change in knowledge. The knowledge 
t h a t an ec l i p se , for example, v;ill take p lace , and then tha t 
i t i s taking place and, u l t ima te ly , that i t has happened, 
br ings no change in God's Essence because He already knew a l l 
these s t ages . Taking another example, we know tha t at every 
morning the Sun r i s e s from the East and shines throughout 
the whole day and then^at every evening, i t s e t s in the West. 
We are so much accustomed to t h i s da i ly process tha t i t makes 
no sense to say that the knowledge of a person gradual ly 
increases with the passage of the day. Knowledge, roughly, 
means the awareness of something which we did not know previously. 
I t always adds something new. .'/hen I already know, for ins tance , 
tha t the Sun wi l l shine at a pa r t i cu l a r pos i t ion tomorrow at 
2 a.m., then i t i s senseless to say, when the Sun has passed 
away from that p a r t i c u l a r pos i t i on , that my knowledge has 
increased. In case of human beings i t i s a matter of be l ie f 
to expect for an event to take piece under c e r t a i n condi t ions , 
and our bel ief may, l a t e r on, be jus t i f i ed by the ac tua l 
occurence of the event. In th i s s i t ua t ion the occurence of 
the event wil l increase our knowledre because v;e l"c/.cd i^ 
''^efore i t s occurence. but in t c^ case of Go.., i t \/: s "lv;?ys 
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in His knov.Ied ,e, even fc-fore i t --ctually hap-'onec. He 
knov/s a na r t i cu lp r event , net because i t happens, but i t 
does hanren because He knov/s i t . God's knov.'lcdge of a tninf 
IS no I conditioned by i t s ex i s tence ; instead i t s ex i - t t nce 
i s conditioned by the knowledge of God. Therefore, cnere i s 
no question of change in His Essence fix)m His knowled -e of 
the p a r t i c u l a r s . 
There i s an ambiguity involved in the expression of 
the manner of God's knowledge, i . e . , universal way. The 
expression conveying knowledge of pa r t i cu l a r s ' i n a universal 
way' i s c e r t a in ly not c l e a r . To say that God knows un iversa l ly 
a l l tne a c t i v i t i e s of hunan beings conveys a sense which i s 
d i f fe ren t from saying that He knows the a c t i v i t i e s of a 
p a r t i c u l a r person in a universa l way. In the l a t t e r case the 
meaning of 'knowledge in a universa l way' i s ' t he co l l e c t i ve 
knowledge'. Here i t means tha t God knows a l l the act ions of^ 
say, Zaid which he wi l l do a f te r his b i r t h . In t h i s s i t i . a t ion 
God v.'ould know the i n f i d e l i t y of Zaid if he leaves Islam 
because God knows a l l h is ?ct ions in an order of sequence. He 
knov/s at v.'hat stage of t - i s order Zaid v/ill le'^ve Islam. A 
quest ion may be raised here, i . e . , the idea that God knov;s 
a l l tr e action': of a 7iart icul?r person in an order of seauence 
implies time factor v/hicii i s a condition for a oeing ana can 
not be accepted in tne context of God. In response to tn i s 
object ion i t may be s ta ted b r i e f l y that the human v-ay of 
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t h ink in? should not be considered to be s imi la r to tn r t of 
God. Time i s the mode and the condit ion of human thought. 
But in the context of Ck)d i t has no r e a l i t y . I t means that 
God's knowledge of the order of act ions of a p a r t i c u l a r 
person does not involve time f ac to r . Now, coming to the 
o r ig ina l problem, if th i s is what Ibn SIna understands by 
'knowledge in a universal way' then his pos i t ion i s not so 
object ionable because such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n does not 
oppose God's knowledge of the p a r t i c u l a r s . This i s how 
most of the commentators of Ibn Sina in t e rp re t h i s view on 
t h i s i s sue . According to M. Saeed Sheikh: 
" . . . i b n Sina does not mean to say tha t 
God does not have the knowledge of the 
pa r t i cu l a r s or that His knowledge i s 
r e s t r i c t e d only to that of the universa ls 
or general concepts. Ibn SIna i n s i s t s that 
God does have knowledge of the p a r t i c u l a r s ; 
only t h i s knowledge comes to Him not 
through sensuous perception but through 
i n t e l l e c t u a l perception, not from noment 
to moment but e te rna l ly . "^ 
Al-Gnazali takes Ibn s rna ' s i n t e rp r e t a t i on to :r.epn 
that God must be ignorant of ind iv idua l s , and t h i s , l i t rue 
is neresy. Ibn Rushd observes the whole issi^e to be t'le 
r e su l t of the confusion due to makin:; an analogy between the 
Eternal Kno-'led^e an' the originated knov.led ^e. In case of 
the or i United knowledge the ' lartj cul=5rs are tne cause of our 
1. Sheikh, H. Saeed, "Al-Ghazali", M.::. Sharif ' s ed t . A History 
of r.uslim Philosorhy, p. 609. 
130 
k no-,/led^;e. But in the case of the e te rna l kno'.vled^e, t..e 
kno-,vled,'";e i t s e l f i s the cause of the existence of tne p ? r t i -
c u l a r s . I t means that tne mode of r e l a t i o n Detv.een Eternal 
knowledge and the pa r t i cu l a r s i s d i f fe ren t from that of 
o r ig ina ted knowledge and the p a r t i c u l a r s . According to Ibn 
Rushd the accusation that the philosophers bel ieve t n a t the 
Eternal kno-.'vledge is disconnected with the p a r t i c u l a r s i s 
b a s e l e s s . In fac t , the philosophers hold that God does not 
know the p a r t i c u l a r s with or iginated knowledge because i t i s 
condit ioned, God knows the p a r t i c u l a r s with His Eternal 
knowledge; His knowledge of them i s so le ly the cause of 
t h e i r ex is tence , t h e i r being issued from Him. 
A new problem that may a r i s e here i s about the d i r e c t 
Divine in te rven t ion . If God knows simply tha t such and such 
subsequent events concerned with a p a r t i c u l a r w i l l take p lace , 
and He knows th i s in a universal manner, i t would be d i f f i c u l t 
to explain His d i r ec t in tervent ion at a time wnen Frophet^ 
such as Abraham(AS), for example^ v;as being plunged into f i r e 
because His knowledge i s unconcerned with the temporril order 
and the events taking place in i t . In t h i s s i t u a t i o n His 
Universal Knowledge v/culd require the mediators, tlie angels , 
in oi-^der to ue ialor-ied nuout .l:e current ai iair-s occur m^' 
1. cf. .Averrc'es, "On God's Kno\;ledge", George F. Hourani 's 
t r a n s l a t i o n of "Letter to a Friend", Kedieval Philosorhv 
e d t s . John F. ./ipcel ?nd Allan D, V/olter, general e d t s . 
Paul E -^v/prris i n ' ^ichard H,Pot)kJn (The Free P ress , ..ev 
Yorl:, 1^6/4), Dp. /55-9 . 
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under the spatio-temporal cond i t ions . But th i s ooviously 
cannot be accepted. God i s not l i k e 'one of the Leibnitzir .n 
monads, a windowless s p i r i t u a l being who has to fol] ov; the 
p re -es tab l i shed harmony ana who can not i n t e r f e r e in tne 
a f f a i r s of the other monads. Tnere i s a great d i f ference 
between God of the r e l ig ion and God of the phi losophers . Goc 
of r e l ig ion i s e s s e n t i a l l y a ^/illing Being ./hose ac t ions can 
not be r e s t r i c t e d through c e r t a i n laws and p r i n c i p l e s . His 
act ions are spontaneous. The r a t i o n a l i s t approach f a i l s to 
give a proper explanation of the way of His ac t i ons . we may 
present a number of accounts on i n t e l l e c t u a l level in j u s t i -
f i ca t i on of metaphysics. But at a stage reason must have to 
commit su ic ide . The re l ig ious aspect cons i s t s of a number of 
fac tors l i k e love, f a i t h , emotions, b e l i e f s , s u p e r s t i t i o n s , 
sentiments e t c . and the i r corresponding a c t i v i t i e s which are 
qu i te foreign to the i n t e l l e c t u a l equipment. In t h i s context 
i t can be said that our f i n i t e instruments are incapable to 
produce an exhaustive and yet s a t i s f ac to ry account of tne 
Divine Knowledge and i t s r e l a t i on \/ith tne p a r t i c u l a r s . How-
ever , one th ing, a t l e a s t , is c l e a r t h r t tne in t en t ion of tne 
Muslim philosophers and that of otner l i ke minded people should 
not be blamed because tliey try to present the i r humble e f fo r t s 
i n the service of God, The g lo r ious . Their e f for t i s to 
shov; tlie harmony between reason and revela t ion in order to 
provide a b e t t e r foundation foi f a i t h . 
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Under the :3ixth Frcblen of the Tahafut al-Ghazali 
s t r i v e s to show that the proofs of the philosophers for the 
uni ty of God and, therefore , for the denial of the Divine 
At t r ibutes are a l l unsound and inva l id . The phi losophers , 
l i k e I ' i u ' t a z i l i t e s , argue that the Divine At t r ibutes should 
not be conceived in addi t ion to the Divine Essence, because 
t h i s involves p l u r a l i t y . The descr ip t ion of the Divine 
At t r ibu tes in the :ioly Scr ip ture should not be taken as such. 
They are simply the metaphorical expressions. Al-Ghazali 
c i t e s two arguments through which the philosophers t r y to 
disprove the independence of Divine At t r ibu te s . But they 
bas i ca l ly a s se r t the same thing in di f ferent v;ays. Let us 
see the f i r s t argument. In i t the philosophers present 
three a l t e r n a t i v e s , concerning the existence of an a t t r i b u t e 
and i t s subjec t , v i z . , ( i ) both ex i s t independently, ( i i ) each 
wi l l need the other or ( i i i ) one wi l l be dependent on the 
o ther . F i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e involves absolute dua l i t y which i s 
unacceptable. The second also i s not acceptable because 
there i s no necessary being in i t . The philosopher's re jec t 
the chird a l t e r n a t i v e OIGO on the ground that one of the two 
i s to oe talcen as necessary while the otJier as a dependent 
being. One's being dependent r.ieans thai i t i s a caused being. 
And t.-is implies tlie existence of an external cause. oiinil-'Ply 
in tnoi r second rrgun.t nt t.ie puilosophe; s t ry ^o prove t..at 
cr.G no' ion of a t t r i b u t e demands for an external cnuse. But 
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in the context of Jod the idea of '^ n external ceuse for tne 
Divine At t r ibutes i s unthinkable . /hus the Uivine At t r ibutes 
can not be thou^^ht to be r e a l a r^ r t from the Divine Essence, 
h'ow the problem comes to a stage './here me philosophers 
a s se r t that a^ n a t t r i b u t e cannoc be a necessary being because 
i t depends on something e l s e . And t h i s i s protes ted by 
a l -Ghazal i . He says; 
"Why do you say so, i f by the necessary 
being you mean a being which has no 
e f f i c i en t cause ? Why should i t be 
impossible to say t h a t , jus t as the 
essence of the Necessary Being i s e t e rna l 
and independent of an e f f i c i en t cause, 
so are His a t t r i b u t e s e t e rna l and i n -
dependent of an e f f i c i en t cause ? If 
by the necessary being you mean a being 
without a recep t ive cause, then the 
a t t r i b u t e s are not necessary in that 
sense. Nonetheless, they are e t e rna l 
and have no e f f i c i en t cause, what i s the 
con t rad ic t ion involved in t h i s view ?"'' 
The argument given by al-Ghazali i s based on the 
argumentum ad hominem. The object ion i s infac t against the 
method of Ibn Slna v/ho re jec ted the r ea l i cy of the a t t r i b u t e s 
in order to e s t ab l i sh the idea of s e l f - e x i s t e n t necessary 
2 being. Altliough fa l l ac ious from the log ica l point of view, 
the argument i s yet appealing. I t shows the inconsis tency 
and ununifor'^ity in the nanner of argumenca ticn of the l.uclim 
p e r i p a t e t i c s . However, according to Ibn ^ushd, the argument 
1. Al-Gha^ali, Tah^fut. p . 111. 
2 . I b n Kushd, TT, p . 1 9 2 . 
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fo r the unity of Gk)d in Ibn SIna i s not as forcefu l l as 
tha t of the K u ' t a z i l i t e s . There i s an important d i f ference 
between t h e i r methods, Ibn Sina refutes the independent 
exis tence of the Divine Attr ibutes by showing tha t i t nece-
s s i t a t e s the int roduct ion of an unwarranted ex te rna l cause; 
while the Ku^taz i l i t es refute the independent r e a l i t y of the 
Divine Attr ibutes from the s implic i ty of 'God. According to 
them a l l the possible beings are subject to the causa l connec-
t i o n and they are a l l below the F i r s t P r i n c i p l e . The F i r s t 
P r i n c i p l e , or the IJecessary Being i s the cause of a l l the 
poss ib le beings . So far there i s agreement between both the 
schools of Mu ' t az i l i t e s and Ash ' a r i t e s ; but a f t e r t h i s they 
take divergent pos i t i ons , for the i r views on the nature of 
the F i r s t P r inc ip l e . According to the Mu^taz i l i t es the 
den ia l of t rue p o s s i b i l i t y means pure s impl i c i ty ; and t h i s 
would, thereby, r e j ec t the notion of Divine At t r ibu te as 
something which is independent of the Divine Essence. But 
Ash*'arites do not accept th i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the denia l 
of t rue p o s s i b i l i t y . According to them the r e j e c t i o n of t rue 
p o s s i b i l i t y does not mean pure s impl ic i ty . I t means ' e t e r n i t y ' 
and 'the absence of an ef f ic ient cause ' . Hence, the Divine 
At t r ibutes ere r ea l with the Divine Essence. This Ash ' a r i t e 
pos i t ion is impl ic i t ly sustained by a l -Ghazal i . 
1. Term ' t rue Doss io i l i tv ' stands for th^t which has a cause. 
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Anotr.er important discussion in Tahafut covers c e r t a i n 
issues concerning human psychology. I t mainly cons i s t s of, 
what the philosophers argue for , the immaterial i ty and the 
immortality of the soul . The discussion i s incorporated 
under the Eighteenth and the Nineteenth Chapters. A d e t a i l 
discussion on t h i s issue will be given in the succeeding 
sec t ion . I t may here be pointed out that the Muslim ph i loso-
phers borrowed many inconsis tent ideas from non-conducive 
sources due to t he i r excessive longing to combine neo-Platonism 
with Aris totel ianism, They sometimes seem to hold that the 
soul i s the form of body, sometimes that i t i s subs i s t en t 
substance which i s immortal, and sometimes they hold that the 
soul after death takes a pneumatic body. Their views, in th i s 
way, have inherent con t rad ic t ions . If soul i s considered to 
be the form of the body, i t can not be t rea ted as a subs i s ten t 
substance and immortal because, being a form, i t l a s t s only 
with i t s matter and, therefore , the mortal i ty of body would 
imply the sou l ' s mortal i ty a l s o . This point i s r i g h t l y raised 
by al-Ghazal i . Moreover, tne phi losophers ' concept of the 
soul as s e l f - subs i s t en t , e t e rna l , ungenerated, i nco r rup t ib l e 
substance becomes i r re levant when, following the Islamic 
be l ie f , they deny the Platonic ider^ of the pre -ex is tence of 
2 the soul. However, so far the r'Ositiop. of I'-'^n Pushd i s 
concerned, he admits t!ie resur rec t ion but not of the f lesh 
1. Al-Gha-~li, Tahafut, p. 225. 
2 . Vnn den i^erg, TT, Vol . I I , 3 5 7 . 3 . 
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i i i s viev; aboul: L:.e e x i s t e n c e of liie SOL-I r . f t c r de? th 
resembles . . i th th^.t of l a t e r Greeks . According to him 
the souls of trie doaJ e x i s t somev; ,ere i n the Cosmos. He 
says : 
"And these sou ls a re e l t i i c r l iKe 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s betv/een the sou l s 
of the heavenly bod ies and the 
sou l s i n tiie s e n s i b l e bodies of t he 
sublunary world, and then no doubt 
they have abso lu te dominion over 
t h e s e l a t t e r souls and zhese b o d i e s , 
and from here a r i s e s t h e b e l i e f i n the 
J i n n , or these sou l s themselves a re 
a t t ached to the bod ie s v/hich they 
c r e a t e according to a resemblance which 
e x i s t s betv/een them, and when the 
bodies decay they r e t u r n to t h e i r 
s p i r i t u a l mat te r and to the s u b t l e 
i m p e r c e p t i b l e b o d i e s . "2 
1. I b i d . , Vol. I , " I n t r o d u c t i o n " , p . XXXIV. 
2 . Ibn Rushd, TT, p . 358. 
SECTION-* C 
ON RESURRECTION 
That the death is sure for everyone is a fact confirmed 
by experience. But the issue that what happens after death 
has produced varied opinions on this topic. For some people 
death is the end of everything for an individual while others 
believe that after death body decays and is reduced to dust, 
but the soul has to start a new life. 
The problem about the nature of the life beyond is 
not a new one but as old as the human existence on the earth. 
The primitive people of every region of the earth believed 
in some kind of existence after death, either ghostly or 
spiritual or a kind of physical survival. The archaeologists 
provide plenty of evidences to make us believe that the 
people belonging to the Stone Age believed that the soul of 
the deceased starts some kind of new physical life after 
death. This is the reason that they used to keep food and 
other things, necessary for daily life, in the grave with the 
dead body. The root of the vampire superstition can be 
traced to the belief that the dead person will come out of 
the grave, not merely as a spirit, but in body. Hence, in 
order to prevent such a possibility they used to bind the 
dead with cords, lay heavy stones or mound of earth on the 
grave. 
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H i s to r i ca l ly the be l ie f i s an existence a f t e r death 
can be traced back to the ancient Greeks where we find 
Homer introducing the belief in Hades where the dead people 
were supposed to spend a l i f e without consciousness. But 
we do not find an elaborated view of th i s matter u n t i l 
P l a t o gave a philosophical support to the doc t r ine of the 
immortality of the soul . He not only t e l l s about the survival 
of the soul a f t e r death but also that the soul r e s i de s in a 
body before the b i r t h of a person. Body i s considered to be 
t h e prison and freedom from i t i s the aim of l i f e . A phi loso-
phe r ' s self, a f t e r death, ge ts absolute freedom from the 
cyc le of death and r e b i r t h . I t i s because the philosopher i s 
a lover of wisdom and wisdom i s pursui t of the e t e rna l to 
which, not to the world, belongs the sou^. According to Plato 
t r u e philosopher does not care for t h i s world or the body 
because body i s e v i l . I t i s the l i f e beyond for which he 
s t r i v e s to cleanse h is soul by study of philosophy. But 
a f t e r Plato we do not immediately find any p o s i t i v e explana-
t i o n of the idea of resur rec t ion . Even in Judaism the i ssue 
i s not elaborated su f f i c i en t l y . David Stewart says: 
"The doctrine of the resur rec t ion of the 
dead was s t i l l highly cont rovers ia l i n 
Judaism during the emergence of C h r i s t i a -
n i ty . We can see t h i s ref lected in the 
New Testament Gospels as one of the on-
going quarrels between the Pharisees and 
Sadducees. The Pharisees supported the 
doctrine of resur rec t ion whereas the 
Sadducees, defenders of the "old-time 
re l ig ion" , rejected i t as a modernistic 
innovat ion," ' 
I.David Stev/art, Exploring the Philosophy of Religion, (Pren t ice -
Hall Inc. Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey, 198u) , pp.312-3. 
1 4 : 
The s ign i f i can t d i t l n c t i o n between Platonic and the 
Hebrew views of human dest iny i s tha t for Plato human beings 
a r e incarnated souls while according to Jewish thought human 
be ings are animated bodies. P l a t o ' s view on the f a t e of 
the soul a f te r death, again, disagrees with tha t of ea r ly 
Chr i s t i an be l ie f u n t i l l i t was otherwise In te rp re ted by 
S t . Thomas Aquinas and others in the Middle Ages. Plato had 
sa id t h a t the soul i s immortal as such and wi l l survive 
a f t e r death and tha t body i s the pr ison of the sou l , the decay 
of which means the l e t t e r ' s freedom. According to the ear ly 
Chr i s t i an bel ief the soul i s not immortal by n a t u r e . I t i s 
the Divine Will which may or may not l e t the soul e x i s t 
a f te r dea th . The bodily existence or the immortali ty of the 
soul a f te r death i s a t t r i bu ted to the power and wi l l of God* 
This doctr ine may be regarded as a th i rd and intermediate 
view about the nature of the soul between n a t u r a l i s t e p i -
phenoraenalism and P la to ' s^na tu ra l immortal i ty". I t was i n t r o -
duced by St . Paul (died C. 64 A.D.), a d i s c ip l e of Jesus and 
a leading f igure in the expansion of C h r i s t i a n i t y to whom i s 
a t t r i b u t e d as many as t h i r t e en of the twenty seven books of 
t h e New Testament. St, Paul did not produce any phi losophica l 
argument in favour of r e su r rec t ion . He claims t h a t Jesus was 
r i s e n a f te r h is death and tha t th i s single ins tance of r e -
su r rec t ion i s suf f ic ien t to prove the r e su r r ec t i on of human 
beings . He says: 
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". . .how can some of you say tha t the 
dead wi l l not be raised to l i f e ? 
If tha t i s t r ue , i t means tha t Chr is t 
was not ra ised; and i f Christ has not 
been raised from death, then we have 
nothing to preach and you have nothing 
to bel ieve."1 
St . Paul says that the s t a t e of the resur rec ted soul 
w i l l be a bodily s t a t e . He does not go into d e t a i l to explain 
whether or not the soul wil l have the same physical body which 
i t had l e f t . He gave the analogy of a seed which dest royes 
i t s e l f in order to give r i s e to a large t r e e . Since the t r ee 
i s something qui te other than the seed* t h i s would thereby 
mean that the resurrected soul wi l l have a body other than 
i t previously had. What i s important here to note i s tha t 
the resurrected s t a t e wi l l be a bodily s t a t e . This notion 
of sou l ' s exis tence af ter death, on the one hand, i s d i f f e ren t 
from the Greek thought of the pos s ib i l i t y of the disembodied 
souly on the other hand i t has great a f f i n i t y with al-Ghaz31i 's 
view on the bodily r esur rec t ion . 
The ear ly Chr is t ian h e s i t a t i o n to bel ieve in na tura l 
immortal i ty i s quite absent in St . Thomas Aquinas. He advo-
cated the immaterial i ty as well as the immortality of the 
soul . He is a pe r ipa t e t i c in real sense who re jec ted the 
not ion of one universal in te l l igence of the Arabian th inkers 
1. David Stewart ' s edt , Explorinp; the Philosophy of Rel igion, 
op. c i t . , p . 315. 
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who were influenced by Plotinus 'emanationism. According 
to St. Thomas in te l l igence and w i l l are the essence of the 
human soul which are three in kind, v i z . , organic s e n s i t i v e 
and the i n t e l l e c t u a l , corresponding to t h e i r funct ions . The 
i n t e l l e c t u a l soul , though in t imate ly united with the organic 
body, i s i n f a c t , hyperorganic, completely free from the body. 
S t . Thomas also viewed that the dogmas of a bodily r e s u r r e c -
t ion could be r a t i ona l ly J u s t i f i e d . He, under the inf luence 
of A r i s t o t l e , argued tha t form and matter , or soul and body 
c o l l e c t i v e l y cons t i t u t e one substance. For the s e l f - exp re -
ssion of the soul i t i s necessary for i t to have a body. So 
the resu r rec t ion means the resurgence of both the soul and 
the body. But i t i s not c lear whether by body he means the 
e a r l i e r body or a new one. However, the Chr i s t i an ph i loso-
phers general ly do not advocate in favour of the previous 
body that the soul had. 
On the issue of the exis tence of the soul a f te r death 
al-GhazSli widely d i f fe r s from the philosophers and agree 
with St . Paul, He re j ec t s the phi losophers ' view about the 
immortali ty of the soul . The philosophers hold that having 
come into exis tence the human souls can not be destroyed and 
t h a t t h e i r ever las t ing nature makes i t impossible for us to 
conceive of t h e i r des t ruc t ion . Al-GhazHi discusses this 
i ssue in the Nineteenth Chapter of the Tahafut, where he 
says: 
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"Since the mutual fitness of the body 
and soul is invisible to us, and be-
cause it is this mutual fitness which 
demands a definite relation, it is, 
therefore, not improbable that this 
unascertainable mutual fitness should 
be of such a kind as to make the immor-
tality of the soul dependent upon the 
continuance of the body, wherefore the 
corruption of the body should cause 
the corruption of the soul. That 
which is unascertainable affords no 
ground for the Judgement as to whether 
it demands a necessary interrelation 
between the soul and body, or not. 
May be, the relation between the soul 
and body is necessary for the existence 
of the soul; and the soul will there-
fore perish when this relation is 
served."'' 
One thing is remarkable here. It appears that al-
Ghazali was not totally against the immortality of the soul, 
This is clear in the Twentieth Chapter where he says: 
"Nor do we deny the immortality of the 
soul separated from the body. But we 
know these things on the authority of 
religion, as expressed in the doctrine 
of Resurrection, No doubt, the Ressurec-
tion will not be comprehensible, if the 
immortality of soul is not taken for 
granted. But we take objection, as we 
did before, to their assertion that mere 
reason gives them final knowledge of 
these thihgs,"^ 
It appears that al-Ghazali held two contrary views 
on immortality. In the nineteenth discussion he rejected 
1. Al-Ghazali, 0£, cit,, p. 225. 
2. Ibid,, p. 235. 
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i t would in the twentieth d iscuss ion re t r i ev ing his s teps 
he accepted i t . But his view i s not ce r t a in ly s e l f - c o n t r a -
d i c to ry , ra ther his approach is double edged. By re jec t ing 
the immortality, on the one hand, he wanted to show the 
weakness and the loop-holes in the phi losophers ' argument 
to prove i t , which i s the bas ic aim of the Tahafut. On the 
o ther hand, by th i s r e j e c t i o n , perhaps he wanted to r e j e c t 
t h e "natural immortality" which was also rejected by St , Paul, 
and l a t e r on supported by St . Thomas Aquinas and the Muslim 
P e r i p a t e t i c s . The view is in fac t P l a t o ' s b ra in -ch i ld who 
re jec ted the view that the soul i s dependent on God's w i l l 
for i t s existence af te r death . According to al-Ghazal i the 
soul is created and a subject to the wi l l of God, Not only 
i n TahSfut but in a l - Iq t i s ad f l a l - I^ t lqad also he dea l t with 
the problem of inmortal i ty and re jected the phi losophers ' 
view on i t . He says: 
"We have t reated t h i s problem in d e t a i l 
in the Kitab al-Tahafut adopted in i t 
in refuting the ph i losopher ' s doct r ine 
the view that affirms the immortality 
of the soul ^which according to them 
has no posi t ion in space and tha t 
allows the resumption of i t s manage-
ment of the body, regardless of whether 
or not such a body i s the same as o r i g i n a l 
human body. 
This, however, i s a consequence Z^Ie made 
log ica l ly incumbent on them to accept^ 
that does not agree with what we be l ieve 
(wa dhalika ilzamun l a yuwafiqu ma 
na*-taoiduhuJ. h'or that book was wr i t t en 
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for the purpose of refuting their doctrine 
not for the pui-pose of establishing true 
doctrine." '' 
From this statement it is clear that the doctrine of 
immortality in Platonic sense is not acceptable to al-Ghazali 
and he acknowledged it in the Twentieth Discussion of the 
Tahafut only for the sake of argument. Nor we can say that 
al-Ghazali agreed with what the MutakallimOn are told to 
have believed in the nature of the soul, i.e., man is body 
and life, an accident, depends on it; that soul does not 
exist and that death means the discontinuance of life which, 
2 
later on, is to be restored at the time of resurrection. 
This Kala"mi view of the soul is obviously against the well 
established and undisputed Muslim belief in the "hidden— 
world" ('•alam al-Barzakh) where both good and evil souls are 
told to reside separately till the day of resurrection. It 
is unacceptable that an orthodox person like al-Ghazali 
would have believed in such a doctrine of semi-epi-pheno-
_ 5 
menalism in a l - I q t i s a d . 
1. Michael E. Marraura, "Al-Ghazali on Bodily Resurrection and 
Causal i ty in Tahafut and the I q t i s a d " , Allgarh Journal of 
Islamic Thought, No. Two, (i^partment of Philosophy, 
Aligarh Muslim Univers i ty , Aligarh, 1989), p . 59. 
2 . Al-Ghazali, £2* c i t . , p . 236, 
3. Michael E. Marmura says that al-Ghazali believed in the 
Kalgm doctrine of resurrection. But the doctrine mentioned 
by him is a bit different from that mentioned in the 
Tahafut. In al-Iqti^ad al-Ghazali is reported to have said 
that after the annihilation of the body and the accident 
(life), souls do not lose their identity. They can thus 
be recreated. This recreation is of that which previously 
existed and not a replica (££. cit., p. 58). While in 
Tahafut the Mutakallimum are said to have believed in 
the theory of epi-phenomenalism (op. cit., p. 236 - 7) 
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However, i t i s undisputable tha t a l -Ghaz51i ' s aff i rmation of 
of the itiur.ortality in the Twentieth Discussion i s something 
which in fac t he did not b e l i e v e . This i s e x p l i c i t y l y supported 
by his statements in a l - Iq t igad as well as his r e fu t a t ion of 
s o u l ' s i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y in the Nineteenth Discussion of the 
Tahafut. 
Another equal ly important i ssue r e l a t ed with the doctr ine 
of Resurrect ion i s about the way of existence that the soul 
i s supposed to have a l t e r Resurrect ion, F i r s t , l e t us take 
t h e desc r ip t ion in the Qur 'an. The desc r ip t i on of the s t a t e s 
of the good and the ev i l souls in t he i r respec t ive places i s 
almost sensuous. The l i f e in paradise i s described in terms 
of pleasure and luxury while t ha t of the h e l l in terms of pain 
and torment. Some i l l u s t r a t i o n s of paradise and he l l from the 
Qur'an are r e spec t ive ly quoted here : 
"Lo! Allah wi l l cause those who be l ieve 
and do good works to en ter Gargens under-
neath which r i v e r s flow, wherein they 
w i l l be allowed armlets of gold; and 
p e a r l s , and t h e i r raiment the re in w i l l 
be s i lk . ' ' ^ "A s imi l i tude of Garden which 
those who keep t h e i r duty ( to Allah) are 
promised: the re in are r i v e r s of water 
unpolluted and r i v e r s of milk whereof the 
flavour changethnot, and r i v e r s of wine 
de l ic ious to the d r i n k e r s , and r i v e r s of 
c l ea r - run honey; t h e r e i n for them i s 
1. P i c k t h a l l ' s t r a n s l a t i o n , The Holy Qur'an - XXII - 2 ? . 
every kind of fruit, with pardon from 
their Lord. (Are those who enjoy all 
this) like those who are immortal in 
the Fire and given boiling water to ^ 
drink so that it teareth their bowels?" 
"There wait on them immortal youths with 
bowls and owers and cup from a pure 
spring wherefrom they get no aching of 
the head nor any madness, And fruit 
that they prefer And flesh of fowls that 
they desire. And (There are) fair ones 
with wide, lovely eyes. Like unto hidden 
pearls. Reward for what they used to do. 
There hear they no vain speaking nor 
recrimination (Naught) but the saying; 
Peace, (and again) Peace! And those on the 
right hand; what of those on the right 
hand? Among thornless lote trees and olua-
tered plantains, and spreading shade, 
And water gushing, And fruit in plenty 
Neither out of reach nor yet forbidden, 
And raised couches; Lol We have created 
them a (new) creation And made virgins 
Lovely, friends."2 
Similarly descriptions of pain and torment are given 
in the hell are also in sensuous terms: 
"And for those who disbelieve in their 
Lord there is the doom of hell, a hap-
less journey's end! IVhen they are flung 
therein they hear its roaring as it 
boilests up. As it would burst with rage. 
'/Whenever a (fresh) host is flung therein 
the wardens thereof ask them: Came there 
unto you no warner ? They say: Yea verily 
a warner came unto us; but we denied and 
said: Allah hath naught revealed; ye are 
in naught but a great error. And they 
say: Had we been wont to listen or have 
sense, we had not been among the dwellers 
in the flames. So they acknowledge their 
1. Ibid., XLVII - 15. 
2. Ibid., LVI - 15 - 37. 
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sins; but far removed (from mercy) are 
the dwellers in the flames!"'' "And those 
on the left hand2: What of those on the 
left hand ? In scraching mind and scold-
ing water And shadow ol black smoke, 
Neither cool nor refreshing, Lo! hereto-
fore they were effecte with luxury And used 
persist in the awful sin. And they used 
to say: When we are dead and have become 
dust and bones, shall we then foresooth, 
be raised again Then lo! ye, 
the erring, the deniers, Ye verily will 
eat of a tree called Zaqqum And will fill 
your bellies therewith. And thereon ye will 
drink of boiling water. Drinking even as the 
camel drinketh. This will be their welcome 
on the Day of Judgement." ^ "Hath these 
come unto thee tidings of the Overwhelming ? 
On that day (many) faces will be downcast 
Toiling weary, Scorched by burning fire. 
Drinking from a boiling spring, No food 
for them save bitter thorn fruit which , 
doth not nourish nor release from hunger." 
These are some of the instances in the Qur'an, and many 
other like them in the Traditions provide the ground for 
belief in Resurrection and the life in the paradise and the 
hell in physical terras. But the doctrines of the Immateriality 
and the immortality of the soul which is held by the philoso-
phers are evidently against the orthodox belief. Muslim 
philosophers denied the sensuous interpretations of the heaven 
and the hell arguing that the litei'al interpretation of the 
^' Ibid.. LXVII, 6 - 1 1 . 
2. We are told that on the Day of Judgement the people of 
paradise will receive their certificates in right hand and 
those of hell in the left hand. 
3. Ibid., LVI - 41 - 56. 
4. Ibid.. LXXXVIII - 1 - 7. 
15' 
Gur-'anic verses would amount to the pe r son i f i ca t ion of God. 
They i l l u s t r a t e some of the Qur'ahic verses descr ib ing God 
as having e a r s , eyes , hands e t c . They hold that these verses 
can not be taken l i t e r a l l y . They are only metaphorical expre-
ssions in order that the common people may understand e a s i l y . 
The best way for a man to understand something indescr ibable 
i s the language and the mode through which he i s most accustomed 
The human a t t r i b u t e s are the best way for a man to understand 
something non-human. Thus, according to the philosophers the 
desc r ip t ion of the physical p leasure and pain in the Qur^an 
should be taken as the symbolic p resen ta t ion of the s p i r i t u a l 
nature of that l i f e . Among them a l -Fa rab l and Ibn Sine are 
the main. About al-FarabX Ibrahim Madkour w r i t e s : 
"Although a l -FarabI fu l ly admits the 
e t e rna l b l i s s or the painful suffer ing 
of the he rea f t e r , yet he reduces them 
to s p i r i t u a l matters having nore la t ionsh ip 
with the body and mater ia l p r o p e r t i e s , 
because the s p i r i t , not the body, i s t ha t 
which enjoys or su f f e r s , i s happy or un-
happy. "2 
1. "But mortalsthink tha t the gods are born as they are,and have 
percept ions l i k e t h e i r s , and voice and form." "Yes, and if 
oxen or l ions had hands, and could paint with t he i r hands 
and produce works of a r t as men do, horses would paint the 
form of the gods l ike horses and oxen l i k e oxen. Each would 
represent them with bodies according to the form of each," 
"So the Ethiopians make t h e i r gods black and snub—nosed; 
the Thracians give t h e i r s red h a i r and blue eyes" 
Xenophanese* Translated by John Burnetj Early Greek Philoso-
phy, (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1950), p . 115. 
2 . Ibrahim Madkour,"Al-Farabiy ed. M.M.Sharif, p . 467. 
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But the interpretation of Ibn-Sina is more obvious and bold: 
",..Ibn Sina drastically modifies the Muslim 
dogmatic theology b> declaring that the 
Qur-'anic revelation is, by and large, if not 
all, symbolic of truth, not the literal truth, 
but that it must remain the literal truth for 
the masses..."' 
Al-Ghazali was fully aware of and concerned with such 
developments. He says in the Tah"afut; 
"They deny the return of souls to bodies: 
the existence of a physical Paradise and 
Hell: the Hur with large eyes, and every 
thing which has been promised to man by God, 
And they maintained that these things are 
symbols mentioned to common men in order to 
facilitate their understanding of spiritual 
reward and punishment which are superior to 
those of a physical character."^ 
Al-Ghazali agrees with the philosophers that the pleasure 
in the paradise is superior to those experienced on earth. Here 
again he seems to having agreed upon the immortality of the soul. 
But what he here summarily rejects is the philosopher's view 
that the nature of the life beyond is spiritual. He says that 
it is better to believe that the heavenly life is of a combined 
nature, i.e., both spiritual ana physical. But it is not agree-
able to hold that the description in the sacred books, the Qur^ an 
and the Traditions, is only an allegorical expression propor-
tioned to the limitations of common understanding. Just as the 
1. Fazlur Rahman, "Ibn Sina", ed. M.M.Sharif, p, 498. 
2. Al-Ghazali, Tahafut. p. 229. 
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verses and the traditions with anthropomorphic import are 
1 
allegories used to facilitate understanding." He says that 
the philosophers' claim is unacceptable due to two reasons. 
First, the verses and the traditions with anthropomorphic 
expressions are clearly in the line of the conventional use 
of metaphors in Arabic while the descriptions of the paradise 
and the hell frequently in detail leave no room for allegorical 
interpretation. Secondly, rational arguments prove the unappli-
cability of the terms like space, time, categories or human 
organs in the case of God. So in order to understand these 
expressions a rational interpretation is needed. But things 
as promised to us in Paradise are not beyond the Divine 
Omnipotence. 
The view of the spiritual life in the life beyond of the 
Shl*^ ah is not different from that of the Sunnis except that 
they totally reject the literal interpretation of the Qur^anic 
verses with regard to God in the context of the beatific 
vision (Ruyat Barl). For a proper treatment of the Shl'^ ah view 
about the Resurrection and the life-beyond a detail illustra-
tion is given below: 
"Says the Shaykh Abu Ja^far: Our belief 
concerning resurrection is that it is a 
fact. Verily Allah, the Mighty and 
Glorious, has said in His Mighty Book: 
"Bethink thou (0 Mul} ammad) of those of 
1. Ibid., p. 235. 
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old, who went forth from their habitations 
in their thousands, fearing death, and Allah 
said unto them: Die, and then He brought 
them back to life"(2,243). These people 
were the residents of 70,000 houses, and 
they were visited by the plague each year. 
They rich, on account of their opulence, used 
to go out; while the poor would remain on 
account of their poverty. So the plague used 
to attack lightly those that went; while it 
raged severly among those that remained. Now 
those that remained would say: If only we had 
departed, surely the plague would not have 
come upon us. And those that went would say: 
Had we stayed, it would have attacked us, 
even as it has attacked them. So they all 
agreed to depart from their houses collect-
ively when the time of the plague was nigh. 
Then they all went 'out and camped on the banks 
(of a river). And when they had put down 
their belongings, Allah cried to them: Die, 
and they perished, one and all. And the 
passers-by swept them off from the road, and 
they remained in that condition as long as 
Allah willed. One of the prophets of Israel 
named Jeremiah passed by them. He said: If 
Thou wiliest, 0 my Lord, Thou couldst revivify 
them so that they may inhabit Thy cities, and 
beget Thy slaves, and worship Thee with those 
who worship Thee. And AllSh through a revela-
tion asked him: Do you wish that for your sake 
I should bring them back to life? The Prophet 
said: Yes, 0 my Lord. So AllSh revivified them 
for his sake and sent them with him. 
(119) Now these people died and returned to 
the world and (again) they died at their 
appointed times. AllSh says: "Or (bethink thee 
of) the like of him (the Prophet Ezra) who, by 
passing a township which had fallen in utter 
ruin, exclaimed: How shall Alllh give life to 
this city, after it has been dead ? And Allah 
caused him to die (for the space of) a hundred 
years, and then brought him back of life. 
AllSh said: How long hast thou tarried? He 
(the man) said: I have tarried a day or a part 
of a day. He said: Nay, but thou has tarried 
for a hundred years. Just look at thy food and 
drink, they have not rotted! And look at thine 
ass! so that We may make thee a token unto 
150 
mankind; and look at thy bones, how We 
adjust them and then cover them with 
fleshl And when (the matter) became 
clear unto him, he said: I know now 
that Allah hath power to do all things" 
(2,259). And so their prophet remained 
dead for a hundred years, then he 
returned to the world and remained there-
in, and then died at his appointed term. 
He was Ezra, but it is also related that 
he was Jeremiah, 
And Allah, Exalted is He, in the story of 
those that were selected among the BanI 
Isra-'il of the community of Moses for the 
appointed term of his Lord, says: "Then 
We raised you to life after ye had been 
dead, that haply ye might give thanks" 
(2,56). And that was because when they 
heard the Word of Allah, they said: We 
shall not believe in its truth until we 
see Allah clearly. So, on account of 
their wrong-doing the thunderbolt fell upon 
them and they perished, Moses said: 0 my 
Lord, what shall I say to the BanI Isra-*Il 
when I returned to them? Then Allah revived 
them and they returned to the world; they 
ate and drank and married women and begat 
children, and lived in the world and died 
at their appointed times. 
And AllSh said unto Jesus, son of Mary: 
(Remember the time) when you caused the dead 
to live by My command, and all the dead who 
were revived by Jesus by the command of Allah 
returned to the world and lived therein so 
so long as they lived, and then they died 
(120) at their anointed times. 
And as for the Companions of the Cave (ashabu^l-
kahl). "they tarried in their Cave three hundred 
years and nine years o/er"(l8,25). Then AllSh 
revived them and they returned to the world 
in order that they might question one another; 
and their story is well known. 
And if a questioner were to ask: Verily Allah 
E>calted is He^says: "And thou wouldst have 
deemed them waking though they were asleep" 
(18,18). (Then, how can there be resurrection 
of those that slumber?) To him it may be 
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answered: Verily they were dead; for 
AllaVi the Mighty and Glorious has said: 
"Woe upon us! who hath raised us from 
our place of sieep? This is that which 
the Beneficient did promise, and the 
messengers spoke truth" (36, 52). And 
if they (the unbelievers)say: That is 
so (that is, if the unbelievers say that 
this refers to the resurrection of the 
dead); (then we say) verily the Companions 
of the Cave were also dead. There are many 
examples of this kind. Thus it is estab-
lished that resurrection did take place 
among the peoples of the past. For the 
Prophet, on whom be peace, has said: There 
will occur among these people (the like of) 
what has occurred among previous peoples, 
even as one horseshoe resembles another, 
or as one arrow feather follows another. 
Wherefore, according to this premise, it 
is necessary to believe that resurrection 
(raj'a) will take place in this community 
as well. 
Our opponents (the Sunnites) have related 
that when the MahdT, on whom be peace, will 
appear, Jesus, son of Mary, on whom be peace 
will descend upon the earth and pray behind 
the MahdT, Now the descend of Jesus to the 
earth is his return to the world after death, 
because Allah the Glorious and Mighty says: 
"Verily I will cause thee to die and will 
take thee up to Myself"(3, 55). And Alllh 
the Mighty and Glorious says: "And we gather 
them together so as to leave not one of them 
behind" (18, 45). And He says: "And (remind 
them of) the Day when We shall gather out 
of every nation a host of those who denied 
Our signs" (27, 85). Hence the day on which 
the multitude will be gathered together will 
be other than the day on which shall be 
gathered together the host. 
And Allah the Glorious and Mighty says: "And 
they swear_by Allah their most binding oaths 
(that) Allah will not raise up him who dieth. 
Nay, but it is a oromise (binding) upon Him 
in truth, but most of mankind know it not" 
(16, 40). The reference here (121) is to 
raj'a. And that is because thereafter he 
says: "In order to make manifest to those 
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that differ concerning It" (16, 41). 
And this "making manifest" is to be 
found in this world, not in the next. 
And I shall write« if Allah wills, a book 
exclusively on the topic of raj'a, in 
which I shall explain its real nature 
and the proofs regarding the authenticity 
of its occurrence. And the profession (of 
belief in) transmigration of souls is false, 
and he who believes in it is an unbeliever, 
because transmigration involves the denial 
of the Garden and the Fire,"'' 
And on the belief concerning the return (ba'th) after 
death: 
"Says the Shaykh Abu Ja*^far, may the mercy 
of Allah be upon him: Our be l i e f concern-
ing the r e tu rn to l i f e a f te r death i s tha t 
i t i s t r u e . 
The Prophet sa id: 0 sons of ^Abdu'1-Muttalib, 
v e r i l y the scout does not l i e to h i s owti 
people . I swear by Him Who sent me as a 
Prophet of t r u t h , that you wi l l sure ly die 
even as you sleep» And you wi l l be resurrec ted 
even as you awaken, and a f te r death there i s 
no abode except Heaven or He l l . The c rea t ion 
of the whole of mankind and t h e i r r e su r r ec t ion 
i s , for Allah the Mighty and Glorious l i k e 
the c rea t ion of but one sou l . This i s in 
accord with His Word, Exalted i s He: "Your 
c rea t ion and your r a i s ing (from the dead) are 
only as ( the c r ea t i on and the r a i s i n g of) a 
s ingle s o u l . " ( 3 1 , 28) .2 
Ash-Shaykh as-Saduq, I ' t i g a d a t u ' l Imamiyvah [.The Bel iefs 
of the Iraamiyyahl t r ans la t ed by Asaf A.A.Fayzee as A Shl^te 
Creed (World Organization for Islamic Services Tehran-
I r a n ) , Chapter 18. 
I b i d . . Chapter 19. 
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Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiyan (1835-1908), the pro-
pounder of a sect of Indian Muslims known as the Ahmadiyyah, 
is also against the material interpretation of the heaven. 
According to him there are "no cows and bees in heaven to 
make milk and honey. The goods of heaven are secrets from 
the earth. So they can not be material things." The 
dwellers in the paradise, according to him, shall eat fruits, 
not like those we eat in this world, but some spiritual 
fruits. Moreover, references to the spiritual experiences 
in heaven and hell are also found in the views of some of 
the modern Sunni intellectuals, among whom Sir Sayyid Ahmed 
Khan and Mohammed Iqbal can be mentioned here in brief. Sir 
Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817 - 1898) was tremendously impressed 
by modern scientific thought and worked all his life to 
reconcile it with Islam. He interpreted the Qur-^ an in the 
light of contemporary rationalism and science, for he was 
much influenced by Mu<^tazilism, the Muslim rationalism. In 
his view any interpretation of the Qur*an that conflicted 
with human reason, science or nature was in reality a mis-
interpretation. His interpretation of resurrection also is 
in the same line: 
1. Irving F. Wood, "State of Dead", Encyclopaedia of Religion 
and Ethics, edt. James Hastings (Ed"lnburgh: T.and T.Clark) 
Vol. XI, p. 850. 
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"...he explains resurrection and its signs 
in a scientific manner. He does not accept 
that dead bodies will be raised from their 
graves. He affirn.;3 his faith in the Resu-
rrection of bodies also, but holds that the 
life after death will be without body. 
Paradise and hell do not possess spatio-
temporal existence. Neither are their plea-
sure and pains of material nature. He says 
that paradise represents the highest form 
of spiritual happiness (felicity)."'' 
Similarly Iqbal (1876-1938) also does not consider 
the heaven and the hell as some spatio-temporal locations 
where souls have to undergo through a thorough experience 
of pleasure or torment. According to him the hell is not 
a place of everlasting torture inflicted by a revengeful 
God, nor is the heaven a holiday. He says: 
"Heaven and Hell are states, not localities. 
Their descriptions in the Qurian are visual 
representations of an inner fact, i.e,, 
character. Hell, in the words of the Our-* an 
is 'Clod's kindled fire which mounts above 
the hearts' the painful realization of 
one's failure as a man. Heaven is the Joy p 
of triumph over the forces of disintegration." 
Although Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Iqbal are considered 
as the two of the most respected contemporary intellectual 
figures of the sub-continent Muslims, their rational approach 
is not acknowledged by and large by Muslim community. Saiyyed 
1. Syed Waheed Akhtar, "Salyyid Ahmad Khan's Approach to 
Religion", Aligarh Journal of Islamic Thought, No. 2, p.91-
2 ^  ' — i * « » 
2. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought 
in Islam, p. 123. 
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Aljmed Khan was sternely criticised by the Muslim jurists. 
He was also charged by heresy. Thus we find that the Muslim 
majority is unmoved by the rational interpretation (ta^wll) 
of the verses of the Qur^an. 
The problem concerned with the survival after death 
has been a great and disturbing issue among the contemporary 
philosophers belonging, not only to the theist camp, but also 
to that of atheist. The atheists and the naturalists argue 
through the doctrine of epi-phenomenallsm. According to 
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) the continuity of human body is 
a matter of appearance and behaviour, not of substance. The 
belief in bodily resurrection is purely an emotional matter. 
Body is in continuous change by process of nutriment and 
wastage. Physics also proves that this process is inherent 
in the nature of atoms. He says: 
"If, therefore, we are to believe that 
a person survives death, we must believe 
that the memories and habits which cons-
titute the person will continue to be 
exhibited in a new set of occurences." 
Further he says: 
"But it is easy to see that it is very 
unlike. Our memories and habits are bound 
up with the structure of the brain, in 
much the same way is which a river is 
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connected with the; river-bed.... But the 
brain, as a struclure, is dissolved at 
death, and memory therefore may be expected 
to be also dissolved. There is no more 
reason to think otherwise than to expect a 
river to persist in its old course after 
an earthquake has raised a mountain where 
a valley used to be."'' 
Although we do not have some very clear proofs to 
establish that life, in some special form, survives death, 
the recent developments in some non-philosophical fields 
heve hopefully provided very vivid and clear evidences in 
favour of such belief. We cannot say that these experiences 
are psychologically influenced by the belief of the experi-
ents in the survival of the life after death because these 
instances include the experience of the deceased belonging 
to both groups, i.e., believers and non-believers. The 
researchers attained tremendous success to find out the 
evidences about the survival of human personality in some 
particular form after death through various approaches. 
Such researches cannot be easily discarded on the pretext 
that they are based on pseudo-scientific, as para-psychology 
is doubted. 
One case in the field of parapsychology here needs a 
brief attention. A number of experiences in the field of 
1. Bertrand Russell, "Do we Survive Death?", Why I am Not 
a Christian, edt. Paul Edward (London: George Allen and 
Ijnwin Ltd., 1961), p. 71. 
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parapsychology provide sufficient evidences to support the 
belief that there is some other world where the non-physical 
•body' or a 'psychic personality' exists after the death of 
a person. In it a psychological contact is made with the 
recently deceased person, with or without the appearance 
of the figure of the deceased person to the medium who receives 
the contact. In such contacts the personality or spirit of 
the deceased gives the medium in trance plenty information 
which the medium could not tell by normal means. Sometimes 
the spirit gives some extremely personal experiences, known 
to no one and later on came to be true when verified. In the 
cases when the person dies due to accidents like falling or 
drawing or attack, the spirit tells in detail about the cause 
of death. 
However, it would be unwarranted to present these 
exneriences as the proofs to support the belief in immortality. 
Though the experience is something private and subjective, 
there is something very persuasive in them. But the evidences 
of the trance medium reports are something that cannot easily 
be kept aside. If some instance is repeated hundreds and 
1 . For the case of a drawing accident see the case of the death 
of Edgar Vandy in C.D.Broad's Lectures on Psychical Research 
(London: Routledge and Kegan PiuTTT^H?) Ch.XV. In this 
case the contact between the spirit and the medium was made 
six times at different sittings. Except a few very minor 
differences, the informations co.llected from all the sittings 
strangely agreed on all the major points. For a detail the 
Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research can be 
referred. 
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thousands times and yet it produces the same result, it 
would be extremely unjustified to think it as a mere coinci-
dence. Para psychological contacts repeatedly provide the 
hopeful results in favour of the existence of the spirit 
after death. 
CHAir'i..rl - IV 
THE i r^ACT ^ J L TAHAFUT 
Al-Ghazali thinl^s that the Phi losopher ' s claim that 
tnf-ir netaphysical theor ies conta in the same v a l i d i t y as i s 
found in Mathematics and- lor ic i s unv/arranted. Rather, in 
his view, they are based on supposi t ions and opinions . Had 
i t been the c ;se the conclusions dravm by metaphysics would 
not have been l e s s convincing than those dravv^ n by mathematics. 
Their premises, according to a l -Ghaza l i , and methods do not 
provide us any c e r t a i n t y . He uses t h e i r own demonstrative 
methods and argumentation against them. Because of his 
pene t r a t ive understanding, deei learn ing 3nd proper knowledge 
of zhe a r t of ar^.umentatiort, n is .vor-lc had such a profound 
impact on the I-'.uslin .o r ld of iiin time thc t the Philosophicpl 
r c t i v i t i e s of L-^ PL-'ern Islam WAI er^ent a severe decl ine and 
1 
-rventuaJly d i ca. In a l -uhaza l i we find the f ina l v ic tory 
of the Ash spr i t e School over philosophy. He was the grea tes t 
f igure among the Iluslim thoolo,',ians who so sever'ely reacted 
against the Ar i s to t e l i an i s ; and the neo-TZa ton isn . In his 
argument'iiicn he is both a thieologian and a mystic. As a 
tiieologian ' e is pgoinst reconr i l l a t i o n of philosophy and 
r e l i g i o n . ilis approach in t h i s way l e f t an eve r l a s t ing 
impact on the fur ther develoj^ment of Islamic thought which i s 
1. 'Jatherine Perry, "Ibn Husiid'c Defence of Philosophy" 
Studlc. l.^ . C-^m-i'^ratlve Religion. Vol. 17, No. 1-2, p . 59. 
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nost ly negative in na tu re . The change Drought in to the 
Dercert ion of the Muslim about philosophy was so le ly due to 
the attacK of al-Ghazal i on the philosophers incorporated in 
h i s TahFiut. According to Frank Thi l ly : 
"Arabian philosophy comes to an end in 
the Orient at the turning point of the 
eleventh century . Al-Ghazzall a t t acks 
the teachings of the phi losophers in the 
i n t e r e s t of the popular r e l i g i o n in h i s 
book, Destruct ion of the Phi losophers , 
and denies the competence of philosophy 
to a t t a i n t r u t h . He misses in the systems 
the doctr ines e spec i a l l y emphasized by 
Islam orthodoxy: the theory of c r e a t i o n , 
the doctr ine of personal Immortali ty, and 
the be l ie f in the absolute prescience and 
providence of God—the view t h a t God knows 
and foresees a l l the minute occurences of 
l i f e and can i n t e r f e r e in them at any time. 
The appearance of a l -Ghazza l i ' s work not 
only si lenced the phi losophers , but led to 
the burning of t h e i r books by the public 
a u t h o r i t i e s . " 2 
All tnese and such other adjec t ives for a l -Ghazal i 
ai-e c e r t a i n l y tne r e su l t of an exaggerat ion. His a t tack on 
the philosophers '"id influence the manner of thinking and 
caused only imr-edla'-e and temporary s tagnat ion in the phi losophi-
cal a c t i v i t i e s . But the phi losophizing got some other modes of 
express ion. Nor v/as al-Ghazal i an a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t as 
alleged by some of h is commentators. Such comments about 
1. Imtiyaz Yusuf, "Discussion between Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd 
about the Nature of Resurrect ion" , Islamic Studies (1986), 
Vol. 25, No. 2, p . 188. 
2 ' Th i l ly , Frank, A History of PhilORnnhy. (Central Book 
Depot, Allahabad, 1981), p . 221-22. 
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a l - G h a z a l i are very unfor tunate . He, i n f a c t , was not 
against reason. He sometimes appears to hold both reason 
and i n t u i t i o n as equal and made them to go p a r a l l e l . In 
the Tahafut the main in t en t ion of al-Ghaz"ali i s to prove 
the insuf f ic iency , or to disprove the competence, of reason 
as a guide to reach the t r u t h . According to him the inferences 
of reason are not a l l t rue in philosophy. He a t tacks the 
e lc i tude of the Muslim p e r i p a t e t i c s for t h e i r u n c r i t i c a l and 
dot^matic adherence to A r i s t o t l e . He says that they try to 
use the big names l i k e Socra tes , Hippocrates , P l a t o , Ar i s to t l e 
e t c . with exaggeration bel ieving tha t they possessed e x t r a o r d i -
nary i n t e l l e c t u a l power and tha t t h e i r mathematical, l o g i c a l , 
metaphysical and such other p r i n c i p l e s were indubi tab le for 
2 — 
discovering the hidden things. His main objective in Tahafut 
is to demolish this type of notion. And he successfully 
achieves this objective. He shows how the ideas of the Kuslim 
philosophers are inconsistent in themselves. They seem to 
have been confused due to importing two conflicting ideas from 
Aristotelianism and neo-Platonisra into Islamic thought. Their 
approach in this way could no longer maintain their faithfullness 
to either. Their philosophy becomes a collection of the hetero-
geneous ideas conflicting with each other. Their belief^ 
1. cf. L. Saeed Sheikh, "Al-Ghazali", M.M.Sharif, A History of 
Muslim Philosophy, p. 589. 
Al-Ghazali, o£. cit., "Introduction", p. 2 
170 
for exanple_,in the e t e r n i t y of the world c o n t r a d i c t s , on 
the one hand, with t h e i r be l ie f in the agent or the maker 
of the world, discussed in tho t h i r d , fourth and the f i f th 
chTDters of the Taliafut, and^on the other hand, with the 
orthodox Islamic be l ie f in tiie createdness of the world i s 
one of tnc s imi lor other con t rad ic to ry p o s i t i o n s . 
According to al-Ghazal i the evidence of t r u t h is 
-attached with the object of knowledge. Like Hume, he holds 
tnat t ' lere nre two sources of knowledge: Sense percept ion 
ind the necessprv p r inc ip le s of thought. In the Car tes ian 
fashion he doubts the evidence of sense percep t ion , because 
Liiey often deceive us . And once w:ien h i s confidence in sense 
-lerception i s shaken he tui'u^. to s c ru t i n i ze the p r inc ip l e s of 
thought a l so . His scepticism crosses even that of Hume when 
he doubts the i r v a l i d i t y a l s o , Hov/ reason could t e l l that ten 
i s more than three ? Thiings api)ear d i f f e r e n t l y with the change 
Q-f s i t u a t i o n s . So a si'-uatiLui is poss ib le when the pos tu la tes 
of reason a!.p)ear d i f f e r e n t l y , Al-Ghazali supposes the exis tence 
of a judge above reason who can con t rad ic t the pos tu la tes of 
tnought. rie sometimes considei'S t h i s empirical world to be a 
dream in con t ras t to the v/orld to come when things would appear 
d i f f e r e n t l y . This cons idera t ion of a l -Ghazal i br ings to our 
mind the concept abadhitatva or non-contradictedness of 
Sankara-Advaila in Indian philosophy. According to Samkara 
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n e i t h e r a cogni t ion i s val id uecause i t r epresen ts a thing 
as i t ac tua l ly i s nor i s i t inva l id because i t represents i t 
o therwise . But i t i s va l id only when i t s object i s such as 
i s not subsequently rejected^ and i t i s inva l id v/hen i t s object 
i s thus r e j ec t ed . "But a l l t i a t we can l eg i t ima te ly infer 
from the harmony of knowledge with the r e s t of our experience 
upto that t ime, i s not that the knowledge i s absolute ly free 
from e r r o r , but that i t i s not yet con t rad ic t ed . But i t i s 
found that one exoerience i s cont radic ted by a second and 
l a t e r on t h i s second i s again contradic ted by a th i rd one, 
and so on. So the problem a r i s e s about the c e r t a i n t y of the 
attainment of that knowledge'^ich fur ther can not be contra-
d i e t e d . For Samkara tha t knowledge i s Brahmabhuyam or being 
the t r u t h . However, such a concept i s absent in al-G-hazali. 
j^bout him v/e cnn only say that h i s ' an tecedent ' scepticism 
kept everything under the range of doubt in order to get a 
secure ground for bel ief ; and that in t h i s process sometimes 
he superceded even Hume. BuL th i s a l l was only a prel iminary 
process . To c r i t i c i z e a l -Ghazal i on the grounds that he denied 
the dynamic cnarac ter to thought and i t s self—transcending 
2 
reference to the i n f i n i t e i s unfor tunate . 
1. D.K.uatta, The Six V/ays of Knowing, (Universi ty of Calcut ta , 
Ca lcu t ta , 195^; p . 2 1 . 
2 . Sir r.ulianmad Iqbal , The Reconstt-uction of Religious Thought 
in Islam (Or ien ta l Publ ishers and d i s t r i b u t e r s , Delhi, 1975), 
pp. 5-b. 
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l''iOreover, the notion tha t rafter pub l i ca t ion of Tah"afut 
the phi losophica l a c t i v i t i e s in the Muslim ';orld came to an 
end and tii-^t :efcpite t .0 al tei ipt of Ibn Rushd, Islamic 
o]iilosoui:y could n'jvor recover irom tha t blov; i s also an e>:a-
•.^orriion. I t v/es cert- in ly P t:erious blow on both philosophy 
ana na tura l sc ience , yet the phi losophica l s tud ies did not 
s top . I t r-^ther found a new way of expression, i . e . Sufism, 
Even in p ilosonhy also we find many great p e r s o n a l i t i e s . Some 
of tho :,reat -r.,:,ures in the f i e ld of pliilosophy and sufism 
" f t e r al-Ghaz5li ai o Ibn Bajjah ( c 5O0/IIO6 - 533/113B), 
Ibn Tufail ( G . 5 B 0 / 1 1 C 4 ) . Ibn Rushd (520/1126 - 595/1198), 
Shr.ykh a l - I shraq Suhrawardi (549/1154 - 587/1191), Khwijah 
NPsir al-Din al-Pilsi (597/1201 - 672/1274), Ibn Khaldun 
(732/1332 - e0P/l406),Mir Damad (d. 104l / l63 l ) and Mulla Sadra 
(d. 105(i/l640). So the charges are not t rue c a t e g o r i c a l l y . 
However, l i ^ e anyother ori?:inal th inker , i t was na tura l for 
him to be c r i t i c i z e d . His approach to theology both as a 
mystic and as a philosopher i s qu i te su f f i c i en t for the 
conservat ives to c r i t i c i z e him for h i s l i ue ra l i s r a , and for 
l i b e r a l s to c r i t i c i z e him for his conservatism. He was charged 
as misguided one by TartuTshi (d, 520/1126), al-Mazari 
(d , 536/1141), Ibn Jawzi (d . 597/1200), Ibn a l -Salah 
(d. 643/1245), Ibn Taymryyah (d. 728/1328), Ibn Qayyim 
3 , Mahliqa Qarai and 'All Qull QarSi •'Post Ibn Rushd Islamic 
Philosophy in Iran, Aligarh Journal of Islamic Thought 
(1989), No. Two, pp. 9-45. 
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(d . 751/1350), Ibn Jav/zi i s reported to have made h i s 
comment that al-Ghaz"ali was one who "Traded theology for 
Sufism", while according tc iDn Taymlyyah, a l-Ghazal i traded 
theology for philosophy. All h i s works were banned and 
pub l i c ly burnt and possession of them was s t r i c t l y forbidden 
throughout Spain following the issue of a decree (fatwa) 
against him by Qadi *Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Hamdin of 
Cordova. The des t ruc t ion of both h i s ph i losophica l and 
theo log ica l worKs was ordered by the Marakash Sultan *Ali ibn 
Yusuf ibn Tashif ln . The most renowned c r i t i c of a l -GhazSl i ' s 
philosophy, p a r t i c u l a r l y of Tahafut, i s Ibn Rushd who t r i ed 
to refute each and every point one by one in h i s Tahlfut al 
Tahafut. The approach of both the great p e r s o n a l i t i e s i s 
equally subt le and pene t r a t i ng . According to Ibn Rushd, "he 
belongs to no sec t ; he i s an Ash ' a r i t e among the followers of 
Ash^ari, a Sufi among the Suf is , a philosopher among the 
phi losophers" , and he t r i e d through h i s Destruction "to pro tec t 
himself against the wrath of theologians , who have always been 
the enemies of phi losophers ."-^ 
Al-Ghazali, i n f a c t , was a committed Ash 'a r i t e and 
staunch orthodox Muslim. Fost of the c r i t i c i s m leve l led 
against him are the r e s u l t of eicher unapprehension or 
1. M. Saeed Shaykh, "Al-Ghaz^i" in M.M. Sharif ' s A History of 
Muslim Philosophy, p . 536. 
2. I b id . 
?. cf. Brehier, Emile, The Middle Ages and the Renaissance, 
translated by Wade Baskin (The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1968), p. 98. 
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misapprehension of h is r ea l view. An example would be 
su f f i c i en t to present the po in t , Al-Ghazali , in h i s one of 
the be?t phi losophical compendiums, e n t i t l e d Maqasld a l -
Fa l l s i f ah (The In tens ions of the Phi losophers ) , gave so 
f a i t h fu l an exposi t ion of Aris tote l ianisra t h a t , l a t e r on v/hen 
t r ans l a t ed by Dominicus Gundisalvus, a Spanish, i t was cons i -
dered to be the \.-ork of a r e a l A r i s t o t e l i a n ; and th i s notion 
continued for a long time. Consequently l a t e r philosophers 
l i k e Thomas Aquinas (d, 673/1274), Albert the Great (d ,679/ 
1280), and Roger Bacon (d,694/1294), a l l consider the autnor 
of the In ten t ions of ihe Philosophers as a p e r i p a t e t i c and 
presented him v;ith Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd. However, t h i s 
misunderstanding was the r e s u l t of the unfai thful a t t i t u d e of 
the t r a n s l a t o r who overlooked the short in t roduc t ion in which 
al-Ghazal i s ta ted that the ideas in the book belonged, not to 
him, but to the philosophers and tha t was a prel iminary study 
of the views of tne philosophers inorder to refute them in 
2 
his Inter work, viz., Tahafut, Interestingly not only Medieval 
thinkers DUL even some of the modern commentators also seem 
to consider al-Ghaz'^ li as a peripatetic and mention his name 
with Ibn Jina and al-Far-abi. For example, according to Gilson: 
1. Vi. Saoed Sli^ ykh in M.I-.. Sharif' s edt,, o^. cit,. p, 593. 
2. Ibiu., rootnoie 31. 
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"Ar i s to t l e .-las coci-ectly c l a s s i f i e d the 
scic-nces, but theosophy must be placed 
et i.i-.ir head, sad A r i s t o t l e ' s c l a s s l f i -
cat j on? r-an be coinr^loted by Alfarabi ' s^ 
which Aln,azel lo l lov/ed," ' 
At another r)lace he wrices: 
" . . . h e [^Gerson] f ixes h is c r i t i c i s m , on 
t:iG neoplatonic natural ism of Avicenna, 
Al/jazel cmd severa l o ther unbel ievers , 
whose p r i n c i p l e i t was that from the one 
as one can come only the one, whence they 
conclude that the second I n t e l l i g e n c e 
alone was caused by the f i r s t . " 2 
And other absurd ca tegor ica l statements (which con t r ad i c t s 
v/hat i s :JusL i l l u s t r a t e d above) l ike: 
" (Alf^azel was a Chr is t ian) 
, i>3 
Thus thxese and such other notions about the personality and 
v/orks of al-Ghazali have, unfortunately, veiled the reality. 
His contribution, not only in the field of theology but also 
in that of Philosophy and Sufism still -lacks the proper 
recognition. Even Muslims could not understand_, especially, 
the philosophical importance of his works.However, he occupies 
a unique position lor his contribution, both in philosophy and 
theology. His influence in the West is in the both fields. 
1. Gil son, Etinne, History of Christian Philosophy in the 
Kiddle Ages (Sheed and wasd, London, 19^5), p. 269. 
2. Ibid. , p. 532. 
3. Ibid., p. 265. 
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Migue l Asin P a l a c i o s , who s t u d i e d a l - G h a z a l i , has shown h i s 
t h e o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e on the Wertern t h o u g h t . Tahafut i s 
nore c r e d i t e d than anyother of h i s -works fo r t h i s pu rpose . 
Jome a u t h o r s cons ide red h i s in-^'luence on the - ' e s te rn thought 
simil-a: to t h n t of P l o t i n u s , Augustine and P a s c a l . P a l a c i o s 
r i v e s the mode of developrriGut of a l - G h a z a l i ' s thought i n the 
. • ' e s t : 
"The Spanish Domirlcan monk Raymond M a r t i n , 
\-!ho was 3? r Hebraeus ' contemporary , borrowed 
the same idea from him and from a l - G h a z a l i . 
Ins te ' -d of p r o f i t i n g only by the books of 
i luslim "ph i lo soph t - r s " , h e , u n l i k e t h e 
s c h o l a s t i c s , d i r e c t l y p r o f i t e d by a l - G h a z a l i ' s 
t e x t s i n h i s book e n t i t l e d Pugio F i d e i and 
Exp lana t io Symboli , w r i t t e n i n the f i e l d 
of r e l i g i o n . _ These t e x t s were t aken from 
Talia"fut, Kaqas ld . al-Munqidh, MIzan, Mag as ad, 
Ki 1 siak a t a 1 Anwar- and Ihy5« "'=^  
The i n f l u e n c e of the Tahafut on Raymond Mar t in i s a l so 
mentioned by Alfred Gui l laumc. According to him Raymond Mar t in 
a contemporary of S t . Thomas Aquinas and a great Arabic Scholar 
of n i s t ime, unders tood the v^'Jue of a l - G h a z a l i ' s Tahafut a l -
F a l a s i f a h in r e a l s e n s e . He adopted a l - G h a z a l i ' s t echn ique 
in ' l i s ov/n booK Pugio F i d e i . He a l so t r a n s l a t e d the Tahafut 
and e n t i t l e d i t as Ruina Seu P r a e c i p i t i u m Phi losophorum. -v'ith 
the c i r c u l a r i o n of M a r t i n ' s ij^.^JX, the i n f l u e n c e of a l - G h a z a l i 
1. c f . Ulken, H . Z . , " I n f l u e n c e of Muslim Thought -Theologica l 
I n f l u e n c e " , M.M.Shar i f ' s e d t . , og . c i t . . p . I36O, 
2 . I b i d . , p . 1361 . 
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spread throughout the Christian and Judaic thoughts. Coming 
to St. Thomas Aquinas, we are told important sources saying 
that he was intensely influenced by al-Ghazali through either 
Knrtin or Moses Maimonides or some other channels. Stating 
the comron elements in both al-Ghazali and St. Thomas, Guillaume 
says: 
"Some of the more important questions on 
v/hich St. Thomas and Algazel agree are 
the value of human reason in explaining 
or demonstrating the truth about divine 
things; the ideas of contingency and 
necessity as demonstrating the existence 
of God; the unity of God implied in His 
perfection, the possibility of the 
beatific vision; the divine knowledge and 
the divine simplicity; God's speach a 
verbum mentis; the name of God; miracles 
a testimony to the truth of the Prophets' 
utterances; the dogma of the resurrection 
from the dead."2 
And that: 
"Their intention, their sympathies, and 
their interests were essentially the 
same. Both endeavoured to state the 
case for the opposition before they 
pronounced judgement; both laboured to 
produce Suramas v/hich would provide 
a reasonable statement of their faith, 
and both found a happiness in the 
mystical apprehension of the divine which 
they confessed made their earlier strivings 
seem as nothing."3 
1. Guillaume, Alfred, "Philosophy and Theology", The Legacy of 
Islam, edts. Arnold, Sir Thomas and Guillaume'J Alfred 
(Oxford University Press, London, 1950), p. 273. 
2. Ibid., p. 274. 
3. Ibid., pp. 274-75. 
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The most outstanding influence of a l -Ghaza l i ' s Tahafut 
'^op. be tv^cnn in the Mhilosnoi.ors of h is three immediate 
ruccesso:: . , n-'inely Yehuda Hale\ i (d. 1145), Moses Maimonides 
(11^5 - 1204), Nicholas of Autrecourt (1300 - 1355), Yehuda 
H ' l e v i , liKe a l -Ghaza l i , a s s e r t s in h i s Kusari that the 
nhi losopnical methods are incaoable to pene t ra te into the 
-1 
re l i ' : ious t r u t h s . Accoi-'dinf to him reason i s a tool of 
speculat ion v/hicli i s i^sefu] insofar i t deals with the exper-
ience . But i t f a i l s to i^ive o piK)per and s ign i f i can t account 
of ihe question deepHy rooteu in the fact of r eve l a t i on . 
Pnilosopliy i s i n su f f i c i en t in i t s approach to the most important 
nrobleirs o" l i i e and to ^he i-elii:ious t r u t h . Similar ly Moses 
iiaimonides -=,lso iiolds tna t philosophy and reason are i n s u f f i -
c ien t in tne i r approach to the r e l i g ious t r u t h . He has discussed 
2 
t n i s problem in h is Moreh Nebuchin. Nicholas of Autrecourt, 
the Hume of the middle ages, as he was ca l led by Rashdall , i s 
the best one on whom the influence of Tah"afut i s very evident 
Simon van den Bergh says: 
"I may remark hei-e chat i t seems to me 
probable the Nichol;<s of au t recour t , 
'The medieval Hume' was influenced by 
Ghazal i ' s Ash ' a r i t e t h e o r i e s . He 
denies in the same way as Ghazali the 
l o g i c a l connection' between cause and 
effect He ,j^ves the same example 
Macdonnla, Duncan B . , Develjpnient of Muslim Theolo/yy, Jirris-
prudence and Cons t i tu t iona l Theory (, Amarko BooK ARency. IJev/ 
Delhi, 1973;, p . 237. 
I b i d . , p . 23^ . 
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of if.nis and Stupa, he seems to hold 
'^Iso the Ashlar i t e t h e s i s of God as 
the sole cause of a l l ac t ion 
and he quotes in one place Ghaza l i ' s 
metaphysics. . . . " ' ' 
The fac t s supporting the be l ie f tha t Nicholas of 
Autrecourt \vas influenced by al-Ghazal i can be traced in h is 
method of argumentation. Some times he uses the terminology 
2 
s imilar to that of a l rGhaza l i . His tone becomes more akin 
to that of a l -Ghazal i e spec ia l ly when he argues against the 
concoT't of necessary connection between cause and e f fec t , 
He argues? 
"From the fact that one tiling e x i s t s 
v;e call not conclude that another 
e x i s t s ; so we can not conclude from 
the world 's ex i s tence , the exis tence 
of God. Inverse ly , from the non-
exis tence of one thing we can not 
conclude that another does not e x i s t ; 
so we can not conclude tha t if God 
did n o t , e x i s t the world would not 
e x i s t . " ' ' 
In order to shov/ the s i m i l a r i t y of the argument of 
Micholas to tha t of al-Ghazal i i t would be su f f i c ien t to 
compare the follov/ing l i n e s from Tahlfut with those i l l u s t -
rated above. V.'hile in i t ia t ing- the d iscuss ion on the problem 
1. Simon van den Bergh, TT, Vol. I , " In t roduct ion" , p.XXX-XXXI, 
2 . Nicholas of Autrecourt , The- Universal T r e a t i s e , t r ans la t ed 
by Kennedy Leonard A, and o thers (The Morquette Universi ty 
Press , Milwankee, ».'iscosin, 1971), p . ^2, See the t r ans r 
l a to r ' s ' comment in footnote 29 that the argument was 
recounted by a l -Ghaza l i . 
3 . o f . Gilson, Etfence , 0 £ . c l t , . p . 509 
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of c a u s a l i t y in the Seventeenth Chapter of Tahafut, 
a l -Ghazal i argues: 
"The aff irmation of one does not imply 
the aff irmation of the o ther ; nor does 
i t s denial imply the denia l of the 
o t h e r . The exis tence of one i s not 
necess i t a ted by the exis tence of the 
o ther ; nor i t s non-existence by the non-
existence of the o t h e r . " 
Asin Palacios has given a very painstaking account in 
order to show how the influence of al-Ghazali t r ave l l ed from 
Medieval to Modern per iod. He produces evidences to prove a l -
Ghazali ' s influence on Pasca l . For t h i s purpose he presents 
2 
eleven paragraphs, on the problems of the l i f e beyond and 
the e t e r n i t y which are common to both al-Ghazal i and Pascal. 
He also mentions the ideas in a l -Ghaza l i ' s works where from 
P a s c a l ' s ideas are der ived. However* he says that the problems 
discussed by al-Ghazal i are more c r i t i c . a l and pene t ra t ing than 
by Pasca l . Hov;ever, as we are told, not only in theological 
f i e l d , a l -Ghaza l i ' s works caused grea t impact in Phi losophical 
mode of tnought in the rt'est. His works were f i r s t t r ans l a t ed 
into Latin as enr ly as in the twelfth century and, so, cons i -
derably influenced the Jewish and the Chr is t ian scholas t ic ism. 
After Raymond Martin, who most f ree ly used a l -Ghaza l i ' s Tahafut 
1. Al-Ghaz'ali, Tahafut. p . 185. 
Ulken, H.Z., in M.M.Sharif's e d t . , o_£. c i t . . pp. 1364-6. 
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and Pasca l , Descartes i s orn,' o' the phi losophers of the 
I-:odern ;',^ ',o most influenced by a l -Ghaza l i . I t i s general ly 
taken to be beyond quest ion that the Cartes ian dictum "I 
tb.inl'., t he re fo re , I am" i s derived from tha t of a l -Ghazal i , 
"I v;ill^ there fore , I am" to which Descartes became acquinted 
through the Lat in t r a n s l a t i o n of al-Ghazal i works. I t may 
be nen'cloned here , by the way, tha t Descartes was a good 
scholar of Latin and that he wroce two of h is most important 
..orKG namely, i ' leditations de prima Philosophia and Pr inc ip ia 
rhi losoDhiae, in La t in , Again t;ie resemblance between a l -
v^nazoli 's al-I'iunqi(ili and Descar tes ' Discours de l a methode 
30 obvious that nobody can deny the influence of al-Ghazali 
on Descai'tes. ri.K.Sharif has given a large space to show ideas 
2 
matter , longua^^.e and examples common to both the books. This 
resembDance, r a the r imi t a t ion , i s so evident that Henry Lewis 
says that "had any t r a n s l a t i o n of i t exited in the days of 
Descartes, everyone would have cr ied out against the Plagiarism". ' 
On th i s s i m i l a r i t y H.M.Sharif comments: 
"If i t v/ere only H Tew fac t s of t h e i r 
autobiographies , t n e i r going, for example, 
to qu ie t e r placer^ lo r contemplation, and 
a few other things common to these works 
of al-Qijazali and .Descartes, they might 
be considered to have been due to mere 
coincidence, but wiien the e n t i r e plan of 
1. M.K.Sharif, I b i d . . p . 1382. 
2. I b i d . . p . 1382-4. 
3. cf. I b id . 
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t h e i r respec t ive works, the whole 
treatment of the subjec ts d iscussed, 
and the whole content of these 
subjects down to de ta i l ed arguments, 
examples, and r e l a t i v e l y unimportant 
mat te r s , culminating i n scept icism 
and in u l t imate discovery of the 
method of f inding the t r u t h , run 
p a r a l l e l to each o the r , i t becomes 
impossible to a t t r i b u t e a l l that to 
coinscidence In 
any case , whatever the f a c t s , in_our 
opinion the influence of ai^-Ghazali on 
Descartes^ Discours de l a methode i s 
ind ub i t able ."1 
Ki,M.Sharif mentions a number of other Modern Western 
Phi losophers even a f t e r Descartes also who have been very 
c lose to the ideas of a l-Ghazal i through e i t h e r d i r ec t or 
i n d i r e c t influence of him which may be b r i e f l y mentioned 
h e r e . Like Grescas, Bruno, Galileo and Descartes , Spinoza 
followed a l -Ghaza l i ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between the i n f i n i t e and 
i n d e f i n i t e . The idea of substance as something absolut ly 
simple without accidental q u a l i t i e s and d i s t i n c t i o n of genus and 
spec ies . And wi.thout s e p a r a b i l i t y of essence and exis tence , 
i s .just what a l -Ghazal i holds about the idea of God, We 
find only the terminological d i f ferences in t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a -
t ion of the views l i k e freedom of w i l l , necess i ty and pos s ib i -
l i t y r e t e n t i v e and composite memory e t c . The Philosophical 
elements common to al-Ghaz'ali and Leibniz can be traced in 
t h e i r ideas about the i r empirical r e a l i t y of tlie world, c l e a r 
and confused percep t ions , the u l t imate un rea l i t y of the concepts 
1. I b i d . , p . 1384, 
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of space and time which are simply the modes of r e l a t i o n s . 
Again in Kant we find the echo of a number of a l -Ghaza l i ' s 
views. Kant 's view on the insuff ic iency of the t heo re t i ca l 
reason to solve the quest ions concerning God. His At t r ibu te s , 
soul and the world, was s t rangely an t ic ipa ted by al-Ghazali 
with fu l l e labora t ion and covers more than half of the space 
in h is Tahafut. The nature of the t h e o r e t i c a l reason led Kant 
u l t ima te ly to declare the imposs ib i l i t y of r a t i o n a l cosmology, 
r a t i o n a l psychology and that of r a t i o n a l theology. Due to 
t h i s impression Kant turned h i s a t t e n t i o n towards p r a c t i c a l 
reason while a l -Ghazal i turned towards r e l i g i o u s and mystical 
experiences. Again, s i m i l a r l y , the a n t i c i p a t i o n of the whole 
eraperical t r a d i t i o n from Locke to Hume can be traced in a l -
Ghazal i . Like the empi r i c i s t s a l -Ghazal i also acknowledged 
the importance of the experience in the process of knowledge. 
However, he takes term'experience in a l i b e r a l sense as to 
include even the prophetic and s a i n t l y i n t u i t i v e experiences 
a l so . Thus he provides a grouna for the c e r t a i n t y of knowledge 
and escapes from the Humean pos i t ion . ' ^ 
I t hardly needs any mention that how c l e a r l y al-Ghazali 
an t i c ipa ted David Hume (d. 1776), the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s and 
some other modern and contemporary phi losophers . The crusades 
of al-Ghazal i and tha t of Hume against the old phi losophical 
1. Saeed Sheikh, M. , in M.M. Sharif ' s ed t , 0£. c_it., p . 595. 
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concepts l i ke exis tence of s n i r i t u a l and eve r l a s t i ng subs-
tance , u l t imate r e a l i t y of the ex te rna l world or that of 
matter , a type of necessary connection between cause and 
e f f ec t , and so on contain the equal force of argument. They 
agree at many other i ssues l i k e the bankruptcy of the phi loso-
phers to prove the exis tence of the Maker or the Agent of the 
world, the idea of the i n f i n i t y of space and time apart from 
the extension of tr.ings and succession of events in experience, 
the c e r t a i n l y of knowledge, the l i m i t a t i o n s of reason e t c . 
But tl-ie d i f ference between them i s tha t of a theologian and 
a scept ic in the rea l sense. There are many i s s u e s , l i k e 
exis tence of Ilaker of the world, which al-GhazsTli infact 
believed in but argued against them only in order to refute 
the basic p r i n c i p l e s , methods and assumptions of the Phi loso-
phers , This reac t ion was so le ly against the unnecessary and 
unjuslif i^-ble g l o r i f i c a t i o n of the c a p a b i l i t y of reason to 
solve even t.:ose problem which are infac t beyond i t s realm. 
So ol-Ghazal i , as i s c lea r from v;hat he s ta ted at the beginning 
of Tahaful, may or may not hold a view he infac t attacked on. 
But the 'consequent ' scept ic ism,as i t i s genera l ly known, of 
David Hume does i n f i c t doubt a l l tnese things both t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
and p r a c t i c a l l y . He doubted both reasons and reve la t ion ; but 
al-vih^zali found a haven in r . 've la t ion and f a i t h , Al-Ghazali 's 
scenticism may be compared with tha t of St, ^^ugustine Both l e f t 
the valuable records of their ' s p i r i t u a l quest . But s t i l l they 
nave a diffs rence, Wnereas St . Augustine remained fa i th fu l 
to philosophy tnrout,hout his J i f e , a l -Ghazal i u l t imate ly 
oecame a mystic. 
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Al-Ghazal i ' s explanat ion of the r e l a t i o n between 
cause and e f i ec t a n t i c i p a t e s M i l l ' s de sc r ip t ion of induction 
in a more c e r t a i n way. He also an t ic ipa ted Schopenhauer, 
Bergson, Jacobi and Schleiermacher. Like Schopenhauer he 
acknowledged w i l l , not thought, to be fundamental r e a l i t y . 
And l i k e Bergson and o t n e r s , he s t ressed on the importance of 
i n t u i t i o n in the process of immediate knowledge. 
Since i t i s d i f f i c u l t to prove how the mode of thought 
during the l a t e r period was d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y influenced 
by Tahafut, we can a t l e a s t show how they have one or another 
type of a f f i n i t y . And in t h i s connection there s t i l l remain 
two thinkers to be mentioned, namely, Henry Mansell (d .187 l ) , 
a d i s c i p l e of Hamilton, and Ri tschl (d. 1889). Developing 
Hamilton's doct r ine of the r e l a t i v i t y of knowledge, Mansell 
maintained that i t i s not poss ib le for us to have the i n f i n i t e 
or the absolute knowledge. Applying his method in the realm 
of theology, he s t ressed that our knowledge about the a t t r i b u t e s 
or the essence of God i s a l l r e l a t i v e . In h is approach^although 
Mansell uses scho las t i c method and tone, h is a t t i t u d e i s s imi lar 
2 _ 
to that of a l -Ghaza l i . I t can be said here tha t a l -Ghaza l i ' s 
pos i t ion is b e t t e r than that of Mansell in the sense tha t l a t t e r 
r e j e c t s the capab i l i t y of reason through reason, he cuts the 
same branch on which he s i t s ; while al-Ghaz'ali ge ts she l t e r in 
1. M.M.Sharif, 0£. c i t . , p . 1387. For an account of the 
influence of al-Ghazali on the '.Vest M.H.Zuberi 's Ar i s to t l e 
and Al-Ghazali (pp. 139 - 46) may be r e f e r r e d . 
?. Kacdonald, o_p, c i t . , p . 237. 
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haven of r ove l a ' i on , Rit;schl. on the other hand^ may be 
considered to be one of the mccern theologians who to some 
e x t e n t , has an a f f in i ty with al-G'hazali , He also r e j e c t s 
metaphysical exerc ises and phi losophica l in te rven t ions in 
the realm of theology. The r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n s , provided 
to us through r e v e l a t i o n s , are the ul t imate guide for a l l our 
r e l i g ious p e r p l e x i t i e s . Reason may be helpful to a c e r t a i n 
extent but a f te r that i t commits su i c ide . If reason exceeds 
i t s l i m i t , the information i t provides , i s qu i te vague and 
unsound. I t i s simply conjec ture . Like al-Ghazali , Ri tschl 
also adopts tne e t h i c a l a t t i t u d e and takes any piece of 
knowledge in terms of value. /iccording to Macdonald: 
"Or one point he C3l-Gha2"ali]I goes 
oeyund R i t s ch l , and, on o ther , Ri tschl 
goes beyond him. In h i s devotion to 
the fac ts of the r e l i g i o u s consciousness 
Ri tschl did not gx> far as to become a 
mystic, indeed i^ejected mysticism v;ith a 
conscious indignat ion; a l -Ghazzal i did 
become a mystic. But on the other hand, 
Ri tschl refused absolu te ly to en te r upon 
the nature of Cod or upon the d iv ine . " ' ' 
Al-Ghazal i ' s a t tack on tiie phi losopher , in t h i s way, 
influenced the mode of thoughi noth pos i t i ve ly as well as 
negat ive ly . I t i s l e s s negative than p o s i t i v e . Although he 
refuted the phi losophers , wii'K doing so, he himself used 
}>hilosophy. In fact his alt:io'-< on the phi losophers i s not an 
a t tack on philosophy as such^ riis r eac t ion i s against the 
1. I b i d . , p . 238. 
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dogmatic, u n c r i t i c a l and biased a t t i t u d e of the Muslim 
p e r i p a t e t i c s . He endeavoured to show the incons is tenc ies 
and lacunae in t h e i r pi^raises and conclusion. He wanted to 
pu l for th the f a l l a c i e s involved in t h e i r confused specula t ion . 
And, while doin^ so he spread the teaching of the phi losophers . 
I t became a way for i t s p u b l i c i t y a t general l e v e l . The ideas 
and tho views of Socra tes , P l a t o , A r i s t o t l e , Plot inus e t c . were 
no more taken then to be something e so te r i c and irapo__ssible to 
grasp . They become access ib le to the mental equipment of the 
common people. Philosophy^which previously was taken to be 
something!; belorvjing only to the previledged people of some 
spec ia l c l a s s , no more remained so reverend. He proved that 
any ordinary man can understand and produce philosophy without 
any prel iminary knov/ledge of i t by wri t ing Tahafut. The content 
method and the ai^guments of the Tah'afut possess no l e s s c l a r i t y 
of ideas , maLurity of thought and the log ica l exact i tude than 
any other f^reat philosophic-il work. The Tah'afut i s an endeavour 
of al-Ghazal i to bring philosophy and theology a b i t c lose r 
to epch other so tha t ' :ey T^ay be compared and contras ted pro-
pe r ly . He could ea s i l y captui e txhe f a l l a c i e s of the ph i loso-
n'l^rs T.d made i t pub l i c . Here 1 conclude by refer ing to 
I'.acdona] d: 
"he lea rapn b-^ ck from scho las t i c labours 
upon ineologica l dogmas to l i v ing contact 
v.'ith, study and exegesis of, the i^i/ord and 
the t r a d i t i o n s . .Vhat happened in Europe 
when the yoke of medieval scholas t ic ism 
was broken, wnat i s happening with us now, 
happened in Islam under h i s l e a d e r s h i p . He 
could be a scholas t ic with s c h o l a s t i c s , but 
to s t a t e and develop tneological doc t r ine on 
aScripLual basis was emphatically his method* 
«ve snould now ca l l him a Bib l i ca l theologian ." 
CONCLUSION 
The Tahafut a l - F a l a s i f a h r e p r e s e n t s the cu lmina t i on 
of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t a s k of a l - G h a z a l i . I t does belong to 
the pe r iod of f u l l m a t u r i t y i n h i s l i f e . I n i t he l e v e l l e d 
c e r t a i n l y a d e v a s t a t i n g a t t a c k on t h e i d e a s and d o c t r i n e s of 
Kuslim p e r i p a t e t i c t h i n k e r s . His approach i n h i s miss ion has 
been as d i a l e c t i c a l , s u b t l e and c r i t i c a l as any i n the h i s t o r y 
of p h i l o s o p h y , './hat i s p e c u l i a r w i th a l - G h a z a l i i s t h a t 
-although he r e f u t e s the p h i l o s o p h e r s and t h e i r sys tems , he i s 
no t a n t i - m e t a p h y s i c a l . Among contemporary p h i l o s o p h e r s t h e r e 
are a number of a n a l y t i c a l t h i n k e r s who from time to time 
launched campaigns a g a i n s t t r a d i t i o n a l ph i losophy and metaphy-
s i c s , G.E.Moore 's theory of common sense and h i s appeal i n 
f a v o u r of the or 'dinary l anguage , t he l o g i c a l atomism of Russe l l 
and e a r l y . " / i t tgens te in appea l to reduce the complex p r o p o s i t i o n s 
i n t o e lementa ry p r o p o s i t i o n s , A . J . A y e r ' s emphasis on the l i n g u -
i s t i c a n a l y s i s and h i s i dea of meaningfulness i n f e r r e d through 
v e r i f i a b i l i t y of the s t a t e m e n t , r educ t ion i sm and the idea of 
xlie u n i t y of s c i ence of Cornat and Neurath and many o t h e r 
^ h i l o s o r h i c a l t echn ioues are a l l a n t i - m e t a p h y s i c a l . The h o l d e r s 
c - r t e i n l y h--ve f>n extrprne d i s t n t e f o r metaphys ics and g r e a t 
r o s n e c t for s c i ence and m'^ t h e m a t i c s . But what seems to us 
very i n t e r e s t i n g fnct here i s i h a t a l - G h a z a l i a l so used almost 
a l ] such a n a l y t i c a l t o o l s ; but they no more e l i m i n a t e meta-
p h y s i c s . They r a t h e r confirm i t . Al-Ghazal i makes a s u c c e s s -
fu l a t tempt to prove t h a t the p h i l o s o p h i c a l methods are not 
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n e c e s s a r i l y meant against the r e l i g ious dogmas. They may be 
used as to support r e l i g i o n . And t h i s depends on one 's c a l i b r e 
as how to deal with them. This i s the reason, what we find 
in the Tahafut, th^t a l -Ghazal i provides a more c e r t a i n ground 
to the orthodox doc t r ines l i k e bodily r e s u r r e c t i o n , Divine 
kncdedge , Divine A t t r i bu t e s , c r ea t ion of the world, the 
concept of miracles and so on. 
The conf l i c t between the philosophers and al-Ghazali i s 
i n f a c t a con f l i c t between the tool of reason and the vehic le 
of f a i t h . But in t h i s s t r i f e a l -Ghazal i also uses reason 
against i t s e l f . The pos i t ion of a l -Ghaza l i ,never the less , i s 
s t ronger than tha t of the phi losophers . I t also includes the 
testimony of the hea r t . He i n d i r e c t l y a s s e r t s that the r e l ig ious 
dogmas are beyond any d i s p u t e . He considered f a i t h and love 
to be the fundamental v i r t u e s . Faith i s based on w i l l . I t 
i s the condi t ion of the Divine Grace. Bare i n t e l l e c t f a i l s 
to explain the mystries of the dogmas. An over-confidence on 
the power of the i n t e l l e c t may lead a person towards i n f i d e l i t y ; 
but f a i t h i s the most r e l i a b l e instrument against a l l h e r e t i c a l 
and un- re l ig ious forces , Ho\vever, a l -Ghazal i also believed 
that reason, if properly employed, could c e r t a i n l y succeed to 
be in harmony with r e l i g i o n . And t h i s was h is pro jec t in 
Tahafut, 
Now, at the end, l e t us r e c a p i t u l a t e the essence of the 
problems discussed so f a r . The Tahafut i s a unique combina-
tion of the i.^etaohys i c a l problems and the epistemological 
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methodology. At the gross l.vel we find it to be a dialectical 
criticism of the metaphysical problems under twenty heads. But 
when we deeply go through this we find that the epistemological 
issues of equal importance are very intelligently intermingled 
with those of metaphysical. The whole discussion may be kept 
under five gross categories: 
1). The problems concerning the existence, nature and 
powers of God. Under it we include the problems 
from point 3rd to 13th. 
2). The problems concerning the nature of the world. 
It consists of the points, 1st, 2nd, l4th and 15th. 
3). The problems concerning the nature of soul. It 
includes the points l6th, 18th and 19th. 
h), The problems concerning the natural law which 
consists of the 17th point; and 
5). The problems concerning the life after death under 
the 20th discussion. 
Al-Ghazali prefers to start his discussions with the 
problem of the eternity of the world. This initiative infact 
is meaningful. The discussion under this head, which consists 
of one sixth of Llie total space of the book, anticipates almost 
all the succeeding problems in one or the other way. In the 
sixceedin/; arguments, like t'-i-l gainst the philosopners' view 
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t h a t God i s the Agent and the IlaRer of the v/orld, t he i r 
proofs for His exis tence as a c rea to r or cause of the v/orld. 
His necessary ex i s tence , and against s imi la r other phi losophical 
i s s u e s , al-Ghazali i l l u s t r a t e s t h e i r incompatible pos i t ion in 
the fii^st proolem, v iz , the e t e r n i t y of the world. He frequently 
uses t h i s as argument urn ad hominem. This proved, i n fac t , very 
important weapon of al-Ghazali against the phi losophers . The 
notion of the e t e r n i t y of tne world b a s i c a l l y does not allow 
i : s holder to propound the concept of d i v i n i t y simultaneously 
unless he intr-oduces an onLological dualism, i , e . the world 
i s e t e rna l as v/ell as God i s e t e r n a l . But the problem is yet 
not solved. The concept of an e t e r n a l dualism i s s u i c i d a l . 
I t e n t a i l s a number of other uncompromising i s s u e s . Two, or 
more then two, things can not be e t e rna l simultaneously. The 
e t e r n i t y of one would l imi t the e t e r n i t y of the other which 
is con t r aa i c t ion in terms, for by e t e rna l v/e understand some-
thing v/iiich i s not being l imi ted by any other th ing . Moreover 
the concept of the e t e rn i t y of the world i s not compatible with 
ti iat of God for another reason, v i z . due to t h e i r na ture . The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and the world i s that of between 
s p i r i t and mat ter . In t h i s sense the concept of the e t e r n i t y 
of both of then would mean that they have been e t e r n a l l y 
coex i s t en t , and tha t the ro le of God in the c rea t ion of the 
world i s simply that of a des igner . But the r e l a t i o n between 
the designer and the designed, the i n t e l l i g e n t and the uncon-
scious i s very d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h . The same problem we 
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a re en.cuuntered with in Samkiiya system of Indian philosophy 
where a l l at tempts to show ;;ho r-elationship between Puruga 
and P r a k r t i , soul and matter , f a l l apa r t . Neither any 
mechanical nor a t e l e o l o g i c a l explanat ion i s capable to do 
t h i s . Tliere a r e , no doubt, c e r t a i n systems which hold the 
s p i r i t u a l dualism, l i k e Madhva School of Vedanta and Shaivism^ 
again, in Indian philosophy. But in these systems a l so , despi te 
both the r e a l s are s p i r i t u a l , the i r holders e i t h e r take recourse 
to so:ne mystical and non-philosophical methods for es tab l i sh ing 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p or to introduce the concept of a higher 
being in which t h e i r dua l i ty i s u l t imate ly merged. 
The e t e r n a l by d e f i n i t i o n means beginningless as well 
as endless . Thus, to t a lk about the c r ea t ion which the ph i lo -
sophers already hold as somef:!i.ng e t e r n a l , envolves con t rad ic -
t i on . In o ther v/ordsy o r ig in c.ud e t e r n i t y are incompatible 
with each o the r . So, i t i s noi the pene t ra t ive sk i l l of a l -
Ghazali alone tha t i s respons ib le for the des t ruc t ion of the 
philosoDhers but also the inh^ rent incons i s tenc ies in the 
ideas of the Muslims p e r i p a t e t i c s . They take Ar i s to t e l i an 
a>cioms as such and t r e a t tneii. to oe above any d i spu t e . All 
of their four arguments, as al- jhaza l i p r e sen t s , ba s i ca l ly 
commit t h i s e r r o r . Their fa . i ' u i . for example, to think why 
Gon did not crente the '-.'orlo r ,,-iure the time he ac tua l ly did 
so, to find a cause m the wil j. <)f God, to think of delay in 
occurence of the e f fec t , and .;<? oi:, are the inev i t ab l e conse-
quences of t l :e i r dogmatic fr^^'-A lulness to A r i s t o t l e . At one 
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place in the same argument, in place of inferring the reality 
of time from motion, they appear to infer the reality of 
motion from the idea of time. Similarly, they think that 
their idea of possibility must have some actual substratum. 
This notion leads them to hold the reality of matter as subs-
tratum of the possible world. And that was what they wanted 
to prove in their argument for the eternity of the world. 
But their idea of 'possibility' is basically illogical. A 
possible being, by definition, is that which neither exists 
nor does not exist. And such a concept violates both the 
laws of Aristotle himself, viz., the Law of Contradiction 
and The Lav/ of Excluded Middle. The argument anticipates 
another similar argument given by St, Anselm. St, Anselm, in 
his ontological argument to prove the existence of God, tries 
to prove the actual existence of the most perfect being from 
the idea of most perfect possible being. Later on, same 
thing was done by Descartes in a more rationalized fashion. 
However, what the peripatetic philosophers overlooked as to 
think that their line of thought, whether it is Aristotelian 
or Plutonian, may not be accepted by a thinker who rejects 
the authority of their ideals. Al-Ghazali raised, like Moore 
and Ryle in our time, questions against their fundamental 
philosophical concepts. His scepticism did not allow him to 
accept any of the traditional axioms and hypotheses without 
examining their truth carefully. And this, certainly, shook 
the whole edifice of the traditional mode of thought. 
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In Tahafut we experience the culmination of the Kalam 
controversy on the Unity of Gjd. The Mu^taz i l i te — Ash 'a r i t e 
--onflict on Divine Esf'ence and the Divine At t r ibute seems, at 
l e a s t p a r t i a l l y , solved here . Al-Ghazali agrees with the 
Mu^taz i l i t es that c e r t a i n de sc r ip t i ons in the Qur^'an are 
obviously metaphorical . The desc r ip t ions l i k e God's having 
hands, ears e t c , should not be taken l i t e r a l l y . But from th i s 
we are by no means j u s t i f i e d to infer tha t o ther a t t r i b u t e s 
ascribed to Him are a l l metaphorical . In h is arguments a l -
Ghazali appears to have agreed to hold that a t t r i b u t e s depend 
on essence. But th is does not prevent us to maintain t h e i r 
n e c e s s i t y . In other words, ciccording to al-Ghazali,dependence 
and necess i ty are both compatible with eachother because 
from a necessary being the philosophers mean a being that does 
not have an e f f i c i en t cause. In the second argument in t h i s 
discussion al-^^hazali makes i t r i e a r that if the a t t r i b u t e s 
^y^Q regarded to be subordinnte to the essence, the philosophers 
c-^ n not infor from th i s the : the l a t t e r i s the e f f i c i en t cause 
of the '-^ttribuLe. In the support of his argument he gives a 
number of re-^^sons. This obviously i s the r e j ec t ion of the 
rpnf^ral d e f i n i t i o n of the necessary being which i s supposed to 
be the cause of the continf';enc neings, Al-Ghazali here too 
uses t'.io or,,umentum ad homlnem. He argues that the a t t r i b u t e s 
of Ltod der)enri on riis esronce, t tney are necessary because 
tnoy do not h':ve any e f f i c i en t cause. 
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T!io controve.'sy on the ni-oblem of Divine Knowledge 
is mainly due to the confusion that arose due to the ambiguity 
invo]ved in Ibn S ina ' s term "the Universal way". Ibn Sina 
appears to hpve held that Divine Knowledge i s not perceptual 
or sensuous and that i t is to ta l ly d i f fe ren t from tha t of us . 
God knows everything about each and every p a r t i c u l a r v^ithout 
any reference to spat io- temporal cond i t ions . Since space and 
time are p r inc ip l e s of ind iv idua t ion or p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n , 
God knows things in a universa l way. He e t e r n a l l y knows every 
ind iv idua ls and the happenings concerned v;ith them. Now, 
as for t h i s in te r 'p ro ta t ion , we do not find anything so ser ious 
on the bas i s of v/hich i t s pi-opounder may be accused of committ-
ing herecy. But what al-Ghazal i understands by the notion 
that God does not know the pai- t icular ac t ion , say i n f i d e l i t y 
of a p a r t i c u l a r person i s tha t He knows only that the in f ide l i t y 
of a c lass of people and not of individuals. Now i f both 
the poss ib le i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Ibn Sina and al-Ghazali mentioned 
above are co r r ec t , the l a t t e r seems to have missed the essence 
of what the former infact meant. Yet the use of the term 
universa l may be protested her-e because i t does not give us 
the exact denota t ive meaning as i t apparently promises. I t may 
p ro jec t divergent and uncertajji h i e r a r ch i ca l fac ts as i s c l ea r 
from P l a t o ' s concept of idea,;.' In h is account of the hierarchy 
of the ideas , every pai ' t icular c l a s s from the lov/est to the 
hi_,hest i s univej^sal. So the ^.imple use of the term ' un ive r sa l ' 
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does not neces -a r i l y lend us ro one p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s than the 
another . Similar ly Ibn S ina ' s use of the terra ' un ive r sa l way' 
as the metl-od of knowledge of the act ions of p a r t i c u l a r s , gives 
us man '^ mannings l i k e ' a p a r t i c u l a r ac t ion of a l l the pe r sons ' , 
' a l l the act ions of a p a r t i c u l a r person' ' a l l the act ions of 
a l l the persons ' and so on. Thus the meaning that al-Ghaz"ali 
der ives fi^ om Ibn S ina ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was not qui te un-
p r e d i c t a b l e , 
Al-Ghazali appears to have developed extreme d i s t a s t e 
for most of the fundamental phi losophical i dea s . His a t t i t u d e 
towards the concept of c a u s a t i o n . i s one of them. He denounced 
the idea of necessary connection between cause and e f f ec t . 
The pos i t ion of al-Ghazali in t h i s respect i s s t ronger than 
t h a t of Hume. I t becomes c i ea r when on one occasion Hume, 
while defininn a cause, s t a t e s tha t a cause i s something 
precedent an'' contit-uous to another and so united with i t 
that the idea of one determines mind to form the idea of other 
and the impression of one to foj-m a more l i v e l y idea of the 
l a t t e r . './e see that while r'?jHcting the idea of cause Hume 
i n d i r e c t l y accepts i t in the .vox-ld of i deas . His use of the 
word 'determine ' evident ly imT>lJp'S tha t in the mental world 
he acknc 'ed^es i'lo r e a l i t y of some force v/hich compels mind 
to form the idee of ar. e f f e c i . But a l -Ghaza l i ' s pos i t ion i s 
compact as well as .iouble pd, ' . J . On the one hand, he ascr ibes 
the causal cf:^icaC" to me pC/cn of God who may or may not 
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l e t happen the na tura l consequences. On the other hand 
ne m?Keb an invulnerable room for the explanat ion of the 
n i i c c l e s . All miracles are n u u r a l because they take place 
in accordajnce \; i th the v/ill of God to v/hich obey each and 
every nptur^!! laws. S imilar lv a l l na tu ra l events are 
miraculous for both the socal led na tura l and the miraculous 
h-^ve a com'ion source. However, a l - ' jhaz 'a l i ' s r e j e c t i o n of the 
idea of causal connection was the f i r s t systematic revol t 
against the t r ada t i ona l H e l l e n i s t i c mode of thought. I t s 
e f f ec t , d i r ec t as well as i n d i r e c t , has been t raced , by and 
l a r g e , in the contemporary period of phi losophica l th inking, 
A]-Gnazali 's c r i t i c i s m of tne phi losophers ' account of 
human psychology i s mainly fiui.i tv/o p o i n t s , v i z . immater ia l i ty 
and immortality of the soul . He has given arguments against 
both tne concepts . One thin^, which has been remarkable from 
tne oeginning to the end of tne Tah'af ut in tha t a l -Ghaza l i ' s 
approach \/as jus t c r i t i c a l . On many i s sues he appears to 
nave acKnowled,f_od the phi losophers ' view at some places or in 
h i s other works; but for the sake of the r e f u t a t i o n of the 
philosophers he adopts the reversed p o s i t i o n . If we keep 
the objec t ive of Tah'af u t , n-^mely, the re fu ta t ion of the 
nhi losophors , m our mind,we 'ould not see a con t rad ic t ion 
oet\/een wh t^ a l-Ghazal i ai gued in the Nineteenth Chapter, 
n-^-nely, the r e fu ta t ion of the pi i i iosophers ' t hes i s that a f t e r 
ic^vinr come into eyis tence t -> human soul can not be destroyed. 
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what he appears to have admitted during the d iscuss ion on the 
concept of the bodily r e s u r r e c t i o n , in the Tv/entieth Chapter 
i s th3t the human soul i s immoi-tal. For a l -Ghazal i the wi l l 
i s one oi the most fundamental T:rinciples of the metaphysics. 
And the Divine Will i s the key LO a l l the theologica l metapny-
s i c a l complexi t ies . This he appl ies to the controversy of 
the irnr-'i^terialiLy ana the immortali ty of sou l s . The soul may 
or may not be eve r l a s t ing foi- i t i s the wi l l of God which 
nakes i t so . And the same i s appl icable to i t s being s p i r i t u a l . 
Tne soul may or may not continue to be r ea l a f t e r the d i s en t e -
gra t ion of the physical body. Hence, so far the factor of 
Divine .vill is associated v/itii ^ne imiLortality of the soul , 
the p o s s i b i l i t y for the support of the view of epiphenomenalism 
may not c a t e g o r i c a l l y be Kept aside in h i s treatment of the 
r e a l i t y of the self af ter dea th , Hov/ever, Al-Ghaz'ali i s very 
s t r i c t to favour the l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Quranic 
verses about the bodily r e s u r r e c t i o n . His uncompromising 
a t t i t u d e in t n i s matter leads to him to be charge the 
herecy against the Muslim p e r i p a t e t i c s . His reference to the 
iioly Book makes his pos i t ion h-- .-.r-ong at t h i s point that 
t^ ven Ibn Rushd in Tah~fut~al-V -.i^.lut touches t h i s issue very 
s l i g h t l y . riiG nvoidancc of . ' .-^I'ious d iscuss ion by Ibn 
lUisiia on t h i s topic hecomes 'iii-i-fe v i s i b l e wiien we find him 
to depl .,itb. the isnue m .•-•one ciic-rt paragraphs only. Since 
',1-G:i^zali b'-lieved in the ider ui the bodily r e su r rec t ion 
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l i t e r a l l y , v/e nre bound ':o iniex tha t ne also believed 
in the inir..ortality of huinnn boln^i, otherv/ise the viev/s that 
body is ciiff^rent from the soul would be incompatible with 
e-'ch o the r . And i l t h i s i s the case , v/e should take h is 
argunents r-^cinst the immortality in the Nineteenth Chapter 
as instrumental for the r e fu ta t ion of the phi losophers , t h e i r 
log ic and methods. However, there seems very l i t t l e doubt 
on the e>:isti-nce of the soul a f te r death . The r e a l matter 
of controvoi sy ic Fbout the r e su r r ec t ion of body, i . e . , 
whether the soul \^i l l receive the same physique which i t 
;^reviously had or a r ep l i ca of i L. Like most of the Chr is t ian 
thinr.ors pl-Gha^~li also supports the view in favour of the 
r e p l i c a , accoi^ding to him i t i s soul , not body, t ha t makes 
» "lan v/hat he i s . Dut s t i l l he argues that i t depends on the 
Divine >/ill v;hether or not the soul should receive the previous 
body with tne same mater ia l c o n s t i t u e n t s . He claims that i t 
i s within tJic r-n^.-e of the Divine Power that i t can provide with 
tne same physical body whiich was decomposed and reduced into 
dust a f t e r death . Thus both tlie i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are acceptable 
to al-Gnaz"ali. Moreover-, on tht desc r ip t ions of Paradise and 
".iell also h is approach is almost l i t e r a l . To him the pleasure 
and happiness promised in the Paradise and the pain and torment 
threptened in the Hell are a l l t rue jus t as described in the 
Our^ an. Any attempt to give a s p i r i t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
them, in the view of a l -Ghazal i , i s v io l?c ive to the re l ig ious 
law. 
?0G 
I f we exclude the problem of CJod's knowledge of the 
p a r t i c u l a r s on the ground of the ambiguity involved due to 
the use of terms, there remain two i ssues in Tah'afut on the 
ground of which al-Ghazal i l e v e l s the charge of heresy on the 
philosopi:iers, v i z . , the e t e r n i t y of the world and t h e i r denial 
of the bodily r e su r r ec t i on and that of the metaphorical i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of the desc r ip t ions of Paradise and He l l . So far 
the pos i t ion of Ibn Rushd on r e s u r r e c t i o n i s concerned he 
thinks that the descripLion of the l i f e beyond in mater ial 
1 
sense i s more appropria te than in purely s p i r i t u a l sense. 
He quotes a verse p a r t i a l l y from the Qur* an (XIII , 35) and 
two t r a d i t i o n s which favour the l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
Paradise and He l l . In h i s own opinion those who doubt r e l ig ious 
p r i n c i p l e s end i n t e r p r e t them in such a way as to cont rad ic t 
v/hat the Prophets of t he i r relip;ions have taught must be 
2 
punished with the cnarge of i n f i d e l i t y . On the question of 
al-Gha<i^li' s charge of heresy on the philosophers Ibn Rushd 
f a i l s to r e fe r to .^ ny philosopher who had denied the bodily 
r e s u r r e c t i o n . I t seems th^t in t h i s d iscuss ion al-Ghaz?li 
\/as mainly concerned with those who are against l i t e r a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and we have already discussed t h i s problem in 
the th i id chapter in d e t a i l . However, Ibn Rushd, at the end 
of Tahafut-al-Tahafut accuses a l -Ghazal i to have been confused.^ 
1. Ibn Rusha, TT, p . 361. 
2. I b i d . , p . 360. 
3. I b i d . , p . 362. 
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He says that al-Ghaz"?,!! in nis book MJzan-al-^amal (Balance 
of action) has justified ihe sufis' concept of spiritual 
resurrection on the basis of universal consent (Ijma^); while 
in Tahafut he asserts that no Muslim believes in the spiritual 
resurrection. His l?:tter view contradicts his former view. 
Again, if Sufis are exempted from the charge of heresy by 
universal ccnsept, the philosophers also should get this benefit. 
So, according to the Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazali's own position is 
inconsistent. Here, if we look at the problem of resurrec-
tion -without being biased towards or against any of the two 
camps, we can say that the Qur'anic verses on this problem 
should neither be taken in pure spiritual sense nor in pure 
material or perceptual sense. Some of the verses like ascrip-
tion of perceptual organs to God, are certainly metaphorical 
and they should not be interpreted literally. But, so far 
descriptions about Paradise and Hell are concerned, both types 
of interpretations are available in plenty. However, al-
Ghazali's position in Tahafut seems preferable. So far the 
charge of heresy is concerned, here we can only say, as we 
saw in the third chapter, there have been many Muslim intellec-
tuals who held the concept of spiritual resurrection without 
being accused of any charge^ :^ t least, for such interpretation. 
But on the problem of the eternity of the world the position 
of the philosophers, as al-Ghazali points out, is basically 
1 .^  Not only in Tahafut, but in his another work also al-Ghazali 
attacked on the denial of the concept of bodily resurrection. 
of. Van den Berg, TT, Vol. II, pp. 562-4. 
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vulnerab le from 10r:ical point of view and i s c e r t a i n l y 
i nco mp-^  t ib] e ^'ith the r c l i , i o u s do '^ma of Islam, 
Tah^f u t , unaoubtedly, is -^  -^reat masterpiece of I t s 
t i r . e . Besides i t s ph i l o sop l i i c i l va lue , i t represents some 
very imoortant aspects of our day to day l i f e . At a time 
•^ 'hen the i deolo^'icp] d i f ferences are p reva i l ing throughout 
al] the ethic-.1 and rnor.'il r-spf^cts of our l i f e v;e find the 
Taha'fut as a monument of f a i t h . I t represented the same 
mis-^-ion as that of e x i s t e n t i a l i s n in our t ime, i , e . , i t seeks 
T^  under'^ ^ t-^nr' the meaning of the r e a l i t y , not through reason 
oi l o g i c , but throu/h reve la t ion and e x i s t e n t i a l experience. 
The main ob.lective of the I'alia'fut i s to prove the insuff ic iency 
of reason to guide to the ul t imate t r u t h . But those c r i t i c s 
,.'ho, on t.he basis of t n i s fc^ct, conclude that i t deal t a death 
blow to ihe development of philosophy in the Muslim world are 
c e r t a i n l y , not j u s t i f i e d , Th-ir conclusion i s the r e su l t of 
l-^ck of i n s i r n t to t r r c e out the main role of reason in Tahaf u t . 
However, al-Gn?'/:ali i s , what /an den Ber'g says , ba s i ca l l y a 
mu^  min, a t rue be l iever in i'luslim law. His hear t submits to 
a t r u t h , to a reason h is reason does not know, *His theology 
is the philosophy of the near t in which there i s expressed 
man's fear and lone l iness and hi? feel ing of dependence on an 
line.erst-^ndj n,^ ' and loving Being to whom he can appeal from the 
derjt 's of his despa i r , and whose mercy i s i n f i n i t e ' . On the 
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i n n o r t a n c e nf a l - G h a 2 ~ l i ' s T a h a f u t - a l - F a l ' a s i f a h F a t h e r 
Bouyt^.es s-'^ys: 
"The T a h a f o t w i l ] r e m a i n , as I h o p e , 
a u s e f u l i n s t r u m e n t i n t h e s t u d y of 
t h e most p a s s i o n a t e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
Q-pf^ riiT r.t 1 nnQ . t h o s e which e n -
d e a v o u r t o knov/ God,"'^ 
Tomen, u e o r g e J . , "The Climax of a P h i l o s o p h i c a l C o n f l i c t 
i n I s l a m " , The [•luslim World ( 1 9 5 2 ) , Vo l . X L I I , No. 3 , p . 1 7 5 . 
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